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INTRODUCTION
A FFIRMATIVE action has come under attack locally,' state-
wide,2 and federally.3 During this same period, critical race femi-
nists have brought into sharp relief how women of color are marginal-
ized or erased in discourses over sex and gender, as well as over race
and ethnicity.4 Despite these protests and warnings, the current de-
1. See Ed Mendel, Effort Has High Cost as CSUSM Found Out, San Diego
Union-Trib., Apr. 13, 1995, at A-i; Steve Schmidt, Programs That Help Kids Plan For
College May End, San Diego Union-Trib., Mar. 19, 1995, at B-1.
2. On November 5, 1996, 54.3% of California voters voted in favor of Thomas E.
Wood and Glynn Custred's ironically titled California Civil Rights Initiative
("CCRI"), thus assuring its victory. Bill Jones, Secretary of State of California, State-
ment of Vote, Nov. 6, 1996. CCRI amends the state constitution to prohibit both
discrimination and preferences on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and national
origin in public education, state contracts, and employment, thereby gutting Califor-
nia's affirmative action programs. Cal. Const. art. I, § 31(a). Opponents immediately
filed suit to block implementation of CCRI, and Judge Thelton Henderson granted
interim relief, issuing a temporary restraining order on November 27, 1996, and a
preliminary injunction on December 23, 1996. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson,
No. C 96 4024 TEH, 1996 WL 691962 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 1996); Coalition for Econ.
Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), injunction vacated and stay
denied as moot, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3316, 66 U.S.L.W.
3324 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1997).
In other state action, at Governor Pete Wilson's urging, the regents of the Univer-
sity of California ("UC") voted to support a proposal by regent Ward Connerly, a
Wilson appointee, to eliminate race-based preferences for purposes of admissions and
faculty appointments (the regents voted for it 14-10 on July 20, 1995). See Dave
Lesher & Amy Wallace, UC Vote to End Affirmative Action Echoes Across U.S., L.A.
Times, July 22, 1995, at Al. Interestingly enough, more than twice as many students
admitted at UC schools are children of alumni (13%), than are admitted through
affirmative action programs (6%). Who Benefits From Affirmative Action?, Affirma-
tive Action California: Why It Is Still Necessary (ACLU, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and San Diego, CA), Sept. 1995, at 2, 6 [hereinafter Who Benefits From Affirmative
Action?]. Even more interestingly, Governor Wilson, as well as many of the same
regents who publicly oppose affirmative action because it results in preferences have
reportedly "acted behind the scenes to try to get relatives, friends and children of
business partners enrolled into UCLA." UC Regents Aided Own, Paper Says, San
Diego Union-Trib., Mar. 17, 1996, at A-3. No one, however, seems to be crying foul
over reverse discrimination resulting from these types of preferences.
3. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Robert Shogan,
Affirmative Action Stirs Unforeseen Division in GOP, L.A. Times, August 20, 1995, at
Al. Former Senator Dole also proposed a federal bill similar to CCRI. See Equal
Opportunity Act of 1995, S. 1085, 104th Cong. (1996). Various bills have also been
submitted in the House of Representatives. See American Action Act of 1995, H.R.
1840, 104th Cong. (1995); Act to End Unfair Preferential Treatment, H.R. 1764, 104th
Cong. (1995).
4. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 150 ("Unable to grasp the impor-
tance of Black women's intersectional experiences, [courts and feminist and civil
rights thinkers] have treated Black women in ways that deny both the unique com-
poundedness of their situation and the centrality of their experiences to the larger
classes of women and Blacks."); Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the
Importance of Race: The Implications of Making Comparisons Between Racism and
Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 Duke L.J. 397, 401, 404-05 (stating that comparisons
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bate over affirmative action continues this history of invisibility, per-
petuating America's spoken and unspoken conceptions about where
women of color belong. For example, most discussion of affirmative
action focuses on race,5 more specifically on African-Americans. 6
Some discussion looks at gender.7 To date, however, the affirmative
action dialogue has not focused on women of color, resulting in a con-
between race and gender discrimination fail because the experiences of women of
color are unique); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 585 (1990) ("[T]he experience of black women is too often ig-
nored both in feminist theory and in legal theory."). Richard Delgado noted that this
discussion by critical race feminists is part of a trend which "consists of subdivision
within outsider groups that at one time saw themselves as unitary. Within feminism,
for example, women of color are beginning to question whether the agenda of a
white, middle-class-dominated woman's movement speaks adequately to their con-
cerns." Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 741, 753 (1993).
5. See, eg., Paul Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Three Theories,
72 Iowa L. Rev. 281 (1987) (discussing affirmative action in context of race); Richard
Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want To Be
A Role Model?, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1222 (1991) (same); Arval A. Morris, New Light on
Racial Affirmative Action, 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 219 (1987) (discussing effects of
recent Supreme Court decisions on racially conditioned affirmative action programs);
see also sources cited infra note 9 (discussing affirmative action generally).
6. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (1991)
(describing effects of affirmative action programs on African-Americans); Richard F.
America, Has Affirmative Action Repaid Society's Debt To African Americans?, 94
Bus. & Soc. Rev. 57 (1995) (characterizing affirmative action as payment of restitu-
tion to African-Americans); Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action For
Whom?, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 855, 855 (1995) (discussing how affirmative action "was ini-
tially conceived as a remedy to benefit African Americans"); M. Varn Chandola, Af-
firmative Action in India and the United States: The Untouchable and Black
Experience, 3 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 101 (1992) (comparing affirmative action
and discrimination against blacks in the United States with compensatory discrimina-
tion and discrimination against "untouchables" in India). Recent scholarship, how-
ever, also looks at affirmative action for other minority groups. See, e.g., Selena Dong,
"Too Many Asians:" The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian-Ameri-
cans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1027 (1995) (discussing how
affirmative action affects Asian-Americans); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White:
Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. Third World L.. 225 (1995) (argu-
ing that affirmative action should consider other minority groups in addition to Afri-
can-Americans).
7. See, e.g., John Galotto, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 Colum. L
Rev. 508 (1993) (arguing that strict scrutiny should apply to gender-based affirmative
action); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 Stan. L Rev.
1163, 1196-1202 (1988) [hereinafter Rhode, Perspectives] (discussing how affirmative
action has been advocated as a means to achieve gender equality); Judith C. Appel-
baum, Gender Goals: Affirmative Action is Needed Now, Afore Than Ever, to Neutral-
ize Subtle and Not-So-Subtle Biases Against Women, Legal Times, May 1, 1995, at 28
(stating that affirmative action has played a critical role in creating opportunities for
women and minorities); Helen Norton, Affirmative Action Still A Vital Tool for Wo-
men, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 14, 1995, at A19 (same); M.A. Stapleton, Women-Oriented Af-
firmative Action Also May Fall Under Anti-Preference Spotlight: Experts, Chi. Daily
L. Bull., July 12, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Chidlb File (discuss-
ing effects of Supreme Court decisions on gender-based affirmative action programs).
Discussion of gender, however, remains limited. "In discussions of affirmative action
in the 1980s, little attention was given to overcoming the hurdle of gender bias."
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tinuation of the "nobodying the other" phenomenon described by
Professor Anthony Farley.'
This article attempts to rectify this omission by demonstrating that
women of color constitute a category of identity uniquely implicated
in the affirmative action debate.9 The story of women of color told in
this article shows that without affirmative action the odds are greater
that they will remain in the economic underclass, their acquisition of
power will be hampered, and their subordinated status will be perpet-
uated.1" In telling their story, this article strives to change the status
Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect Wo-
men Faculty, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 67, 72 (1994).
8. Professor Farley discussed this during a panel presentation entitled "Race and
Representation: Racial Imagery in the Law and Media," Western Law Teachers of
Color Conference, Mar. 22, 1996. He stated that intrepid explorers (that is, those
from dominant cultures) acquire their power through the process of "nobodying"
others (that is, those from subordinated cultures).
9. It is impossible to do so without discussing the merits of affirmative action
more broadly. This article's focus, nonetheless, remains on affirmative action for wo-
men of color. For a general discussion of affirmative action, see Bryan K. Fair, Notes
of a Racial Caste Baby: Color Blindness and the End of Affirmative Action (1997);
see also Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1988) (challenging legal scholars to
both reject traditional methods of teaching and scholarship as the only acceptable
methods and to embrace diverse methods of teaching and scholarship); Douglas D.
Scherer, Affirmative Action Doctrine and the Conflicting Messages of Croson, 38 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 281 (1990) (identifying and analyzing four basic types of equal protec-
tion cases, including remedial, race-conscious affirmative action); Michael Selmi, Test-
ing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L.
Rev. 1251 (1995) (examining the assumption that test scores correlate with merit in
the affirmative action debate, as well as relationship between efficiency and voluntary
affirmative action programs); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Sins of Discrimination:
Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78 (1986) (applying a sin-
based paradigm to Supreme Court decisions which only require affirmative action
penance for past sins). For a discussion of affirmative action in legal academia, see
Brest & Oshige, supra note 6; Lino A. Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally
Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 351 (1970); Duncan Kennedy, A Cul-
tural Pluralist Case For Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 Duke L.J. 705;
Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745 (1989)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Racial Critiques]; Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Af-
firmative Action, 1990 Duke L.J. 1157; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Comment, Posner
on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White Authority in the Legal Academy, 41
Duke L.J. 1095 (1992); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 Yale L.J. 1357
(1992) (reviewing Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex
on Campus (1991)). For a discussion of enforcement of affirmative action, see Robert
A. Bohrer, Bakke, Weber and Fullilove: Benign Discrimination and Congressional
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 Ind. L.J. 473 (1981); James E. Jones,
Jr., Twenty-One Years of Affirmative Action: The Maturation of the Administrative
Enforcement Process Under the Executive Order 11,246 as Amended, 59 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 67 (1982); john a. powell, An Agenda for the Post-Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 889 (1995).
10. I do not intend to essentialize women of color. I agree with Angela Harris
that gender and racial essentialism oversimplify experiences of women and people of
color into basic mathematical formulas, predicated on univocal essential experiences.
See Harris, supra note 4, at 588. Women of color exist in every economic class. There
are some powerful women of color, and some women of color who do not think they
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of women of color in two ways. First, by ensuring that the ongoing
discourse over affirmative action includes women of color as vocal
participants, storytellers, and agents of active change. Second, by ar-
guing that various forms of affirmative action should remain in place
specifically for women of color.
To enhance the equal availability of opportunities, to work towards
inclusion, and to obtain positions of power for women of color, wo-
men of color must overcome structural, normative, and pragmatic hur-
dles. One hurdle arises from the movement to eliminate affirmative
action." Affirmative action, by recognizing ingrained patterns of dis-
crimination and exclusion, is one of the few existing paths to improv-
ing the position of many women of color through its use of race and
gender-conscious remedies. While it is not a panacea and should be
considered together with other measures, it has made a difference in
many lives and should remain as a way for women of color to break
out of the colored feminization of poverty, to gain access to institu-
tional power sources, and to elevate the status of women of color.
Affirmative action tends to consist of race-based policies designed
to give preferences to members of certain racial groups. 12 Affirmative
action, however, can also be based on gender, 3  physical
have been subordinated. Nonetheless, statistics support the proposition that women
of color generally do not wield the power or the resources of white men, white wo-
men, or men of color. See infra Parts LA and II.A.
11. For example, in 1995, affirmative action opponents introduced ten bills and
two constitutional amendments in California which attempted to invalidate many af-
firmative action programs. Attacks on Affirmative Action, Affirmative Action Califor-
nia: Why It Is Still Necessary (ACLU, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego,
CA), Sept. 1995, at 3.
12. For example, affirmative action has been utilized for racial minorities in educa-
tion admissions policies. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 273-76
(1978); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935-38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996); see also Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas: Racial Preferences In Higher
Education Upheld and Endorsed, 45 J. Legal Educ. 79 (1995) (discussing affirmative
action admissions in light of Hopwood); Andrea L Bistline, Comment, Preferential
Admissions Policies and Single-Minority Scholarships: The Legal Implications of
Race-Preference In Higher Education, 97 Dick. L Rev. 283 (1993) (discussing histori-
cal educational discrimination and modem affirmative action admissions programs).
Affirmative action has also been used to enhance government contract opportunities
for minorities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(d)(1)-(3) (1994); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also M. Victoria Wilson, Set-Asides of Local Govern-
ment Contracts for Minority Owned Businesses: Constitutional and State Law Issues,
17 N.M. L. Rev. 337 (1987) (observing that set-aside programs offer incentives to local
governments to utilize minority-owned businesses); Kenneth Jost, After Adarand,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 70 (1995) (discussing the impact of Adarand Constructors v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), on minority-owned-businesses and their share of govern-
ment contracts).
13. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), reprinted as amended
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-
70), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (including sex, among other
factors, as an impermissible factor for discrimination). But see Vest, supra note 7, at
72 (observing that "little attention was given to overcoming the hurdle of gender
bias").
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(dis)abilities, 4 and sexual orientation. 5 When there is an intersection
between two or more of these identities, then people with multiple
subordinated identities are often subject to more intense discrimina-
tion than the single axis discrimination suffered by those associated
with a single category of subordinated identity. 6 Some scholars have
"adopted the notion of multiple consciousness as appropriate to de-
scribe a world in which people are not oppressed only or primarily on
the basis of gender, but on the bases of race, class, sexual orientation,
and other categories in inextricable webs."' 7 Interestingly, this con-
cept of intersectionality has made inroads into gender-based discrimi-
nation cases,18 but it is rarely discussed in remedial aspects of
14. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1994) (requiring federal agencies to implement
affirmative action plans for the hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals
with disabilities).
15. While it is difficult to find affirmative action programs which address sexual
orientation, one author describes affirmative action plans from Heller, Ehrman,
White & McAuliffe, The American Friends Service Committee, and the National
Lawyers Guild. Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A
Proposal for True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 47, 92 (1993). While programs targeting physical disabilities and sexual
orientation also exist, they are not as common as race- and gender-based programs.
16. Kimberle Crenshaw coined the term "single axis" discrimination. See Cren-
shaw, supra note 4, at 139. She describes it as a conception of discrimination that
conditions us "to think about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single
categorical axis." Id. at 140. She suggests that "in race discrimination cases, discrimi-
nation tends to be viewed in terms of sex- or class-privileged Blacks; in sex discrimina-
tion cases, the focus is on race- and class-privileged women." Id. She goes on to posit
that people who fit more than one category of marginalization are subject to an addi-
tional axis of discrimination for each additional category. Id. The sum of the whole,
however, is greater than the addition of the parts, with no clear delineation between
the axes.
Recent studies have demonstrated that the impact of both racism and sexism
on women of color is truly a double burden, not a benefit under the rubric of
affirmative action .... [Deborah J. Merritt and Barbara F. Reskin] found
that women of color were consistently disadvantaged in the hiring process,
compared to men of color, despite persistent rumors that women of color
enjoyed a premium in the faculty job market.
West, supra note 7, at 72 n.12 (citation omitted).
17. Harris, supra note 4, at 587 (citation omitted); Berta Esperanza Herndindez
Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric
and Replacement, 25 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 369, 373 (1994).
Each trait a person has that diverges from the defined norm is a deviation.
Every standard deviation from the norm is a measure of difference-a de-
gree of separation from the defined norm. The more different a person is,
the greater the degree of perceived "otherness," the more of an "outsider"
the person is vis A vis the normativas/os, or vis A vis those who deviate less
from the normativa/o mold.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
18. Lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994). Lam filed suit
alleging, among other claims, race, sex, and national origin discrimination. Id. at 1558.
On appeal, the court noted that the lower court erred "in its separate treatment of
race and sex discrimination." Id. at 1562. It explained that:
Rather than aiding the decisional process, the attempt to bisect a person's
identity at the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores the
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discrimination such as affirmative action. I argue that intersectionality
should be central in those discussions because otherwise, women of
color are boxed into either race- or gender-based identities. If the
intersectionality of race and gender is not recognized, their lived reali-
ties are bisected and fractured.
The traditional power structure from which women of color are ex-
cluded or within which they are marginally represented1 9 exacerbates
the intensified discrimination arising out of notions of intersectionality
and multiple consciousness. Power is typically acquired through edu-
cation, money, and family and social connections-primarily the prov-
ince of upper-class white males and only recently accessible to women
of color.2' For example, a report on higher education in California
noted that whites are overrepresented in leadership roles, while La-
tina/os are consistently underrepresented.2 Naturally, the over-
particular nature of their experiences. Like other subclasses under Title VII,
Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared
neither by Asian men nor by white women. In consequence, they may be
targeted for discrimination "even in the absence of discrimination against
[Asian] men or white women." Accordingly, we agree . . . that, when a
plaintiff is claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to determine whether
the employer discriminates on the basis of that combination of factors, not
just whether it discriminates against people of the same race or of the same
sex.
Id. at 1562 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Moore v. Hughes Heli-
copters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that a black female did not
represent the interests of either black men or white women); Jefferies v. Harris
County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding evi-
dence that black males and white females were not subject to discrimination was not
on point when considering race and gender discrimination claims of a black female).
19. For a discussion of women's exclusion from positions of power, see Mona Har-
rington, Women Lawyers: Rewriting the Rules 3-12 (1994).
20. One report noted that:
[B]y 1954, about one percent of entering [college] freshmen were black.
Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans, were legally barred from attend-
ing some public schools. And women were systematically excluded from
some private and state funded colleges, universities, and professional schools
well into the 1970s. In general, it is clear that separation of the races and
relegation of women to the sidelines remained the norm for most of this
century.
Affirmative Action Review, Report to the President § 2.1 (July 19, 1995) <httpJ/
www.whitehouse.gov/WHIEOP/OP/html/aalaa-index.html> [hereinafter Report to
the President]. It is difficult to find statistics specifically addressing women of color-
I instead found statistics either for women or for ethnic minorities. Thus, I frequently
use these statistics and implicitly extrapolate that women of color, as a discrete iden-
tity within either of those identified groups, are going to be even rarer and more
marginalized.
21. State of Cal. Assembly Comm. on Higher Education, Progress and Prospects:
A Status Report on Diversity in California Higher Education 2 (1993) [hereinafter
Progress and Prospects]. To illustrate, even though whites made up 56% of the Cali-
fornia population during the time of the study, they accounted for 75% of the Post-
secondary Education Commission, 65% of the Student Aid Commission, and 89% of
the Council for Private Postsecondary and Vocational Education. Id. In contrast, La-
tina/os, who made up 27% of the population, accounted for only 9% of the Postsecon-
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represented voices sound more loudly in policy-making than
underrepresented voices. It follows that the underrepresented voices
are not heard as loudly or as frequently as the voices of the California
Higher Education Commission members. This is not to say that the
overrepresented members will not take into consideration the needs,
concerns, or positions of the underrepresented members of the Com-
mission or the constituencies which they serve, to the extent those
needs, concerns, or positions are expressed.22 Because of their sheer
numbers, however, they have more voting power and voice, and can
outvote or trivialize those concerns. Furthermore, they may not think
to ask about concerns that especially affect minority populations, par-
ticularly females of color.'
Likewise, power in the academy remains the domain of white
males. "The overwhelming number of academic decision-makers...
are white men. Not only do men make up 80% of the ladder faculty,
but they occupy most of the academic administrative posts."'24 This
feeds the phenomenon of self-perpetuating power, resulting in limited
opportunities for women of color in the academy.25
As outsiders in the academy, women have not been in the best posi-
tion to use favoritism, prestige, or academic status to advance them-
selves or others. Furthermore, one study found that even when
women know how to play the game of politics in the academy, they
may not be willing to participate.26
dary Education Commission, 17% of the Student Aid Commission, and 11% of the
Council for Private Postsecondary and Vocational Education. Id.
22. Nor is this to say that even if expressed, those needs will be granted priority or
even significance. More importantly, their lack of experience with issues of concern
to minority members might cause those issues to go unnoticed.
23. For example, Latina/os might consistently score lower on verbal tests than
others, which could impact their ability to get into colleges and universities. While
any Commission member could notice this and propose remedies, a Latina/o who
spoke another language growing up and experienced a language disadvantage at
school is more likely to point out the source of the discrepancies and offer solutions.
24. West, supra note 7, at 170. Professor West describes "ladder faculty" as "ten-
ured faculty and faculty not yet tenured, but on the tenure track." Id. at 69 n.4. To
illustrate Professor West's point at a state level, "[t]he leadership of the CSU Aca-
demic Senate has been 100 percent White for at least six years." Progress and Pros-
pects, supra note 21, at 4. CSU is an abbreviation for California State Universities,
and academic senates therein are comprised of ladder faculty.
25. In studying women in the legal academy, one scholar concluded that "[t]he
pattern that emerges through my experiences and through the study of relevant statis-
tics is that women faculty members disappear at a substantially higher rate than men
faculty members, and that women consistently are closed out of the higher ranks of
legal education." Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part
of a Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 Temp. L. Rev.
799, 801 (1988). While Professor Angel focused on women in the academy rather
than women of color, she did note that "[t]he problems of minority women are the
most severe." Id. at 805.
26. West, supra note 7, at 142 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 66
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DIALOGUE
The road is hard enough for women to travel, and is even harder for
women of color because of their double outsider status. 27 Thus, it is
no surprise that women of color are only nominally represented in
positions of power? 8 Affirmative action is one of the few tools that
has been available to help women of color aspire to and secure posi-
tions of power by assisting with both initial entry and eventual promo-
tion. Without affirmative action, already dismal statistics for women
of color will become even more gloomy.
Affirmative action is making headlines daily,29 with much of the
press and literature criticizing affirmative action on multiple grounds,
and demonizing affirmative action because of popular myths. Part I of
this article explores some of the myths surrounding the affirmative
action debate, and attempts to debunk the myths as they apply to wo-
men of color.
Part 1E continues the juxtaposition of reality against the myths of
part I, laying out moral bases why we should support affirmative ac-
tion for women of color. It tells the economic story of women of
color, cataloging how women of color have historically been, and con-
tinue to be, at the bottom of the economic food chain.3" It posits that
27. This is evidenced in part by their low numbers in the legal academy. During
the 1992-1993 academic year, only 4.3% of the nation's full-time law school faculty
members were women of color. ABA, The Burdens of Both, The Privileges of
Neither A Report of the Multicultural Women Attorneys Network 19 (1994) [here-
inafter The Burdens of Both]. Professor Marina Angel noted that women of color
"face 'double discrimination:' once for being female and once for being racially or
ethnically different." Angel, supra note 25, at 805 (citation omitted).
28. See infra Parts L.A and II.A.
29. See, e.g., Karen Brandon, Preference Policies Live Despite Attacls on Them:
Affirmative Action Still Explosive Issue, Chi. Trib., Jan. 15, 1996, at 3 (calling affirma-
tive action a "smoldering bomb"); Lynne Carrier, Affirmative Action Foes Go For
Ballot, San Diego Daily Transcript, Apr. 21, 1995, at Al, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Sddt File (explaining how a new affirmative action measure garnered instant
opposition); Robert Shogan, Affirmative Action Stirs Unforeseen Division in GOP,
L.A. Times, Aug. 20, 1995, at Al (discussing divisiveness of affirmative action); Jim
Yardley, Louisiana's Governor Bans Affirmative Action, Atlanta JJConst., Jan. 12,
1996, at Bi (describing affirmative action as a high profile issue in state politics).
30. See generally Carter, supra note 6, at 71 (calling affirmative action a "mixed
blessing"); Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 Cal.
L. Rev. 893 (1994) (describing mixed perspectives of critical race theorists); Kennedy,
Racial Critiques, supra note 9 (examining affirmative action within the legal academia
context).
31. For example, in 1993, Latinas in female headed households earned a median
income of $13,233, compared to $12,423 for African American female headed house-
holds, $21,583 for white female headed households and $31,177 for white male headed
households. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States 471 (115th ed. 1995) [hereinafter Abstract]. As of 1994, 18% of all
families were maintained by single women and 48% of all Black families were headed
by single women. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept's of Commerce, Statistical Brief
95-19RV (July 1995). In 1993, 35.6% of all households headed by women were below
the poverty level. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Leaflet No. 95-1, Facts on
Working Women: 20 Facts on Women Workers (1995). To illustrate the concrete
difference in salaries, female headed households (without husbands) earned a median
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until women of color achieve, or at a minimum approach, economic
parity with white men, affirmative action should remain a policy that
assists women of color in climbing out from the bottom.
Part II also discusses distributive justice as a policy which promotes
affirmative action. Under this forward-looking notion of justice, equal
opportunities should be available for all. While opportunity has not
been a problem for those who typically occupy elite positions, it has
not been as available to women of color. Thus, following a distribu-
tive justice rationale, affirmative action should continue for women of
color until opportunities truly are equally available.
Part II further explores the merits of diversity. It establishes that
diversity should be promoted from a policy standpoint, even though
the current Court might not consider it legally justified.32 It concludes
that diversity provides many social benefits and that affirmative action
for women of color promotes diversity; therefore, affirmative action
should be sustained.
Affirmative action is criticized as illegal because it allegedly violates
the Equal Protection Clause.33 The reasoning is that it treats people
differently based on race or gender. Part III addresses the legality of
affirmative action and explains how the law, even as currently inter-
preted, supports affirmative action for women of color.34 It also criti-
ques the law, pointing out its inconsistencies and shortcomings.
income of $17,443 in 1993, male headed households (without wives) earned $26,467,
and married couples earned $43,005. Id. The numbers are bleaker for women of
color. Families headed by Hispanic women without husbands earned an average of
$12,894 in 1992, while families headed by Hispanic men earned $19,468 and Hispanic
married couples earned $28,515. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Leaflet No.
94-2, Facts on Working Women: Women of Hispanic Origin in the Labor Force
(1994). In almost half of the households headed by Hispanic women (49%), the wo-
man's income was below the poverty level. Id.
32. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-38 (1995). While
the Supreme Court has not explicitly precluded diversity as a justification for affirma-
tive action, the Fifth Circuit has, at least for now. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
945-46 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). Note, however, that many be-
lieve that diversity for diversity's sake is still a sufficient rationale to support affirma-
tive action in higher education. See, e.g., Brest and Oshige, supra note 6, at 861-63
(arguing that a diverse student body and faculty in the university environment en-
hances understanding of commonalities and differences among groups).
33. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In the context of set-aside programs, the
argument is that they "assist minorities and women in their quest to achieve the
equality guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, [and] ... by necessity deny equal-
ity to nonminorities and men." Ronald L. Taylor, The Equal Protection Dilemma of
Voluntary State and Local Set-Aside Programs for Minorities and Women, 27 Hous. L.
Rev. 45, 47 (1990); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204 (outlining Petitioner's argument
that financial incentive to hire minorities violates non-minorities' equal protection
rights).
34. See infra Part III.C.
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Part IV reminds the reader that women of color are still subject to
overt, subtle, intentional, unintentional, and unconscious discrimina-
tion, and that women of color are still at a tremendous economic dis-
advantage compared with the rest of the population. Their hardships
could be ameliorated in part through the continuation of affirmative
action for their benefit. I urge this continuation for several reasons-
many criticisms of affirmative action are misplaced or based on in-
complete information; significant moral bases support affirmative ac-
tion; and under certain circumstances, affirmative action is legal.3"
Thus, lawful forms of affirmative action for women of color should not
only be upheld, but actively encouraged and promoted.' Accord-
ingly, part IV concludes that so long as women of color continue to be
burdened by intersectional discrimination,37 and thus have more hur-
dles to jump than men and white women, women of color have an
especially well-founded claim to affirmative action. Therefore, wo-
men of color should be permitted to benefit from long overdue and
specifically tailored affirmative action. 8
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BACKLASH OR DEBUNKING THE MYTHS
This part considers popular myths about affirmative action and wo-
men of color, juxtaposing the myths against women's lived realities.
In particular, I look at five myths: (1) the myth that women of color
double-dip from affirmative action; (2) the myth that affirmative ac-
tion disregards merit for women of color; (3) the myth that affirmative
action is inappropriate for women of color because it does not fit the
perpetrator-victim or reparations model; (4) the myth that affirmative
action is harmful to women of color because it is stigmatizing; and (5)
35. Note, however, that efforts are underway to do away with affirmative action
altogether. See supra notes 2, 11.
36. While affirmative action has helped many women of color, I acknowledge that,
as structured, it has some shortcomings. Rather than do away with affirmative action,
it is much wiser to restructure it, particularly as it pertains to women of color. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to provide a structural critique of affirmative action.
Suffice it to say, if both people of color (statistics are usually for men) and women
(statistics are usually for white women) lag behind white men in entry and advance-
ment opportunities in education and employment, it follows that the situation is worse
for women of color. Recognizing this imbalance, it would be appropriate to restruc-
ture affirmative action to provide greater entry and advancement opportunities for
women of color.
37. Women of color are, at a minimum, subjected to dual discrimination based on
race and gender. In many cases, women of color suffer from additional discrimination
arising from the confluence of sexual orientation, religion, class, etc. See supra note 4;
supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
38. This article does not attempt to discuss whether affirmative action is appropri-
ate for all persons who have suffered discrimination of various sorts. Other authors
have already done so and no doubt will continue to do so. See, e.g., Brest & Oshige,
supra note 6, at 872-73 (discussing the merits of including various racial and socio-
economic minorities in affirmative action). I focus my discussion on whether affirma-
tive action should continue in effect for women of color.
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the myth that affirmative action is ineffective because it disregards
low-income persons. By debunking these myths, I hope to break
down barriers to the continuation of affirmative action for women of
color.
A. Myth: Women of Color Double-Dip From Affirmative Action
A common myth is that women of color receive a "double affirma-
tive action benefit" because of their "double outsider" status. A wide-
spread perception is that women of color receive enhanced
consideration because of the underrepresentation of both women and
people of color in higher education, government contracts, and posi-
tions of power generally. For example, "[p]opular belief is that affirm-
ative action is alive and well and that multicultural women attorneys
have a double advantage: race and gender."39 The reality is that
while affirmative action has benefited women of color, sometimes
helping them with college admissions and other times allowing them
to enter and advance in professions previously closed to them, the
barriers for women of color remain strong even with affirmative ac-
tion.4" "The combination of being an attorney of color and a woman
is a double negative in the legal marketplace, regardless of the type of
practice or geographic region involved."'"
In spite of remaining barriers, there is a fight to terminate affirma-
tive action because of the misconception that it is not working.4
Some critics argue that affirmative action does not help minorities or
women 43 (they are usually silent on women of color), and thus should
be terminated. The statistics say otherwise. 41 "As a general matter,
39. The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 14.
40. One report noted that "multicultural women today encounter the same barri-
ers to employment and advancement as their predecessors who entered the profession
decades ago." Id.
41. Id. at 9.
42. This criticism is fraught with ambiguity. If it is not working, how do we explain
why government contractors tend to increase their hiring of, or contracting with, mi-
norities and women when there is active enforcement of affirmative action programs,
and decrease such hiring and contracting when there is no enforcement? See Report
to the President, supra note 20, § 3.3 (stating "active enforcement by [the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP")] during the 1970s caused govern-
ment contractors to moderately increase their hiring of minority workers"). This re-
port went on to note that "contractor establishments that underwent an OFCCP
review in the 1970s subsequently had faster rates of white female and of black em-
ployment growth than contracting firms that did not have a review." Id. Finally, it
noted that when OFCCP enforcement was scaled back, there was less minority hiring.
See id.
43. "Blacks now stand to lose more from affirmative action than they gain." Syl-
vester Monroe, Does Affirmative Action Help or Hurt?, Time, May 27, 1991, at 22, 23
(quoting Shelby Steele). Monroe explains that Steele "asserts that affirmative action
has reinforced a self-defeating sense of victimization among blacks by encouraging
them to pin their failures on white racism instead of their own shortcomings." Id.
44. Alfred W. Blumrosen, an employment law professor, noted that "ongoing
equal employment opportunity programs have produced 'significant improvements'
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increases in the numbers of employees, or students or entrepreneurs
from historically underrepresented groups are a measure of increased
opportunity."45 This increased opportunity is not coincidental-over 6
million women have obtained employment opportunities because of
affirmative action.' Affirmative action's effectiveness becomes
clearer when comparing women's membership in various professions
before and after its implementation. In the medical profession, wo-
men made up 7.6% of all physicians in the United States in 1970, but
had increased to 16.9% in 1990.47 In the legal profession, women
made up approximately 3% of all lawyers in the late 1960s,"8 but had
increased to 23% in 1994.49 Furthermore, over the course of a single
decade, the number of female attorneys of color went from approxi-
mately 7,300 to 23,000.50 These increases are encouraging, and they
demonstrate that affirmative action has been effective for women of
color and should continue in effect.
These successes, however, must be tempered with sobering statistics
which show that women generally, and women of color especially,
have a long way to go. The double-dip myth becomes ever more
mythical when considering current statistics. An analysis of women in
major New York law firms indicates that while the number of women
partners increased steadily throughout the 1980's, "there was a sharp
drop-off in new women partners after 1990.' 's1 In 1995, while 13.43%
of the partners in this country's major law firms were women, only
in the occupational position of women and minorities since the 1960s." Proponents,
Opponents of Affirmative Action Point to Statistics, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA),
at C-148 (Aug. 2, 1995). Professor Blumrosen elaborated that -more than 5 million
people of color and 6 million women are in higher occupational categories today than
they would be if we still distributed people through the labor force the way we did in
the sixties [without affirmative action]." Id
45. Report to the President, supra note 20, § 1.2.2. As pointed out, it is difficult to
determine what portion of that increase is due to affirmative action, but undoubtedly,
some of that progress is precisely because of affirmative action. Other factors addi-
tionally contributed to this progress, some of which cannot be measured at all and
others which are quantifiable, but still not susceptible to exact measure. For example,
how do you measure American society's transformation from dominative racists (bla-
tant bigots) to aversive racists (unconscious racists), much less the impact of changing
demographics or the impact of media? For a discussion of the transformation of ra-
cism in the United States, see Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psychohistory 54-55
(1970); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 335 (1987).
46. Who Benefits From Affirmative Action?, supra note 2, at 2.
47. Id
48. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Ad-
vancement in the Legal Profession, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 291, 313 (1995).
49. ABA Comm'n on Women in the Profession, Women in the Law- A Look at
the Numbers 3 (1995) [hereinafter Women in the Law].
50. The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 5.
51. Epstein et al., supra note 48, at 297.
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2.79% were minorities. 52 There were no statistics on what percentage
of those minority partners were women, but I can safely state that it
was fewer than 2.79%. 5' In fact, there are so few partners who are
women of color, they are statistically insignificant. 4 In a hearing re-
garding the glass ceiling, one woman testified that she "found no sta-
tistical data concerning promotion of minority women to partnership.
They are indeed the invisible minority. ' 55 One newspaper article ex-
plained: "Minority women fare the worst. They have the lowest per-
centage of entry level jobs in law firms, following white men, white
women and minority men. '' 56 In fact, fewer than 3% of all lawyers
and judges are minority women. 7 Note also the dearth of statistics on
women of color. They are hard to find because until recently, women
of color's existence, much less their particular issues and concerns,
had not been discretely considered,58 and certainly was not doubly
celebrated.
Not only are there few attorneys who are women of color, but those
who have entered the profession face greater obstacles than either
men of color or white women. An ABA committee summarized the
reasons as follows: "(1) stereotypes that limit job opportunities, (2)
failure to be recognized as competent, (3) failure to advance as rapidly
as others, (4) undue difficulties in attaining partnership status, (5) pay
52. Press Release, National Association for Law Placement, Women and Minority
Partners Scarce at Major Law Firms: Diversification Efforts More Evident Among
Associates (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with the author).
53. All the minority partners were presumably not women. To the contrary, wo-
men of color probably made up a very small portion of those partners.
54. Analysts who surveyed large New York firms stated: "We had hoped to ana-
lyze the experiences of minority lawyers in the study of glass ceilings in large law
firms. There were so few African-American, Latino, or Asian-American senior asso-
ciates and partners at these firms, however, that no analysis could be reasonably exe-
cuted." Epstein et al., supra note 48, at 324. Their survey showed that there were no
Latina partners and only 3% of the female associates were Latina. Id.
55. Gina S. Anderson, Perspective: Rx For Law Firms: Shatter the Glass Ceiling,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 6, 1994, at 2 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. In a footnote to this quote, Anderson noted that "African-American, His-
panic, Asian and Native American lawyers, both male and female, constituted 6.8
percent of associates and 2.5 percent of partners at the largest law firms in 1991. Un-
like women, minorities [presumably including women of color], continue to be under-
represented at the entry level." Id.
57. Women in the Law, supra note 49, at 17. The percent of women of color in the
legal academy was slightly higher as of Fall 1994 when non-white females comprised
6% of legal faculty. Faculty Composition, Consultant's Dig., Nov. 1995, at 4.
58. For example, the findings of a survey of law firms indicated that "[t]he pool of
minority partners and senior associates was so tiny that no analysis of their experience
could be undertaken." Epstein et al., supra note 48, at 302. That same report con-
cluded that while there was progress for women in the legal profession generally, the
picture was not so bright "for minority women, whose numbers remain extremely
small, and therefore, for whom we have meager data." Id. at 438 (footnote omitted);
see also The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 7 ("Beyond the 23,000 total figure of
multicultural women lawyers, law teachers or judges that was reported in the 1990
decennial census, specific breakdowns [that include race as well as gender] are rare.").
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inequities, (6) insufficient mentoring, and, (7) heightened scrutiny of
hours, work product and performance."5 9 The ABA also established a
joint project, called the Multicultural Women Attorneys Network
("MWAN"), to study issues of concern to female attorneys of color.'
It conducted hearings across the country and made the following
findings:
The combination of being an attorney of color and a woman is a
double negative in the legal marketplace, regardless of the type of
practice or geographic region involved; Multicultural women attor-
neys perceive they are "ghettoized" into certain practice areas and
other options are closed or implicitly unavailable; Multicultural wo-
men attorneys must repeatedly establish their competence to
professors, peers and judges; As evidenced by continuing attitudes
and negative stereotypes, multicultural women attorneys are invisi-
ble to the profession and have more difficulty achieving prominence
and rewards within the legal field; To succeed, multicultural women
attorneys must choose between race and gender,"1 and, Minority
women lawyers face barriers of gender discrimination in minority
bar associations and race discrimination in majority bar
associations.
62
Affirmative action has done a credible job of getting women of
color into some power or prestige professions, such as law."3 It would
seem to follow logically that as women entered these fields, they
would change their structure and dynamics, making them more hospi-
table for women generally and women of color specifically.' This is
not happening, however. While a significant number of women have
entered the legal profession over the last twenty years, they have not
59. The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 14. Additionally, many women of
color find that their personal lives are scrutinized more closely than the lives of other
attorneys, as are their clothes. They are expected to make those around them more
comfortable, and they are often treated disrespectfully by other attorneys in their own
firms, as well as by staff, not to mention by opposing attorneys, courtroom personnel,
and judges. They are also more likely to be isolated because they are excluded from
the worlds of both the male attorneys and the white female attorneys.
60. The Network was formed through the efforts of the ABA's Commissions on
Opportunities for Minorities in the Profession and Women in the Profession. They
approved the formation of what was initially titled the Minority Women Lawyers Sub-
committee (now "MWAN"). MVAN's three initial goals were to: identify issues im-
portant to multicultural women; explore possible solutions to those issues; and
educate the ABA on its role and responsibilities vis-'l-vis those issues. hi. at 6.
61. This is a common example of women of color having to choose either race or
gender as their primary identifier. If this either-or alternative is ever replaced by a
both-and alternative, then women of color might actually reap a double bonus, or at
least not be penalized for their double outsider status (footnote not in original text).
62. The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 9 (emphasis added).
63. See Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Wo-
men, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988).
64. As noted in a recent report on women's advancement in the legal profession,
"[tlo many of us, it appeared that the sheer number of women entering the profession
would lead to fundamental changes in certain long-prevailing professional para-
digms." Epstein et al., supra note 48, at 295.
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made as much progress in promotion.65 Nor are they represented in
positions of power in the legal profession.66 The situation for women
of color is obviously worse.67 Not only do they have to contend with
gender bias, they deal with racial bias from majority men and wo-
men. 6s Thus, instead of seeing a double advantage, one frequently
sees a double negative. "Often, white women attorneys are uncom-
fortable or unconcerned about addressing race or ethnicity issues.
Generally, multicultural women feel ostracized by white women and
believe they carry the responsibility of rectifying their own outsider
status. ' ' 69 Thus, discrimination as well as other barriers continue to
haunt the small percentage of women of color who actually enter the
legal profession. Until these barriers are eliminated, affirmative
measures are still necessary to enable women of color a chance to
succeed in the law.
70
The situation is not much different for female law students of color.
They also suffer from relative invisibility, especially compared to
white students who are considered the "norm."'7 1 In describing the
atmosphere at Yale Law School, former students noted that:
Entirely absent were images of women and men of color. These
surroundings kept us distrustful, reminding us that the institution
that admitted us had traditionally denied entrance to women and
65. Id. at 313.
66. "There... has not been any meaningful increase in the number of women who
head practice groups or who play a major management role in the large firms stud-
ied-suggesting that women may not be ascending the leadership ladder at large
firms." Id. at 297.
67. Aside from their slight representation in the law, they face prejudices different
from those faced by ethnic male or white female attorneys. For example, some wo-
men of color come from backgrounds where women are expected to silently make
sacrifices and perform their jobs. "Asian-American women and Latinas acknowl-
edged an additional handicap: their cultural upbringing stresses hard work, harmony
and teamwork over the 'blowing your own horn' method of gaining prominence." The
Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 13.
68. For a discussion of the chasm that can develop between white women and
women of color, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Es-
sences, and The Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 639 (1993).
69. ABA Comm'n on Women in the Profession, Unfinished Business: Overcom-
ing the Sisyphus Factor 22 (1995) [hereinafter Unfinished Business].
70. Of course, there are no guarantees that affirmative measures will lead to suc-
cess. On the other hand, I refuse to believe that of the small percentage of lawyers
who are women of color, so many of them do not thrive because of their own incom-
petence. The odds are against that. I do believe that their marginal success rate has
much more to do with institutional discrimination and barriers, as well as intentional
and unintentional personal discrimination.
71. Grillo & Wildman, supra note 4, at 405. Women of color disappear even in
discussions of sexism and racism, which tend to end up as discussions of sexism domi-
nated by white women. "Essentialist presumptions became implicit in the discussion;
it would be assumed, for example, that all women are white and all African-Ameri-
cans are men." Id. at 399.
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people of color. The pictures, the furniture, the male professors-
all indicated that the place had always belonged to white men.
72
One report described the grim experiences of women law students
of color "primarily in terms of their battle against the credibility prob-
lem, which encompasses both the phenomenon of invisibility and the
presumption of incompetence. '73 The process of fading women of
color into invisibility occurs on many levels. For example, while they
may consider themselves as healthy, whole persons comprised of mul-
tiple identities, female students of color are often asked to excise por-
tions of their identity by being forced to choose between outsider
status on the basis of either gender or race. Thus, their wholeness
vanishes. Their classmates, law professors, and law school administra-
tors also contribute to this fading and fracturing process. Classmates
may exclude them from study groups, clubs, moot court, and advo-
cacy, negotiation, or other competitions, as well as social activities.
7 a
Law professors are notorious for disproportionately calling upon
white males.75 This is even worse for the female of color who gets the
nerve to raise her hand,76 only to be ignored repeatedly." Even if she
is called on, her comments are often overlooked or attributed to
someone else.78 Administrators also contribute to the invisibility of
women of color, even if unintentionally. For example, they do not
include as many of these students as school spokespersons, as tutors,
as advisors, or in other representative capacities. Once again, inter-
72. Weiss & Melling, supra note 63, at 1322-23.
73. The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 11. This credibility problem was exac-
erbated by "the generic gender bias in the profession, as exhibited by white male
professors and classmates." Id. at 12.
74. This "[a]cute alienation... prevents them from taking part in vital extracurric-
ular activities." Id. at 13.
75. Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women s Frperiences at One Ivy
League Law School, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 51, 58 (1994).
76. Women of color "are nearly half as likely to volunteer in class as their white-
especially white male--counterparts." The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 13.
"[W]omen were twice as likely as men never to volunteer in class. Female students
reported feeling alienated by the argumentative style of classroom discussion, by
professors using stereotyped images of women, by casebooks entirely populated by
men, and by 'women's issues' being brushed aside as irrelevant." Jane Easter Bahls,
You've Come A Long Way, Baby. But-, Student Law., Sept. 1996, at 20, 21.
77. In a roundtable convened to discuss experiences of women attorneys of color,
one African-American Harvard graduate stated that one of her law school professors
would call on students in order by row, skip a Black student, then continue in order.
See The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 11. In a different survey, one student
reported that she "held her hand up for 45 minutes without being called on [and] later
asked the professor why, and he told her to 'get used to it; you're a woman.'" Bahls,
supra note 76, at 21.
78. I know that I am not the only woman of color who has made a comment at a
meeting, which comment is disregarded, only to resurface later when made by a white
male and then to be taken seriously. Ibis has even happened to me at meetings at-
tended predominantly by white females.
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sectionality that could be celebrated is instead used against women of
color.
The dual burden on women law students of color both perpetuates
some patterns that commenced earlier, such as the breeding of self-
doubt, and results in new and different forms of silencing. These are
the experiences of women law students of color with affirmative ac-
tion. This speaks of the need to strengthen affirmative action for wo-
men of color and to institutionalize multiculturalism so that the entry
benefits of affirmative action are not lost in outdated but deeply in-
grained institutional racism. Without affirmative action, future gener-
ations of attorneys will lack the richness and diversity that women of
color bring to the practice, academy, and judiciary, and women of
color, the legal system at large, and society as impacted by law will
suffer.
Women of color are also noticeably absent in leadership roles in
higher education. A study on the status of California's higher educa-
tion pointed out that of its thirty-seven top executives, 70% are white,
14% are African-American, 8% are Latino, and 3% are Asian.79
While 22% of the executives were women, 80 each chief executive of-
ficer was a white male, prompting an analyst to point out that "this
group is less diverse than it was a decade ago."'" The University of
California's team of top executives, the most prestigious of Califor-
nia's higher education leadership, was the least diverse, with "no
Asians, Latinos, or women [who] serve at the vice president level or
above.
82
In other professions, the doors have barely opened for women,
much less women of color. For example, only 3% of firefighters, 8%
of police officers, and just over 2% of construction and trades workers
are women. 83 The doors to these professions have opened only a
crack with affirmative action.' Imagine how tightly shut they will be
if affirmative action becomes illegal.85
79. Progress and Prospects, supra note 21, at 2.
80. The report neglected to state the ethnicity of the women, but it implied that
they were white (or without ethnicity) because the same paragraph later identified the
ethnicity of particular leaders, including a white woman and an African-American
man. Furthermore, because of the poor record of minority participation throughout
the report, it is likely that the report would have highlighted any instances where
women of color held positions of power. Id. at 3.
81. Id.
82. Id. The report did not specify whether any women of color served in those
executive capacities, but it clearly stated that there were no Latinas or Asian women
in those roles.
83. Why Affirmative Action is Still Necessary, Affirmative Action California: Why
It Is Still Necessary (ACLU, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego, CA), Sept.
1995, at 5 [hereinafter Why Affirmative Action is Still Necessary].
84. Which, of course, is better than the doors being tightly locked, which was true
before affirmative action provided a key. There seems to be a locksmith who periodi-
cally changes the locks, and we are constantly struggling to keep up with new keys.
85. CCRI and other proposals across the country seek this outcome.
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It is clear from the information in this section that women of color
are not doubly benefiting from affirmative action. While affirmative
action has resulted in increased opportunities for women of color,
they are still underrepresented in higher education, government con-
tracting, and positions of power across the board. On the same day
that I am writing this, I read that women currently hold only "500 of
the 7,213 directors' seats of the Fortune 500, or 6.9%, and minorities
hold 244 directors' seats, or 3.4%."1 While this is concededly better
than the 0% figure which I would have read about not so long ago, it
remains a challenge to get into those positions, and once there, the
work has just begun.87 Many women of color are struggling even with
the benefits that affirmative action offers.as If affirmative action dis-
appears, opportunities for women of color will decline. Furthermore,
women of color who have advanced partly because of affirmative ac-
tion will need to tread cautiously because protective measures
designed to prevent discriminatory behavior may well disappear.
In sum, the information in this section not only exposes the double-
benefits myth for what it is-a myth-but more importantly, it magni-
fies the need for affirmative action for women of color. Affirmative
action has improved lives for many women of color, but it is just be-ginning to do so. It is pivotal at this stage to continue affirmative ac-
tion programs in order both to allow the women who have entered
schools and professions the chance to progress in environments that
are not hostile and discriminatory, and to make equal entry opportu-
nities available to more women of color.
86. Kathleen M. Berry, Executive Update: Who Should Be on Your Company
Board?, Investor's Business Daily, Apr. 27, 1995, at A4. Women of color presumably
account for fewer than 3A% of those directors' seats.
87. For example, the female cadets at the Citadel fought a long, hard battle to gain
entry to the formerly all male academy. See Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.
1995). Yet the decision to admit them signaled only the beginning of a battle to ob-
tain full citizenship at the academy. Recently, two of those cadets were subjected to
abuse in what was described as a mere "hazing" incident. "[T]wo of the female cadets
were sprayed with a flammable liquid and had their clothes set afire." Two Women
Report Hazing at Citadel, Charleston Daily Mail, Dec. 14, 1996, at 3A, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Chrdym File. This is another example of what happens to
women who enter formerly all-male domains-frequently, the challenges have just
started. Women of color have it worse because they also must deal with issues of race
which exacerbate, rather than mitigate, gender issues.
88. While affirmative action has done an admirable job of opening doors for some
women of color, it has not focused on addressing issues of equality once in the door.
For example, while affirmative action may help a woman of color with college and law
school admissions and placement as a new associate in a large firm, it cannot (and
should not) make her "one of the guys" in that firm. Other steps beyond the scope of
this article should be taken to redefine the norms of the workplace or university.
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B. Myth: Affirmative Action Disregards "Merit"
A second myth is that affirmative action disregards merit by re-
warding unqualified beneficiaries (read women of color),89 which con-
sequently punishes otherwise qualified persons (read white men). The
myth goes that unqualified beneficiaries are rewarded with opportuni-
ties which they do not deserve, while qualified persons are being de-
nied those same opportunities. Many people believe the merit myth
and resent affirmative action because of it. They see affirmative ac-
tion as taking away an entitlement which would exist but for affirma-
tive action.9" This rage is flamed by employers' statements such as "I
would hire you in a second if you were black." 91 In fact, at the time
when a Newsweek employee was alleged to have made the preceding
remark, "only four reporters, one staff writer, and one editor out of
200-plus editorial employees at Newsweek were black."'  This type of
inflammatory remark creates damage to the fourth degree from the
perspective of a woman of color. First, she may experience discrimi-
nation as a woman. Second, she may experience discrimination in-
dependent of her gender or compounded by her gender because of
her race or ethnicity. Third, white males may resent her because they
are being told that they cannot get jobs because of her-she is
scapegoated as well as discriminated against. Fourth, and perhaps
most damaging, according to the statistics earlier in this part, she is
probably not getting the coveted spot anyway. If you need proof for
yourself, visit a law school classroom, a medical school laboratory, or
the executive offices of a Fortune 500 company.93 Once there, the
mythic nature of this claim becomes apparent through the absence of
women of color.
Another sub-myth to the merit myth is the idea that white male
candidates are evaluated and qualify for positions or entry strictly
based on merit, while women of color are evaluated in spite of merit.
Aside from being inaccurate, this myth feeds the related sub-myths
89. Of course, the term "unqualified beneficiaries" could also read people of
color, which is frequently understood to be men of color, or women, which is fre-
quently understood to mean white women.
90. Professor Cheryl Harris discusses at length the notion of whiteness as prop-
erty, which entitles whites to certain benefits or privileges. See Cheryl I. Harris, White-
ness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709 (1993). Professor Bob Chang also discusses
the concept of white entitlement, but in the context of fueling the affirmative action
backlash. See Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the Family, and
the Dream That Is America, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1115, 1127 (1996).
91. Farai Chideya writes that a higher up at Newsweek made that statement to at
least one prospective employee. Farai Chideya, Don't Believe the Hype: Fighting
Cultural Misinformation About African-Americans 103 (1995). He denied ever mak-
ing such statements, but he conceded that he thought black job applicants were
granted higher consideration than white job applicants. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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that the merit system is objective and that white males have not been
the beneficiaries of special treatment.
Let me first address the story that women of color are evaluated in
spite of merit. Women of color must qualify for admission or hire
under standards that apply to all applicants or candidates. Thus, af-
firmative action does not operate to elevate an unqualified woman of
color to qualified status.94 Among a group of qualified candidates,
however, affirmative action should operate to provide a woman of
color with a "plus" for her status as a woman of color.95 But that does
not always happen. In a study on employment discrimination, poten-
tial employers prevented African-American job applicants from ad-
vancing to equivalent interviews or hiring levels as white applicants
with the exact same qualifications at least twenty percent of the time.96
Another study suggested that, "Hispanic testers were three times as
likely to encounter unfavorable treatment when applying for jobs as
were closely matched Anglos.
' ' 9 7
If affirmative action operated as intended, women of color should
not only initially qualify under systems that look to their relative
merit, but they should also be able to advance at the same rate as their
male counterparts. That is not happening either,98 and it may not
94. I am not arguing that the underrepresented candidate is necessarily the "best"
candidate (under objective criteria, of course), only that the candidate is qualified for
the position or slot. For affirmative action to operate fairly, an unqualified person
cannot be given preference over a qualified person. See Report to the President, supra
note 20, § 1.2.4.
95. "In... an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be deemed a
'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual from com-
parison with all other candidates for the available seats." Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978). But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th
Cir.) (holding that an admissions program which "uses race as a strong determinant
rather that a mere 'plus' factor" violates the Equal Protection Clause), cert. denied
116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
96. Margary Austin Turner et al., Hiring Discrimination Against Young Black
Men, The Urb. Inst.: Pol'y and Res. Rep., Summer 1991, 4-5 (emphasis added). Gen-
der discrimination is also common. In a study on gender-based employment discrimi-
nation, the analysts found
hiring discrimination against women in high-price restaurants. In addition,
our less formal survey evidence suggests that wage and tip earnings are sub-
stantially higher in high-priced restaurants. Therefore, the pattern of hiring
discrimination that we have uncovered may go a long way towards explain-
ing the sex gap in earnings among waiters and waitresses.
David Neumark et al., Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Inc., Sex Discrimination in
Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study, Working Paper No. 5024, at 18-19 (Feb. 1995).
97. Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimina-
tion, U.S. GAO Rep. to the Congress, GGD-90-62, at 47 (1990) [hereinafter Immigra-
tion Reform]. The report also found that "Anglos received 52 percent more job offers
than the Hispanics and 33 percent more interviews." Id. at 48.
98. In their examination of patterns of American law schools' minority faculty
hiring from 1986 through 1991, Professors Merritt and Reskin compared the treat-
ment of male and female minority faculty. While minority women entered the profes-
sion at rates similar to minority men,
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have much to do with merit. Once women of color are in the door,
they face unique challenges. Different standards are often applied to
them or, alternatively, the stated standards which are routinely ig-
nored for others, are diligently applied to them. For example, there
are higher expectations for women of color. It is not enough to be
average; one must be above-average to get the confidence of peers
and superiors.99 In addition, supervisors frequently provide little or
no mentoring or training, women of color receive minimal exposure to
influential people or clients who can help with advancement, and wo-
men of color work double-duty, often living divided lives, trying to fit
in.l0
0
The second merit sub-myth is that merit is objective.' Those who
chant that "objective merit" alone should control one's admission or
acceptance rely heavily on supposedly neutral criteria, such as stan-
[T]he minority women who joined law school faculties during this period
began teaching at significantly lower ranks than the minority men, obtained
positions at significantly less prestigious schools, and were significantly more
likely to teach low-status courses like legal writing or trusts and estates.
None of these disparities can be adequately explained through differences in
credentials, age, work experience, geographic constraints, or family ties. In-
stead, law schools seem to treat minority women less favorably than minor-
ity men in the hiring process.
Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evidence
of a Double Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev.
2299, 2301 (1992); see id. at 2316-17.
99. As one women testified in a recent study, she felt "the 'need to perform 300
per cent better' in order to compete with male counterparts, to fight for what little
recognition" she received. She described this lack of recognition for the accomplish-
ments of multicultural women government attorneys as "subliminal discrimination."
The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 19.
100. See Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class, 73-91 (1993).
[Black professionals] repeatedly complained of being left out of the informal
communications network, of 'not being in on things.' Few reported having
'mentors' or anyone high within their organizations who took a supportive
interest in their careers. By and large, they judged themselves less likely to
be promoted than their white peers and felt they had to expend an inordi-
nate amount of effort trying to make whites 'comfortable' with them.
Id. at 77; see also Rosa M. Gil & Carmen Inoa Vasquez, The Maria Paradox: How
Latinas Can Merge Old World Tradition with New World Self-Esteem (1996) (dis-
cussing conflict Latinas face in preserving their culture while simultaneously
assimilating).
101. For a discussion of this notion, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chroni-
cle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 Geo. L.J. 1711 (1995). Nicholas Lemann de-
scribes the merit debate as follows:
The history of affirmative action can be seen as a struggle over the fairness
of the modem meritocracy, with minorities arguing that educational meas-
ures shouldn't be the deciding factor in who gets ahead and opponents of
affirmative action saying that to bend the criteria for blacks is to discriminate
unfairly against more deserving whites.... Either way, the trade-off is stark
and will remain so until black America and white America are on the same
educational and cultural footing-in other words, for generations.
Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1995, § 6
(Magazine) at 36.
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dardized test scores, while ignoring or devaluing qualifications or at-
tributes that make women of color unique. Some critics of this sub-
myth argue that the definition of merit which looks only to standard-
ized test scores is not truly objective, 10 2 and they are not alone in this
assessment.0 3 One critic discussed the misconception of objective
merit as follows:
Outside of sports and certain technical specialties, merit tends to be
defined subjectively, primarily by attaching complimentary labels to
those who are thought to be meritorious: people who are "fast
starters," who "have potential," who show style or demonstrate
leadership or otherwise have the mystical "right stuff" that will take
them to the top. Once they have risen, as predicted, it is assumed
they did so on merit-a reassuring if circular assumption. But what
it fails to take into account is the real possibility that merit, objec-
tively defined, has relatively little to do with who gets ahead.'0°
The current application of "objective" merit looks primarily to stan-
dardized tests to determine intelligence and the likelihood of suc-
ceeding in college. 10 5 The University of California took this to heart
by dismantling its affirmative action program out of its desire to "treat
all Californians equally and fairly."' 6 But by dismantling affirmative
action, rather than treating all Californians equally and fairly, it ele-
vates privileged Californians who attend better quality schools, who
have been raised in households where education is valued and empha-
102. "An education-based meritocracy makes its judgments about people before
they've ever really done anything, based on a measure, school performance, that de-
pends heavily on who their parents are and what kind of environment they create."
Lemann, supra note 101.
103. See Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 Am. U. J. Gender
& L. 121 (1993); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust A Comment on the Af-
firmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1332 (1986) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Persuasion and Distrust]; Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke LJ. 758, 776-
79. One critic noted that,
In contrast to messy essay tests, ETS would have you believe, its multiple-
choice questions and answers are scientifically designed and entirely above
suspicion.... When ETS refers to such tests as "objective," we seldom stop
to think that the term can apply only to the mechanical grading process.
There's nothing genuinely objective about a test like the SAT: it is written,
compiled, keyed, and interpreted by highly subjective human beings.
David Owen, None of the Above: Behind the Myth of Scholastic Aptitude 33 (1985).
104. Cose, supra note 100, at 87.
105. Ironically enough, it is not entirely clear what standardized tests do measure.
Professor Espinoza pointed out that a "six-year Nader study concluded that the SAT
successfully predicted college performance in only one out of ten cases. The study
found that SAT score correlation to family income was much stronger than the corre-
lation to college performance." Espinoza, supra note 103, at 139 (footnotes omitted).
For a general critique of standardized tests, see Owen, supra note 103.
106. Governor Pete Wilson used these words at the beginning of the meeting where
the continuation of affirmative action in the UC system was debated. See Amy Wal-
lace & Dave Lesher, UC Regents, in Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirmative Action, LA.
Tunes, July 21, 1995, at Al.
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sized, and whose families can spend more on their children's
educations.
10 7
Objective merit's obeisance to test scores not only privileges the
already privileged, 08 it ignores many positives that women of color
contribute which cannot necessarily be measured in test scores. 10 9
Follow me through a couple of days in Lila's life. Lilia just finished
her last high school class of the week and she is on her way to her
waitressing job at Hasta Mafiana. It is a busy night and she is hustling,
taking orders, and serving beer, margaritas, and food. By the end of
the evening, she is exhausted. She washes her face, changes out of her
work shoes into her tennis shoes, and heads home. Mamdi greets her
with a kiss and asks her, ",tienes hambre?" 1 ° Lilia answers, "si,
mamd, quiero algo de comer mientras estoy haciendo mi tarea.
''H
Before Lilia can get to her homework, her little brother Paco runs out,
hugs her, and begs her to read him a bedtime story. She obliges and
reads him "La Cama de Mamd." 2
Once Paco is asleep, Lilia pulls her history book out of a tattered
day pack and starts her homework. There are some things she is not
quite clear on, but she knows she cannot ask her mamA about them.
No need to lose time, so she continues. By midnight, she is fast asleep
over her book. Mamd gently wakes her and sends her to bed.
The next morning, Lilia wakes early, feeds her little sister Isabella,
and gets ready to tutor grammar school children in English. She re-
calls her early struggles with English and is happy she can work with
others who are going through those same struggles. After a few hours
at the elementary school, she is off to Hasta Mafiana. She completes a
full shift, goes home, and helps her mam with laundry. This is a
snapshot of her life-not unusual days.
Let us fast forward to a college admissions office. Lilia's SAT
scores and grade point average are good, not great. But if an admis-
sions office defined Lilia's merit based only on her SAT scores and
high school grades, it would overlook many of her unquantifiable
strengths-her ability to juggle many competing interests at once and
107. One high school English teacher stated that "[t]he tests often used to measure
achievement often are linguistically skewed to the benefit of white middle-class stu-
dents." UC Affirmative Action Decision, L.A. Times, July 26, 1995, at B8.
108. "[Tjhe narrative content of individual questions creates a discourse, a thematic
content, for the whole test. That discourse has been one that favors the dominant
social force in our society, white men." Espinoza, supra note 103, at 125-26 (footnotes
omitted).
109. Yxta Maya Murray reminds us that merit's meaning "has been constructed
without reference to the virtues and values of people of color, women, and sexual
minorities-typical 'Outsiders'-who have demonstrated excellence even under con-
ditions of subordination." Yxta Maya Murray, Merit-Teaching, 23 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 1073, 1075 (1996).
110. "Are you hungry?"
111. "Yes, mommy, I'd like something to eat while I am doing my homework."
112. Mommy's bed.
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to work efficiently, her willingness to embrace family and to turn
around and lift up those behind her, and her success without the bene-
fits of a personal computer, a personal tutor, or the time that would
have been freed up to devote to school and studies had she not been
working.
113
A large percentage of women of color live below the poverty level,
and that circumstance may teach them greater self-sufficiency and
how to make the most out of the little they have. Also, they may learn
how to work more efficiently, especially if they are single parents who
are working, raising children, and going to school. However, these
characteristics, strengths or gifts are not measured in standardized test
scores. It is unfair to disregard the special gifts which the Lilias of the
world have to offer because they are neither quantifiable nor tradi-
tionally valued."' Thus, merit based on talents other than standard-
ized test scores should be considered. Affirmative action helps
recognize these other talents and therefore must continue in order to
help women of color have equal opportunities.
The third merit sub-myth stems from the idea that white males have
not benefited from special treatment. To the contrary, preferential
treatment has been with us since the founding of this country, usually
for the benefit of white middle- to upper-income males." 5 When it is
used to perpetuate the status quo, it hardly causes a ripple.1 6 When,
however, it is used to make opportunities more widely available for
women, minorities, and women of color, there is an outcry. In re-
113. For a discussion of the consequences and impact of low income on education,
see Oliver C. Moles, Jr., Educational Training in Low-Income Families, in U.S. Dep't
of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Low-Income Life Styles 31 (Lola M. Irelan ed., 1967).
114. "Outsiders' experiences with discrimination and subordination can give them a
richer perspective and highly sophisticated coping tools that the majority simply has
not acquired." Murray, supra note 109, at 1092.
115. As one author has observed:
For more than forty years, 20% of Harvard students have been admitted as
"legacies," children of Harvard alumni .... [T]hese overwhelmingly white
and affluent legacies are three times more likely to be accepted than a "nor-
mal" applicant who may be a class valedictorian or national merit finalist.
What undermines the myth of merit is the fact that many of these children of
alumni are not as well qualified as regular applicants using traditional aca-
demic criteria.
West, supra note 7, at 142 (footnotes omitted). For an excellent discussion of white,
male, heterosexual privilege, see Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege Revealed: How
Invisible Preference Undermines America (1996); see also John K. Wilson, The Myth
of Political Correctness: The Conservative Attack on Higher Education 136-138, 149-
151 (1995) (noting that colleges give admissions preference to legacies); John D.
Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard and Yale,
26 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 491, 502 (1993) (noting that children of alumni receive
an advantage in Harvard's admission process).
116. One academic even asserts that "[wihite men continue to be the only benefi-
ciaries of 'affirmative action,' the only group who are hired at rates significantly
higher than their proportion in the available pool of qualified candidates." Vest,
supra note 7, at 70. This fact has not come under microscopic or widespread criticism.
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sponse to a tirade by a white male about how affirmative action
harmed him for the benefit of "unqualified minorities," Ellis Cose
took him to task:
When the young man paused to catch his breath, I took the occasion
to observe that it seemed more than a bit hypocritical of him to rage
on about preferential treatment. A person of modest intellect, he
had gotten into Harvard largely on the basis of family connections.
His first summer internship, with the White House, had been ar-
ranged by a family member. His second, with the World Bank, had
been similarly arranged .... In short, he was already well on his
way to a distinguished career-a career made possible by preferen-
tial treatment. 
17
As Cose pointed out, "[o]ne cannot honestly and intelligently dis-
cuss hostility to preferential treatment without examining attitudes to-
ward those who benefit from the treatment."'"t 8 In other words, much
of the hostility toward affirmative action may arise more from racism,
sexism, or a desire to preserve the status quo. It is time to explore
these attitudes further to get at the heart of many people's resistance
to affirmative action. While the discussion is sure to be volatile, there
is no way around the discussion.
Related to the third merit sub-myth that white males do not receive
preferences is the notion that there is an abundance of scholarships
for minorities and women of color, with white students thus being de-
nied significant privileges. The reality is that:
The GAO, in a 1994 study found that at the undergraduate level,
scholarships (from all funding sources) for which minority status is
the only requirement for eligibility are rare, accounting for less than
0.25% of all scholarship monies; that scholarships for which minor-
ity status is one of several requirements for eligibility represent
about 3% of scholarship monies; and that scholarships for which
minority status is one factor among many considered are somewhat
more common. On the other hand, [Department of Education] offi-
cials note that there are countless scholarship programs which are
limited to white students, at least de facto, because of some condi-
tion on family origins, membership in some social or fraternal or-
ganization, family affiliation with the particular school, etc. 119
To further reduce the very small percentage of scholarships that are
awarded to minorities because of their minority status would be a
travesty.12 0 It seems that affirmative action critics have been blinded
117. Cose, supra note 100, at 111.
118. Id. at 121.
119. Report to the President, supra note 20, § 10.5.1.
120. "[T]here is a virtual consensus within the higher-education community that
minority-targeted scholarships are essential to meeting schools' diversity and remedial
needs, and that race-neutral approaches will not always be reasonably effective." Id.
10.5.3.
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121by the logs in their eyes, so they cannot see that those currently
"harmed" by affirmative action have in fact been beneficiaries of im-
plicit affirmative action or preferential treatment for at least one hun-
dred years.
Recognizing the various sub-myths, it is easier to understand the
popularity of the myth that affirmative action disregards merit.
Otherwise, one would have to accept the ideas that a woman of color
might actually be qualified for a position, that she may be better quali-
fied than a white male, and that some white males may not be as qual-
ified as they think they are. By continuing to offer alternative
definitions of merit, we can help dispel this myth and perhaps do away
with the need for affirmative action for women of color."z But until
other definitions of merit are accepted, it is crucial to preserve affirm-
ative action for women of color because it allows them a path, albeit
narrow, to opportunity. Furthermore, even under the standard defini-
tion of merit, because of unproven assumptions of incompetence for
women of color and competence for white men, affirmative action
helps women of color by giving them a chance to prove competence-
whereas without affirmative action, the assumption would continue
with little opportunity to disprove it.
C. Myth: Affirmative Action is Justified Only Under a Perpetrator-
Victim Model
A third myth is that affirmative action can only be utilized under a
corrective justice model, which requires both an identifiable victim
and a proven identifiable perpetrator." 3 This corrective justice model
attempts to restore equality between two parties. Aristotle was one of
the earliest philosophers to elucidate the notion of corrective justice
within the legal system to allow an injured party to be made whole by
enforcing a claim against the injuring party. -124 He described correc-
tive justice as a mathematical equation seeking equality and fair-
121. And why do you look at the speck in your brother's eye, but do not notice
the log that is in your own eye? Or how can you say to your brother, -Let
me take the speck out of your eye," and behold, the log is in your own eye?
You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see
clearly enough to take the speck out of your brother's eye.
Matthew 7:3-5 (New American Standard Bible).
122. While some might argue that abolishing affirmative action (without changing
the definition of merit) would take care of the myth, that is misguided. The compe-
tence of people of color in positions of power was questioned before affirmative ac-
tion, it is being questioned now, and it will probably continue to be questioned long
after affirmative action has gone by the wayside.
123. Perhaps "myth" is not the best word choice here, as the Supreme Court has
advocated this position. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995);
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). I intentionally use the word
"myth," however, because this justification of affirmative action makes the existence
of affirmative action mythical. If corrective justice was the only rationale for the
existence of affirmative action, it would die a quick death.
124. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 121-122 (Martin Ostwvald trans., 1962).
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ness.125 It is mathematical because it focuses on a quantity that
represents what rightfully belongs to one party but is now wrongfully
possessed by another party.' 26 In other words, there must be both a
wrongdoer and a victim. 127 Professor Alan Freeman describes the law
under this model as follows:
You can't assert your claim against society in general, but only
against a named discriminator, and you've got to show that you are
an individual victim of that discrimination and that you were inten-
tionally discriminated against. And be sure to demonstrate how
that discrimination caused your problem, for any remedy must be
coextensive with the violation. Be careful your claim does not im-
pinge on some other cherished American value, like local autonomy
of the suburbs, or previously distributed vested rights, or selection
on the basis of merit. Most important, do not demand any remedy
involving racial balance or proportionality; to recognize such claims
would be racist.'
28
Many foes of affirmative action concede that "compensation" to an
identifiable victim via affirmative action is appropriate provided there
is a specific injury to that person.'2 9 In other words, under a correc-
tive justice model, affirmative action for women of color could be jus-
125. Id. at 120-23.
126. See id. at 121.
127. The corrective justice model is akin to a compensation rationale:
Under the compensation rationale, affirmative action is seen as offering
preferences to women or members of racial minorities as reparation or com-
pensation for past injustices. The term compensation draws heavily on the
model of recompense or payment of damages that is found in tort law. In
the context of tort remedies, the particular agent who is responsible for in-
juring another compensates the specific person injured by paying what is
judged to be an appropriate sum of money for the actual extent of the injury
he or she has caused.
Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential
Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate,
11 Harv. BlackLetter J. 1, 14 (1994). Harris and Narayan do not think affirmative
action is justified by a compensation rationale, preferring to justify it based on the
need for equal opportunity for all in order to obtain "full and unimpaired citizenship
in the United States." Id. Since they dismiss this rationalization, they do not accord it
full analysis. For a critique of the perpetrator-victim model, see Lawrence, supra note
45, at 324-25 ("By insisting that a blameworthy perpetrator be found before the exist-
ence of racial discrimination can be acknowledged, the Court creates an imaginary
world where discrimination does not exist unless it was consciously intended."). For
an elaboration of the reparations theory, see Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 362-97 (1987).
128. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev.
1049, 1049-50 (1978) (footnotes omitted). While this quote came from a tongue in
cheek discussion between "The Law" and "Black Americans," Professor Freeman's
point is well taken.
129. This is the ground on which many affirmative action cases have been decided.
If there is statistically supported evidence of past discrimination by an entity, then
that entity's affirmative action program may be upheld so long as the program is nar-
rowly tailored to overcome past discrimination. See infra Part III.A.
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tified only if there was evidence both that particular women of color
suffered multiple discrimination and that the perpetrators alone bear
the cost of making those women whole through affirmative action
remedies.130 Do these women individually have to show that they
have been discriminated against in the past, that they are currently
being discriminated against, or that they are likely to be discriminated
against in the future?' 3 1 Or is it enough if women of color have suf-
fered and continue to suffer multiple discrimination because of the
confluence of race and gender?
132
A criticism of the corrective justice model is that discrimination is
systemic and structural, not simply ad hoc or individual. Thus, a
shortcoming under the corrective justice model is that it can only be
used to equalize parties if intentional discrimination and readily iden-
tifiable wrongdoers and victims exist.133 Undoubtedly, women of
color have suffered from discrimination, both directly and indi-
rectly."3 But the acts of discrimination are frequently subtle and the
match between the discrimination and a remedy under this model is
too inexact and inefficient. As one scholar has noted:
To say we must find the offenders against blacks one at a time and
try them on an individual basis would be as realistic as saying that if
130. Even evidence of past discrimination against women of color does not justify
affirmative action for some-one critic argues that nothing we do today can compen-
sate for wrongdoing in the past. See Shelby Steele, A Negative Vote on Affimative
Action, N.Y. Tumes, May 13, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 46 ("[I]t is impossible to repay
blacks living today for the historic suffering of the race.").
131. The Solicitor General, among others, has argued that only actual victims of
past discrimination should benefit from affirmative action. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 8, 14, Local Number 93, International Association of Fire
Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (No. 84-1999); Brief for Respondent
at 11, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, 19,
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340).
132. Some scholars believe this is enough:
An affirmative action program need not limit its benefits to persons who can
be shown to have suffered personally from discrimination. Rather, persons
may receive benefits because of racial, national origin, or gender group
membership. The Court's approval of affirmative action benefits for non-
victims reflects a realization that a group-based remedy is appropriate for a
group-based wrong.
Scherer, supra note 9, at 330.
133. Furthermore, it attempts to return individuals to positions of equality only if
they started in positions of equality, which is rarely the case.
134. Professors Harris and Narayan highlight this point by stating:
Women and people of color, generally like people with particular disabilities,
were often literally excluded from certain institutions because their race or
gender was seen as a sign of their lack of ability and competence. They were
often denied jobs for which they were qualified on grounds that they would
make clients uncomfortable. Even when women and people of color gain
entry, race and gender often function in a manner similar to physical disabili-
ties in the sense that the institutional arrangement impedes access to the full
range of goods and experiences normally provided by the institution.
Harris & Narayan, supra note 127, at 16.
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you prosecute individual criminals when you happen to catch them
organized crime will go away.... The fixation is at the level of one-
to-one individual justice. Such a constricted perspective is useless in
the face of the actual problem. . . . We cannot dismantle a caste
system any more than we can reform a sexist society simply by plod-
ding from one specific violation to another, leaving the distorted
and distorting structures substantially intact.135
The corrective justice model's insistence on clear discrimination and
a close match between the victim and the crime invokes such a strict
standard of proof that many women of color would be precluded from
access to affirmative action under this model. It is also misguided be-
cause it detracts from affirmative action's goals of increasing the avail-
ability of opportunities, working towards inclusion, and obtaining
positions of power for women of color. The corrective justice model
thus is problematic because the reality for women of color does not
neatly fit this model. For one, the costs to prove discrimination may
be prohibitively expensive.' 36 Furthermore, the one-on-one type of
discrimination required by this model may not be provable, because
the discrimination tends to be more broadly based 137 and system-
atic.'3 ' In addition, the time it would take to prove such discrimina-
tion could effectively preclude remedial action. For example, if a
woman of color is seeking college admission or a job as a highway
worker, by the time she presents necessary proof of past discrimina-
tion against her by the college or employer, the entering class she
wanted to join will have graduated or the job she sought will have long
been filled. Finally, and perhaps most troublesome, this model denies
that much of race and gender discrimination is subtle, invidious, ongo-
ing, and systemic.13 9
Even with its shortcomings, the classic corrective justice model
could still be invoked if modified or relaxed as it has been in some
cases where it was impractical or impossible to identify a particular
135. Daniel C. Maguire, A New American Justice: Ending the White Male Monop-
olies 90-91 (1980).
136. See, e.g., Rhode, Perspectives, supra note 7, at 1196 (noting that the costs of
litigation, both personal and financial, are extensive).
137. For example, it is frequently institutional or unconscious, which is harder to
prove but every bit as real.
138. In discussing structural discrimination, Ronald Ellis states:
[D]iscrimination in employment, deprives an individual of society's eco-
nomic rewards. Lack of economic resources, in turn, leads to poorer hous-
ing, less desirable living and working environments, and lower self-esteem,
These environmental factors affect success in educational endeavors and the
ability to obtain "credentials." Failure to secure the appropriate credentials
affects the ability to secure good employment. The result is a vicious circle.
Ronald Ellis, Victim-Specific Remedies: A Myopic Approach to Discrimination, 13
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 575, 584 (1984-85) (footnotes omitted).
139. See Freeman, supra note 139, at 1056.
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wrongdoer or victim.140 Accordingly, it could be used to support af-
firmative action even if there is no particular wrongdoer whose
wrongs can be traced to identifiable victims.14' The theory would be
that affirmative action attempts to correct injuries inflicted on women
of color through race- and gender-based discrimination.
14 2
A criticism of affirmative action under a relaxed corrective justice
model is that the beneficiaries (direct or indirect victims who are now
perceived as wrongdoers) gain at the expense of perpetrators (direct
or indirect wrongdoers 143 who are now perceived as victims). " ' The
myth that arises here, which many people have been lulled into believ-
ing, is that well-qualified, innocent white males pay for affirmative ac-
tion which benefits women of color. 45 One problem with this myth is
that it assumes innocence, or the lack of racism. But as one scholar
pointed out, "[a]n affirmative action program does not violate the
rights of innocent white individuals when it guarantees to minorities
the portion of society's goods that minority individuals would have
140. See, e.g., Brest & Oshige, supra note 6, at 865 (altering the corrective justice
model to accommodate class action cases). For other examples of modifications of
the corrective justice model in reparations cases, see Ishida v. United States, 59 F.3d
1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (awarding reparations to Japanese Americans intcrned during
World War II); Sato v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 818 (1995) (same); Motoyoshi v.
United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 45 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same).
141. Brest & Oshige, supra note 6, at 865.
142. Professor Kathleen Sullivan noted that the Court itself could have modified
the corrective justice theory by "broadening the concept of who has been 'victimized'
by past discrimination .... It might have held that because American racism has left
blacks an underclass, still systematically disadvantaged as a group compared with
whites, no black is not a 'victim' of past discrimination." Sullivan, supra note 9, at 93.
In a sense, the Court adopted similar reasoning in the reparations cases. See cases
cited supra note 140.
143. They could be indirect wrongdoers insofar as they have received benefits from
racism and sexism even if they did not perpetrate the racism or sexism, or if their
unintentional or unconscious racism or sexism worked to their benefit. See Sullivan,
supra note 9, at 92-94.
144. Justice Scalia has criticized affirmative action because of its unfair impact on
innocent persons. See, eg., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-28 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (cautioning against discriminating against whites to remedy
past discrimination against blacks); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 657-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the major-
ity opinion for permitting racial or sexual discrimination under Title VII when in-
tending to overcome societal attitudes limiting entry of certain races of sexes into
certain jobs). The question remains, however: What about the unfair impact of
racism?
145. For an incisive elaboration of the "innocent persons" argument, see Ronald J.
Fiscus, The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action (1992). Fiscus asserts that
"the innocent persons argument is more than an important constitutional argument.
It is a widely held, racially polarizing social argument. The near-universal belief in it
is without doubt the single most powerful source of popular resentment of affirmative
action." Id at 7; see also Linda S. Greene, Tienty Years of Civil Rights: How Firm a
Foundation?, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 707 (1985) (discussing the popular belief that affirm-
ative action adversely affects innocent parties); Thomas B. Ross, Innocence and Af-
firmative Action, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 297 (1990) (same).
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gained for themselves in a nonracist environment.' ' 146 In other words,
as long as society remains racist, the notion of innocence is mythical.
Another problem with the innocent white male myth is the often ig-
nored reality that those males not only directly and indirectly benefit
from affirmative action, but that they have for a much longer time
than any other group, and in substantially larger numbers. "White
men continue to be the only beneficiaries of 'affirmative action,' the
only group who are hired at rates significantly higher than their pro-
portion in the available pool of qualified candidates.'
'1 47
Another attack on affirmative action relates to the preferential
treatment myth. Underlying this myth is the idea that affirmative ac-
tion beneficiaries are undeservedly preferred to more deserving per-
sons. For example, many people criticize government contract
affirmative action programs as unduly burdening majority contractors
for the benefit of minority- and women-owned businesses ("MBEs"
and "WBEs," respectively). San Diego, California had an affirmative
action contracting program entitled "Equal Opportunity Contracting
Program.' 1 48 Its goal was to award 20% of construction projects over
$50,000 to MBEs and WBEs, and 15% of consulting projects to MBEs
and WBEs. 14 9 Even with this policy, which was partly designed to
create greater equality of contracting and consulting opportunities for
groups traditionally deprived of those opportunities, only 1.9% of
construction contracts were awarded to MBEs and 4% to WBEs, for a
total of 5.9%-far short of the voluntary goal of 20%.15° Only 1.8%
of consulting contracts were awarded to MBEs and 0.8% to WBEs,
for a total of 2.6%-again far short of the 15% goal.' 5 1 Women of
color fared even worse. Of the $209,732 worth of construction con-
tracts awarded to African-American owned businesses, $23,400 worth,
or just under 11.2%, went to women.' 52 This means that African-
American women received approximately 0.09% of all construction
contracts. Of the $6,829,362 worth of construction contracts awarded
to Latino owned businesses, none went to women.15 3 Latina owned
businesses also received zero percent of the $1,657,454 in consulting
146. Fiscus, supra note 145, at 38.
147. West, supra note 7, at 70; see also UCLA Tells of Possible Admission Favorit-
ism, San Diego Union-Trib., Mar. 18, 1996, at A-3 (noting favoritism in admissions for
white students at UCLA).
148. This voluntary, interim program replaced the City's goal-based Minority and
Women Business Enterprise Program, which in turn was rescinded on November 29,
1993. Comm. on Pub. Safety and Neighborhood Servs., The City of San Diego Man-
ager's Report No. 96-56, at 1 (Mar. 13, 1996).
149. See id. at 1.
150. See id. at 2.
151. Id.
152. Id. at Exhibit B.
153. Id.
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contracts awarded to Latino owned businesses." Of the $132,353
worth of consulting contracts awarded to African-American owned
businesses, 55 $12,400 worth of contracts went to women. 56 In other
words, approximately 0.48% of all contracts went to African-Ameri-
can owned businesses. Of these contracts, approximately 9.4% went
to women owned businesses. The African-American women thus re-
ceived a total of less than 0.05% of all consulting contracts
awarded.157
The point of the San Diego story is twofold: even with modest af-
firmative action goals, the city fell far short of its goals, and affirma-
tive action opponents still complained about preferential treatment
and reverse discrimination. 15 8 Majority-owned businesses are hardly
being deprived of contracts, and women of color continue to receive
only a nominal percentage of construction and consulting contracts in
San Diego. As affirmative action proponents point out:
[A]ffirmative action is not a matter of affording "preferential treat-
ment" to its beneficiaries, but instead [is] an attempt to offer them
greater equality of opportunity in a social context marked by perva-
sive inequalities, one in which many institutional practices work to
impede a fair assessment of the capabilities of those who are work-
ing class, women, or people of color.
159
Thus, the notion that affirmative action beneficiaries are receiving
preferential treatment to the detriment of more deserving parties re-
mains as mythical as the notion that affirmative action is causing ma-
jority contractors to go out of business because of preferential
treatment for women of color.'6
The San Diego story brings out another wrinkle in the problem.
Some people complain that affirmative action generally, and in gov-
ernment contracting particularly, has not been effective and should
154. Of the $1,657,454 worth of consultant contracts which went to Latino owned
businesses, none went to women. Id.
155. The $132,353 worth of consulting contracts was out of a total of S27,617,004 in
city-awarded consultant contracts awarded. Id.
156. Id
157. Interestingly, a recent controversy erupted relating to a report on whether
MBEs and WBEs have suffered discrimination in San Diego contracting. San Diego
paid $500,000 for this report, and the city has refused to make the report public- Ron-
ald W. Powell, Minority Builders Irked as City Sits, San Diego Union-Trib., Aug. 13,
1996, at B-1. "If the study shows a clear pattern of discrimination, the finding could
serve as the legal foundation for instituting a preferential contracting program for the
groups that have been shut out." Id
158. It is like someone complaining, after a banquet in which that person ate to
excess and felt sick, that a portion of the leftovers went to hired help. In fact, the
complaints and 1993 lawsuit filed by opponents of affirmative action led to Judge
Keep's 1993 decision ruling San Diego's program unconstitutional. Id. The city thus
abolished the goal-based program late in 1993. Id.
159. Harris & Narayan, supra note 127, at 4.
160. While some majority contractors may be going out of business, it can hardly be
blamed solely on affirmative action.
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therefore be abolished. The myth is that because goals are not being
met, affirmative action is at fault.161 The reality is "that the city's
figures show that minority- and women-owned businesses have re-
ceived dramatically less city work since the equal opportunity pro-
gram was abolished."' 62 First, note that women of color receive more
contracts with affirmative action than without.163 Hence, it is making
a positive difference for women of color. Second, ponder why goals
are not being met. It may be because not enough women of color
submit bids. But other, more sinister reasons exist as well. For exam-
ple, in describing why almost all state departments failed to reach af-
firmative action goals, one report noted that "[t]he program's
administration is fragmented and its provisions are applied unevenly;
in some cases, the law has simply been ignored while in others advan-
tage has been taken of loopholes."' 16 Furthermore, affirmative action
in government contracting has not worked very well in California
partly because it has been sabotaged by majority-owned firms. Fraud
is rampant in the contracting area. "After examining 700 contracts
valued at $375 million, auditors hired by the Office of Public School
Construction reported that 30% involved fronting or other violations
of affirmative action requirements."'' 65 It is telling that this view of
affirmative action does not garner the same attention that the margi-
nal percentage of contracts awarded to MBEs or WBEs receives
under reverse discrimination headlines. 66 Thus, affirmative action in
161. This takes blaming the victim to new lows.
162. Powell, supra note 157.
163. The numbers, however, are not as high as had been hoped.
164. State of California, Little Hoover Comm'n, California's $4 Billion Bottom
Line: Getting Best Value Out of the Procurement Process, Rep. No. 121, at 6 (Mar.
1993).
165. Virginia Ellis & John Hurst, Women, Minorities Still Lag in Government Con-
tracting, L.A. Times, Sept. 11, 1995, at Al. Fronting is the practice of granting busi-
ness ownership to minorities or females on paper for the purpose of qualifying as an
MBE or WBE, but still keeping de facto ownership under white male control. See id.
While the audit findings were turned over to the Attorney General's office for prose-
cution, no action has been taken. Id. So, these companies are lying, preventing busi-
ness from going to bona fide MBEs and WBEs, getting that same business,
complaining about affirmative action, and the government's inaction condones their
behavior.
166. There has been a backlash against affirmative action policies:
[Afcross the state a core of angry white businessmen believe affirmative ac-
tion has fostered a new kind of discrimination, aimed directly at them. They
say that large contractors, pressed to meet affirmative action goals, are in-
creasingly giving minority- and women-owned enterprises the business that
once went to white male owned companies.
Id. Affirmative action is designed, in part, to give business to those prevented from
getting that business in the past due to discrimination. So it should not come as a
surprise that that is precisely what is happening with affirmative action. What is sur-
prising is that such a minimal amount of business is going to MBEs and WBEs. What
is even more surprising is that the very companies who have historically been getting
almost 100% percent of the business are complaining about sharing minuscule per-
centages of that business.
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government contracting has not achieved even modest goals, in part
because of fraud committed by majority-owned firms. Those same
firms are either moaning that affirmative action should be eliminated
because it is not working, or are crying reverse discrimination when a
negligible percentage of contracts is awarded to MBEs or WBEs.
Clearly, affirmative action is not at fault here, and rather than be elim-
inated, it should be revamped to run more efficiently and effectively
for women of color.
Another story will illustrate the fallacy of the myth that well-quali-
fled white males pay for preferences favoring affirmative action bene-
ficiaries. Many parents have complained that their children could not
get into law school because they are not ethnic minorities. Yet a look
at the composition of law schools reveals that minorities, including
women of color, still make up a only small percentage of all law stu-
dents,'67 and they are still severely underrepresented. For example, in
1995-1996, out of a total of 129,318 law students, 9779 were Black
American, 1085 were Native American, 1" and 2495 were Mexican-
American. 1 6 9 Thus, it is evident that minority students hardly cause a
massive displacement of white students. The numbers for practicing
lawyers are even more discouraging. In 1995, only 8.36% of associate
attorneys nationwide were minorities, while a paltry 2.68% of partners
were minorities. 7 ' While 38.99% of the associate attorneys were wo-
men, only 12.91% of partners were women. 7 As noted elsewhere,
few statistics exist on women of color.'2 However, in Chicago, just
under 2% of attorneys are women of color?' 3 Thus, in spite of the
myth that undeserving minorities are taking away white men's entitle-
ments, women of color are still underrepresented in law and many
other professions.
All this is not to say that non-beneficiaries may be asked to bear too
much of the cost of some affirmative action programs. To the extent
that a program is structured so that those parties pay an undue price,
however, the program will not, and should not, last. As case law
shows, non-beneficiaries are well-versed in affirmative action law and
have shown no hesitation in bringing reverse discrimination law-
167. For example, at the University of Texas School of Law, '[t]he state population
is 11.6% black and 25.6% Hispanic; while the 1992 law school class was 8% black and
10.7% Hispanic." Wrong Decision: One View on U of Texas Case, Daily Rep. Card,
(Mar. 25, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Rptcrd File.
168. These students were classified as American Indian or Alaskan Native and
their numbers were lumped together. See ABA, A Review of Legal Education in the
United States Fall 1995, at 68-69.
169. Id. at 67-69.
170. Edward A. Adams, Survey Shows Diversity at Firms Still Lagging, N.Y. LJ.,
Mar. 29, 1995, at 1.
171. Id
172. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 52-58.
173. See Briggs Adams, Law Finns Count Diversity Gains by the Ones, Chi. Law.,
May 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Chilaw File.
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suits.' 74 The solution is not to do away with a program that is result-
ing in some improvement, but rather to modify and overhaul the
program to make it more efficient and results-oriented.
D. Myth: Affirmative Action Beneficiaries are Stigmatized
The fourth myth is that affirmative action stigmatizes beneficiaries.
Critics claim that affirmative action results in continued negative ste-
reotypes of beneficiaries and causes self-doubt and low self-esteem
among those beneficiaries who believe they have attained their posi-
tions because of affirmative action. 175 For most beneficiaries, this is
simply inaccurate-no evidence exists that the majority of affirmative
action beneficiaries are stigmatized.'76
Even if there is some truth to the stigma criticism for occasional
beneficiaries, for women of color who have been conditioned to feel
low self-esteem and self doubt, the experience is hardly novel. For
174. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (involving
lawsuit brought by majority contractor over minority preferences in allocating federal
highway funds); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (involving
lawsuit by majority student over race-based admissions quotas); Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) (involving lawsuit by major-
ity applicants over racial preferences used in admissions programs).
175. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (stating
that classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm); id. at 516-17, 527
(Stevens, J., concurring in part) (same); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545, 547
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (stating that preferen-
tial programs may reinforce common stereotypes); see also Carter, supra note 6, at 12,
14 (observing that some Americans view affirmative action beneficiaries as carrying a
"badge of shame"); Thomas Sowell, The Plight of Black Students in the United States,
103 Daedalus 179, 180-84 (1974) (stating that affirmative action can create a sense of
perpetual inferiority); Ann Scales & Maria Shao, Gains Can Stigmatize Those Who
Benefit, Boston Globe, May 22, 1995, at 8 (stating that beneficiaries sometimes say
that whites believe they obtained their positions because of affirmative action rather
than qualifications); Steele, supra note 130 (noting that, to some, racial preferences
imply an inferior status).
176. It seems that a small minority of beneficiaries buys into the stigma claim.
Derek Bok cites a Harvard poll which indicates that fewer than five percent of Afri-
can-American undergraduates feel the stigma pinch. Derek Bok, The Case for Racial
Preferences: Admitting Success, in Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy 333, 334
(Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S. Zembaty eds., 4th ed. 1992). But see Wilson, supra
note 115, at 151-54 (stating "that [although] affirmative action often stigmatizes those
who benefit from it .... [iut is racism, not affirmative action, that stigmatizes minori-
ties); see also Thomas I. Chacko, Women and Equal Employment Opportunity: Some
Unintended Effects, 67 J. Applied Psych. 119, 122 (1982) ("Women who are selected
because of their sex are stigmatized as second-class citizens in need of special reme-
dies."); Madeline E. Heilman et al., Intentionally Favored, Unintentionally Harmed?
Impact of Sex-Based Preferential Selection on Self-Perceptions and Self-Evaluations, 72
J. Applied. Psych. 62, 67 (1987) ("Women's performance apprehensions were there-
fore expected to be exacerbated by the ambiguity of preferential selection."). Note,
however, that these studies discussed the stigmatizing effects of affirmative action
when beneficiaries believed they benefited solely because of affirmative action, not
because of merit. Yet few affirmative action beneficiaries believe that they are un-
qualified for positions or candidacies. Thus, those who feel stigmatized account for a
relatively small percent of all beneficiaries.
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example, I have spoken with many women of color about their law
school experiences of attending class, hearing a professor say some-
thing demeaning about women of color, noticing no reaction among
their classmates, and ultimately wondering, "Is it just me?"'" To il-
lustrate, at a conference at Harvard Law School organized by the Wo-
men of Color Collective,178 when one panelist described the "is it just
me" phenomenon, women throughout the audience nodded their
heads in understanding.
179
To the extent there is self-doubt or stigma among women of color,
there are many explanations other than, or in addition to, affirmative
action.18 0 For example, women of color already may lack confidence
because of family upbringing or cultural or social conditioning,' 8' re-
gardless of the existence of affirmative action. Furthermore, many
women of color have been treated with disrespect and the expectation
that they will not succeed-too often self-fulfilling prophecies." 2 A
large percentage of women of color enter traditional occupations such
as housecleaning, childcare, and other service/servant types of jobs.s
177. See Lani Guinier, et al., supra note 75, at 46 n.117.
178. Forging Forward: Women of Color and the Law, Harvard Law School, Feb.
24-25, 1996.
179. Id.
180. To the extent that affirmative action contributes to stigma, "one of the tragic
consequences of living in a racist and sexist world that is replete with negative stereo-
types about the abilities of women and people of color is that some of these individu-
als have a difficult time not internalizing these views to some degree." Harris &
Narayan, supra note 127, at 30; see also Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted
But Not Accepted. Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 Berkeley Wo-
men's LJ. 1, 43-44 (1989-90) (noting that rigorous requirements of law school in a
majority environment intensifies feelings of isolation and self doubt in women of
color).
181. One Latina said that her low self esteem at home caused her to look for self
esteem elsewhere-in the streets. Even as she continued through school, she did not
think she deserved a quality education. "She thought that teachers gave her good
grades because they felt sorry for her. The same with the scholarship to University of
California San Diego. And even when she made the provost's list." Anna Cearley,
Teacher's Own Story Gives Hope to Latinas, San Diego Union-Trib., Apr. 17, 1994, at
B-3.
182. One critic noted:
[Y]oung Latinas are not ambitious, succumbing to low expectations of family
and society. Latinas have the highest dropout rate in [San Diego] county,
leaving school more than twice as fast as their African-American and white
peers .... Statistics fail to capture the whole picture, however, since many
students leave school before high school, when the state begins to track
dropouts.
See Maura Reynolds, Role Models Give Boost to Latinas, San Diego Union-Trib.,
May 31, 1992, at B-2.
183. In a report prepared for the United States Department of Labor, the authors
stated that:
Nearly 70 percent of the full-time female labor force work in low-paying
occupational categories. Women of color work in minority- female-domi-
nated jobs in the race- and gender-specific segment of the secondary labor
market. Wage differentials by gender and race are due to channeling women
and minorities into less complex jobs, as well as underpaying female-domi-
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There are few women who look like them in positions of power or
looking after them and their interests. These factors are much more
likely to cause low self-esteem or stigma than affirmative action,
which could give them a boost out of the colored feminization of
poverty.
Regardless of affirmative action, women of color's qualifications are
often suspect in the eyes of their colleagues or peers."8 Until we truly
have a color-blind society,18 5 however, people will always wonder
whether women of color qualify for positions. Women of color often
have to work harder just to get the respect that their white male col-
leagues enjoy as a birth right. The presumption favoring white males
seems to be that they are qualified until they prove otherwise. With
women of color, the presumption seems to be that they are unquali-
fied until they prove otherwise.
Blacks and whites must face the fact that affirmative action has
made no significant difference in the way whites look at blacks.
Competent and successful blacks are still seen as exceptional.
Before and since affirmative action, most white people see another
white as competent until proven incompetent and a black person as
incompetent until proved competent.1 6
Thus, there is little risk that affirmative action would wound our self-
esteem to the point of disabling us, and it certainly would not be the
worst wound we have borne. We would welcome some open doors
nated and significantly minority jobs relative to their compensable
characteristics.
Sharon L. Harlan & Catherine White Bernheide, Glass Ceiling Commission, U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Barriers to Workplace Advancement Experienced by Women in
Low-Paying Occupations (1994). Latina/os sixteen years and older are more likely to
be engaged in low-paying, less stable, and more hazardous occupations (such as
fabricators, laborers and in service occupations) than their non-Latina/o peers, who
are more likely to be in professional or managerial occupations. National Association
of Hispanic Publications, Hispanics-Latinos: Diverse People in a Multicultural Soci-
ety 17 (1995). While the unemployment rate has vacillated for Latina/os as for the
rest of the population, it has consistently been higher for Latina/os. For example, in
1994, Latina/os' unemployment rate was 11.1%, compared to 5.7% for non-Hispanic
whites. Id. at 20.
184. One academic agreed that affirmative action might cause some stigma, but
went on to argue that
[ilt is unrealistic to think... that affirmative action causes most white dispar-
agement of the abilities of blacks. Such disparagement, buttressed for de-
cades by the rigid exclusion of blacks from educational and employment
opportunities, is precisely what engendered the explosive crisis to which af-
firmative action is a response.
Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust, supra note 103, at 1331.
185. America is clearly not yet a color-blind society. If it were, it would be easy for
African-Americans to catch cabs, the Los Angeles riots would not have occurred fol-
lowing the Rodney King verdict, and the nation would not have reacted in such a
divided fashion following the O.J. Simpson verdicts. For a more detailed critique of
the color-blind notion, see infra text accompanying notes 407-13.
186. Joint Ctr. for Political & Econ. Studies, The Inclusive University: A New En-
vironment for Higher Education 18 (1993) [hereinafter The Inclusive University].
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even with the potential accompanying "stigma risk." This risk is much
more attractive than joblessness or low paying work. Furthermore,
any stigma-attached downside to affirmative action does not outweigh
the upside of providing opportunities for women of color that would
not otherwise exist.
E. Myth: Affirmative Action Disregards Low-Income Persons
The fifth and final myth which I explore is that affirmative action
benefits only middle-income beneficiaries to the exclusion of lower-
income persons."8 Critics who make this claim argue that affirmative
action is therefore defective and should be abolished. One fallacy un-
derlying this myth is that even if many current affirmative action ben-
eficiaries are from middle-class families, that was not the case at the
dawn of affirmative action.
The world in which affirmative action policies were initiated was a
world in which a great many prestigious institutions had been exclu-
sive enclaves of upper-class white men. It was also a world where
the trades or the skilled blue-collar professions were predominantly
the preserve of white working-class men. Even a moderate opening
up of these domains to people excluded from throughout history, a
process in which affirmative action policies have played a crucial
causal role, is arguably an important change in the structural status
quo.1 8
8
In all likelihood, many of today's middle-class women of color are
middle-class precisely because of affirmative action."8 9 Furthermore,
while a larger percentage of middle-income than lower-income per-
sons benefits from affirmative action, that does not mean affirmative
action is ineffective. "Affirmative action was never intended to serve
as a direct anti-poverty program. To rely on affirmative action
alone-or even primarily-to solve the black community's problems
would be as unrealistic as relying on black neighborhood self-help
programs alone."'190
Generally fewer lower-income persons than middle- and upper-in-
come persons pursue higher education or become white collar profes-
sionals for many reasons other than affirmative action. It is for
187. See Carter, supra note 6, at 71.
188. Harris & Narayan, supra note 127, at 13 (citations omitted).
189. "There is near-unanimous consensus among economists that the government
antidiscrimination programs beginning in 1964 contributed to the improved income of
African-Americans." Report to the President, supra note 20, § 3.2.1. The Report,
however, cautions us that it is unclear exactly which programs led to this change and
that it was more likely a result of collective efforts. Id.
190. The Inclusive University, supra note 186, at 19; see also Cornel West, Equality
and Identity, The American Prospect, Spring 1992, at 120 ("Progressives should view
affirmative action as neither a major solution to poverty nor a sufficient means to
equality. We should see it primarily playing a negative role-namely, to insure that
discriminatory practices against women and people of color are abated.").
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complex and inter-related social, economic, political, and educational
reasons that are beyond the scope of this article. 191 But briefly, the
economic class breakdown of affirmative action beneficiaries is attrib-
utable primarily to systematic factors that favor the success of middle-
income persons over lower-income persons generally. For example,
middle- and upper-income persons are more likely to be part of two-
parent families than are lower-income persons. 192 TWo-parent fami-
lies, in turn, are more likely to provide a greater support system for
their children, ranging from more time with them,193 to greater re-
sources if both parents work. Those resources could include tutors,
computers, and extracurricular activities that enhance educational op-
portunities. 94 Also, children from lower-income families have lower
graduation rates than children from middle-income families.195 That
is not surprising, considering that "[t]he children and grandchildren of
dropouts tend to have less intellectual stimulation at home and no role
models upon which to base their attitude toward education.'
'196
Even acknowledging the distribution of affirmative action benefi-
ciaries by economic status, one should not jump to the conclusion that
lower-income persons do not benefit from affirmative action. They
directly benefit from affirmative action vis-A-vis college and graduate
school admissions, as well as through employment or receipt of con-
tracts. They indirectly benefit from affirmative action in other ways.
191. There are many works that discuss the perpetuation of cycles of low-income
jobs, limited education and powerlessness of people of color generally. For a discus-
sion of Latinos in this context, see Earl Shorris, Latinos: A Biography of the People
(1992). For a discussion of African-Americans in this context, see Derrick A. Bell,
Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism (1992); Cose, supra note
100; Nathan McCall, Makes Me Wanna Holler: A Young Black Man in America
(1994).
192. "[N]early half the nation's single mothers and their children are poor, com-
pared with 9 percent of married couples and their children." Carrie Teegardin, Single
with Children, Atlanta J./Const., May 7, 1995, at G6. Moreover, "children in single-
parent families do worse in school, have more behavior and health problems, and face
a more difficult future than do children in two-parent families." Michael Gartner,
Surprise! Programs Help Close Race Gap, USA Today, Dec. 5, 1995, at 11A.
193. After all, they are dividing child-rearing between two people instead of one
and if one parent does not work, then the stay-at-home parent can offer even more
time and emotional support to children.
194. Some activities might include music, dance or language lessons, art classes, or
camps. All of these tend to make children more well rounded. If you extrapolate the
impact of these activities over one's childhood, by the time that child is ready to apply
for college, he or she should look much better on paper than an applicant from a
lower-income family who did not have similar advantages.
195. See Russell W. Rumberger, Dropping Out of High School: The Influence of
Race, Sex, and Family Background, 20 Am. Educ. Res. J. 199, 210 (1983).
196. Shorris, supra note 191, at 220. Shorris also listed additional hurdles which
Latinos face-their respect for teachers does not translate into success in the class
room, and their history of failure in the class room conditions teachers and adminis-
trators to expect Latinos to fail. Id. He noted that many Latinos who have succeeded
have done so in spite of repeated counseling to opt for vocational courses. Id. Many
of my friends recount that same story-it is familiar particularly to Latinas.
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For example, many direct affirmative action beneficiaries serve low-
income persons of color. "Black and Hispanic physicians serve pro-
portionally more minority and poor patients than white doctors do
.... 197 In addition, as women of color move up the economic ladder,
they are more likely to become advocates for women of color lower
down the ladder.198 Dean Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige describe
this multiplier effect as follows:
[A group member's] rise may benefit members of her group and
may reduce outsiders' prejudice against group members. Her mate-
rial success may enable her to support group-related institutions.
Her access to power may enable her to promote or protect the in-
terests of other group members. She may serve as an example or
inspiration for young members and thus encourage their pursuit of
higher education and professional career paths... [thus,] a rise in
[her] status may have a multiplier effect, creating external benefits
for other, less advantaged members of her group.
1
Another problem with the criticism that affirmative action should
do less for middle-income persons and more for low-income persons is
that it simplistically ignores the confluence of class, race, and gen-
der.2° The criticism presupposes that if a woman of color is middle-
or upper-income, then she does not experience discrimination and
thus should not benefit from affirmative action. But the reality is that
one's ethnicity and gender do not go away, regardless of economic
class. Ethnicity and gender are integral to identity and often times are
apparent when class is not. Thus, it is possible for Patricia Williams,
197. Mike Madden, Assuring Minority Medical Care.: Affirmative Action in Med
Schools Key, USA Today, July 29, 1996, at 8B. This article went on to report that
"underserved patients receive more treatment from physicians with disadvantaged
backgrounds than from doctors who grew up wealthy." Id.
198. For example, I advocate for low-income Latinas in a number of ways, ranging
from working with school children to organizing Community Law Schools focusing on
issues that impact Latinas. Ellen Head, winner of the Sojourner Truth award, is a
black woman and the director of employment management at Hill Air Force Base.
She believes that progress must continue for women and minorities and she is com-
mitted to "making management aware of the capabilities of those groups." Tom
Quinn, Awards Spotlight Spirit of Women: Awards Honor Spirit of Utah Woman, Salt
Lake City Trib., Apr. 14, 1995, at C-i, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sltrib File
(quoting Ellen Head). She is passionate about making sure the door stays open for
people behind her, including women of color. Dahlia Torres, who went to school at
the University of Texas, has done significant service work in San Diego County. For
example, she has set up English as Second Language classes in migrant camps, she has
organized Mexican dance classes in county areas with large Latino populations, and
she has helped plan Cinco de Mayo celebrations. Her vision includes enhancement of
opportunities for young Latinas. Lola Sherman, Expert on Migrant Camps I of 13
Latinas to Be Honored, San Diego Union-Trib., Apr. 10, 1993, at B-2.
199. Brest & Oshige, supra note 6, at 868 (emphasis omitted); see also Paul Brest,
The Supreme Court 1975 Ten Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Princi-
ple, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 46-47 (1976) (illustrating the positive externalities associated
with the multiplier effect).
200. See, eg., Harris and Narayan, supra note 127, at 5 (noting that middle-class
minorities are not shielded from the effects of racism).
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an African-American law professor, to be refused entrance at a cloth-
ing shop.201 In a similar vein, Patti Chavarria, a Latina lawyer at a
prominent San Diego law firm, went to sign in at court and was told
by a male bailiff that only attorneys can sign in.202 Even Oprah Win-
frey, one of the wealthiest Americans (no, not women, not African-
Americans, but Americans), °3 has been refused entrance to a Man-
hattan boutique.0 4 Granted, that was when she was only making $8
million a year.20 5 Finally, virtually every female of color is at a disad-
vantage when purchasing a car, regardless of her economic status.
20 6
In all of these cases of discrimination, class was irrelevant but race
and gender were not. Rather than looking at the economic class of
women of color, it is more logical to look at whether women of color,
who have traditionally been subordinated and marginalized, are still
disproportionately underrepresented in higher education, the legal
academy, and government contracting. If the answer is yes, then it is
desirable to alter the mechanics which cause that underrepresentation.
It is not essential that representation come only, or even primarily,
from lower-income members of those groups. It is more important to
utilize affirmative action to get women of color in the door. Once
there, they can work with others to ensure representation of women
of color more generally. With more women of color in positions of
power, then discriminatory incidents against women of color like
those described in this section will decline.20 7 Thus, affirmative action
is still needed to get women of color into those positions.
In summary. this part has explored five common myths which sur-
round affirmative action: the double-dipping myth, the merit myth,
the perpetrator-victim myth, the stigma myth, and the myth that af-
firmative action ignores low-income persons. This exploration has ex-
201. See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 127, 128 (1987).
Professor Williams wrote that she sought entry into a Manhattan store where a young
white male peered out at her for awhile before mouthing the words that the store was
closed. Meanwhile, many white people were shopping in the store at mid-day. Id.
202. Telephone Interview with Patti Chavarria (June 3, 1995). It is unclear whether
this act was prompted by Ms. Chavarria's race or gender. That is often the case.
203. Forbes estimated Winfrey's net worth as in excess of $340 million. Robert La
Franco & Josh McHugh, The Forbes Four Hundred: "Piranha Is Good," Forbes, Oct.
16, 1995, at 68. Her 1996 income alone was estimated at $97 million. Robert La
Franco, The Top 40, Forbes, Sept. 23, 1996, at 165.
204. Intriguers: Oprah Winfrey, People Weekly, Dec. 28, 1987-Jan. 4, 1988, at 74.
205. Id.
206. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negoti-
ations, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1991). "[Bjlacks and women simply cannot buy the
same car for the same price as can white men using identical bargaining strategies."
Id. at 821-22.
207. For women of color to get into positions of power, they can take a number of
steps, such as going to college, and then graduate school. This would open doors that
would not otherwise be open. Once they get into leadership positions, they can open
the doors for other women and establish unique networks.
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posed these myths to be just that-myths which detrimentally impact
women of color by creating hostility, both toward affirmative action
and toward women of color as its potential beneficiaries. This explo-
ration has additionally established that affirmative action has been ef-
fective in limiting the impact of discrimination, racism, and sexism on
women of color and in increasing opportunities for them. Conse-
quently, affirmative action should continue as a strategy to increase
opportunities for women of color so long as discrimination, racism and
sexism persist.
II. MORAL BASES SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR
WOMEN OF COLOR
This part discusses three moral bases or justifications supporting the
continuation of affirmative action for women of color.2 s One justifi-
cation stems from the economic injustice which women of color now
suffer, and the moral imperative to change the system which causes
that injustice. Another justification arises from the theory of distribu-
tive justice, which proposes equality of opportunity for all. As long as
opportunities are not equally available to women of color, affirmative
action should remain in place because it promotes greater equality of
opportunity. A final justification for affirmative action arises from its
promotion of diversity. Diversity, in turn, encourages inclusiveness
and offers many advantages such as role modeling, while also defusing
the dangers which accompany exclusiveness, racism and sexism. This
part also elaborates on actual lives of women of color, again as juxta-
posed against the myths outlined in part I.
A. Economic Justice
This section explores the economic story of women of color. It dis-
cusses how women of color have historically been, and continue to be,
at the bottom of the economic food chain. It concludes with a discus-
sion of why affirmative action should remain a policy that assists wo-
men of color in climbing out from the bottom.
Women generally, and women of color particularly, have virtually
always been economically inferior to men.2" One reason is that patri-
archal society devalues and discourages women's participation in the
208. While various policies suggest that affirmative action is justified for different
groups for distinct reasons, I focus here on policies that uniquely justify affirmative
action for women of color.
209. See Deborah Figart et al., The Wage Gap and Women of Color, 26 Inst. for
Women's Pol'y Res. 25 (1989); Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Leaflet No. 93-
5, Facts On Working Women: Earnings Differences Between Women and Men 2
(1993); see also Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem. Feminist Challenges
and Cultural Change, 100 Yale LJ. 1731, 1740 (1991) [hereinafter Rhode, Feminist
Challenges] (stating that women traditionally have been disadvantaged in the labor
market, which led feminists to fight for legislation to correct the disparity).
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work force.21 0 It has discouraged their participation by deflating their
wages, then justifying these lower wages because they are not the
heads of households and therefore do not have to support themselves
or their families.2 ' This may have had some validity when nuclear
families were more common, when there were fewer women in the
work force, and when divorce rates were lower, but even then women
were occasionally heads of household. This wage inequality persists,
even though 60% of women are now the "sole or major wage earners"
in their families. 12
In modern times, women frequently entered the outside work force
as stenographers and typists.213 Schools, in fact, often trained girls to
perform clerical work.214 While these occupations paid less than typi-
cally male occupations,215 at least they paid more than the work that
was typically available for women of color-domestic or agricultural
work. 16 Today, on average, women of color continue to earn less
than white women.217 Consequently, most women of color sit "at the
bottom of the earning-prestige-opportunity-status ladder in the
United States.
' 218
Women of color continue to be economically disadvantaged.21 9
They and their children live in poverty in greater rates than their
210. Margery W. Davies, Woman's Place Is at the Typewriter: Office Work and
Office Workers 1870-1930, at 56 (1982).
211. Id.
212. Kathleen O'Connor, Women Oft Slighted by the Health System, Puget Sound
Bus. J., Mar. 15, 1996, available in 1995 WL 10057220.
213. Davies, supra note 210, at 52-53. Note, however, that women entered the
work force for pay much earlier. For example, some women joined the wage labor
force in the period following the American Revolution. See Alice Kessler-Harris, Out
to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States 21-22 (1982). Wo-
men also hired themselves out as servants and worked as teachers. Id. at 47-48, 56-57.
214. Davies, supra note 210, at 72.
215. As recently as 1991, full time female workers earned 70 cents for every dollar
that full time male workers earned. Elaine Sorenson, Comparable Worth: Is It a Wor-
thy Policy? 3 (1994). Women earn less than men in part because male dominated
professions (such as law and engineering) pay more than female dominated profes-
sions (such as clerical, teaching and nursing). See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Com-
parable Worth: An Analysis and Recommendations 11 (1985). Of course, women
could not enter many higher paying professions until relatively recently, in no small
part due to men's desire to keep those jobs, and the related power that comes with
those jobs, to themselves.
216. See Claudia Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History
of American Women 154 (1990).
217. See supra note 31; see also Gerda Lerner, Black Women in White America: A
Documentary History 219 (1972) (comparing earnings of women of color to those of
white women).
218. See Lerner, supra note 217, at 226.
219. While the following statistics are for men of color, the statistics for women of
color are presumably even more disheartening as they represent only a subset of the
larger set of "people of color."
[T]he black unemployment rate remains over twice the white unemployment
rate; 97 percent of senior managers in Fortune 1000 corporations are white
males .... In 1993, Hispanic men were half as likely as white men to be
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white counterparts.' For example, "[iln 1992, over 50 percent of Af-
rican American children under 6 and 44 percent of Hispanic children
lived under the poverty level, while only 14.4 percent of white children
did so."'" Furthermore, poor children frequently live in households
headed by women of color.' Approximately 8,613,000 children lived
in households headed by women of color as of March 1994.3 These
statistics are expected considering that "[m]inorities and women con-
tinue to be disproportionately employed in clerical jobs and in the
lower grade levels of other occupational series."' ' 4
The question of why women of color remain at the bottom is a com-
plex one with no simple answers. However, there are many causes
which contribute to their economic status. One is the inevitable
strength of precedent: "The consequences of years of officially sanc-
tioned exclusion and deprivation are powerfully evident in the social
and economic ills we observe today."'  Thus, even assuming that so-
ciety recognizes women's economic inequality and considers it a prob-
lem worth solving,' it cannot be solved easily or quickly.
managers or professionals; only 0.4 percent of senior management positions
in Fortune 1000 industrial and Fortune 500 service industries are Hispanic.
Report to the President, supra note 20, § 4.1.
220. Some female scholars argue that they are not only impoverished, but that their
impoverishment is critically tied to men's enrichment. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams,
Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797, 801 (1989) [hereinafter Williams,
Deconstructing Gender] (attributing the impoverishment of women and children to
the enrichment of men). Professor Williams also points out that "Is]ixty percent of all
people in poverty ... are women," and that "[flemale-headed households are five
times more likely to be poor and up to ten times more likely to stay poor than are
households with a male present." Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1
Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 383, 383 (1994) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Williams, Mar-
ried Women and Property].
221. Report to the President, supra note 20, § 4.3. "[Blacks] number disproportion-
ately among the poor and near-poor." The Inclusive University, supra note 186, at 10.
This statement came up in the context of why minorities generally do not pursue
education, which was tied to escalating tuition costs coupled with major cutbacks in
financial aid. Id.
Professor Williams reminds us that "[c]hildren are the poorest group in the United
States... over half of the children living in female-headed households will experience
childhood poverty." Williams, Married Women and Property, supra note 220, at 384.
222. "As of 1991, 23.8% of Hispanic families were maintained by a female house-
holder, with no husband present, compared to 16.4% of non-Hispanic households."
Nat'l Council of La Raza, State of Hispanic America 1991: An Overview 4 (1992).
More frightening, "[a]lmost half (48.3%) of female-headed Hispanic families were
poor in 1990, compared to 31.7% of comparable non-Hispanic families." Id. at 16.
223. Abstract, supra note 31, at 65. During the same time period, approximately
45.9% of Black children and 39.9% of Hispanic children lived below the poverty
level. Id. at 480.
224. Report to the President, supra note 20, § 8.1.
225. Id § 1.2.2.
226. This is a risky assumption given today's political and judicial climate, as evi-
denced by recent instability in women's rights. For example, since Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), granted women a constitutionally protected privacy right to choose
whether to have an abortion, twenty-seven states have enacted laws requiring a par-
ent's consent for a minor to have an abortion. Deborah Haas-Wilson, The Impact of
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Another cause is wage inequality. As of 1993, women on average
earned only 71 cents for every dollar earned by men.227 Still worse,
African-American women earned only 64 cents and Latinas earned
even less-54 cents.228 Thus, even if affirmative action helps women
of color acquire an education or employment, it does not ensure eco-
nomic parity. Nonetheless, if equality of opportunity is a stated goal,
it is preferable for women of color to obtain educational degrees and
employment through affirmative action, as opposed to not having
those opportunities.229
Women also lag behind men economically because of men's reluc-
tance to give up power to women generally, especially if they con-
sciously or subconsciously consider women their inferiors.230 In
discussing a Glass Ceiling Commission study, one report found that
"[t]he fears and prejudices of lower-rung white male executives were
listed as a principal barrier to the advancement of women andminorities.""s
Another reason that women of color are economically inferior is
their overrepresentation as single mothers. 2  In particular, women
who cared for their children full-time while married incurred tremen-
State Abortion Restrictions on Minors' Demand for Abortions, 31 J. Hum. Resources
140, 141 (1996). In addition, during that same time period, thirteen states either be-
gan or altogether cut off public funding for medically necessary abortions for low-
income women. Id. at 143. In addition, Congress tightened abortion restrictions by
passing a bill allowing states to deny Medicaid funds for abortions for poor women
who are victims of rape or incest. H.R. 222, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995). Finally, the
House passed a provision that would prohibit the American College of Graduate
Medical Education from requiring abortion training as part of its accreditation pro-
cess for obstetrical-gynecological training. H.R. 3019, 104th Cong., §§ 515, 3013
(1996).
227. Why Affirmative Action is Still Necessary, supra note 83, at 5.
228. Id. Other articles elaborate on the wage inequity issue. See Mary Joe Frug, A
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1045,
1061-62 (1992); Rhode, Feminist Challenges, supra note 209, at 1735 ("By focusing on
how gender inequality is discounted, dismissed, or deflected, we may gain a better
sense of how it can be addressed."); Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988
Duke L.J. 1207; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 220, at 822-36 (discuss-
ing the Western wage labor system as one based on power relations which elevate
men to "ideal worker" status and relegate women to second class worker status,
which in turn negatively impact women's social and economic position); Symposium,
The Gender Gap in Compensation, 82 Geo. L.J. 27 (1993).
229. It will take steady efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the gender gap in
income. That discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
230. Many feminists consider gender relations as a system of power relations. See,
e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 40 (1987) ("[Aln equality ques-
tion is a question of the distribution of power."); Williams, Deconstructing Gender,
supra note 220, at 801 (applying MacKinnon's description of gender as a system of
power relations to the relationship between family responsibilities and work).
231. Report to the President, supra note 20, § 4.3. The same study found that men
consistently advanced more quickly than women. Id.
232. In 1990, "one-third (33.0%) of all Hispanic families were headed by a single
parent, the great majority (29.0%) maintained by a woman." Nat'l Council of La
Raza, supra note 222, at 17.
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dous expenses as single parents.3 This is exacerbated by their lost
income while married. For example, over ten years ago, one scholar
calculated that a mother who stayed out of the work force until a child
was fourteen forfeited an average of $100,000 in earnings.- Related
to this is the disproportionate financial decline that women and chil-
dren suffer if a marriage ends in divorce. One scholar found that the
standard of living for men in the year immediately following divorce
improves by approximately 10%, while the standard of living for wo-
men and children tends to decline by approximately 27%.31
The differential economic impact of divorce is not surprising, con-
sidering the paradigm for property division on divorce. Some commu-
nity property states divide community property equally, while
apportioning to each spouse his or her separate property.236 The re-
maining community property states, as well as separate property
states, utilize the concept of equitable distribution to divide property
on divorce, with a fifty-fifty division of property becoming the
norm.3 7 At first glance, this "equal" division of property seems fair
because it attempts to provide each spouse with fifty percent of the
marital property. This model, however, has some built-in problems
which typically disadvantage women and children. - One problem is
that one-half of the marital property goes to one person, for that per-
son's use, while the other half goes to the other person, for the use of
233. Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America 360 (1985).
234. Id. at 185 n.*. This amount is obviously much higher now.
235. Katharine Webster, Widely Quoted Figures on Women After Divorce Were Off,
Author Admits, San Diego Union-Trib., May 18, 1996, at A-25. Lenore J. Weitzman's
original research indicated that women's standard of living in the year following di-
vorce declined by 73%. Id. Another researcher, however, challenged that figure, and
Weitzman recently admitted that her original numbers were off. hi. Note that these
figures break down standards of living by gender, not by custodiallnoncustodial par-
ent status. Women, however, tend to receive custody more frequently than men. Ac-
cording to a National Center for Health Statistics review, 71% of custody awards go
to mothers, 8.5% to fathers, 15.5% were shared, and 5% go to friends or relatives.
Maureen Downey, Coping With Separation: Chronicles of Vrisiting Fathers, Atlanta JJ
Const., May 31, 1995, at C-9. In Massachusetts, 98% of the State Department of
Revenue's caseload of noncustodial parents are men. Shaun Sutner, DADD Wages
Fight for Custody Rights, Telegram & Gazette (Worcester, MA), Feb. 12, 1995, at A1,
available in 1995 WL 4255891.
236. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Community Property in California 6 (2d ed. 1993).
237. Id.
238. A thorough critique of property division on divorce is beyond the scope of this
article. Some critiques include Weitzman, supra note 233, at 358; June Carbone &
Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and
Divorce Reform, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953 (1991); Susan Adler Channick, What's In a Name:
A Critical Look at California's System of Characterizing Marital Property, 26 Cal. W.
L. Rev. 1 (1989); Williams, Married Women and Property, supra note 220, at 396-402.
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23two or more persons,  with women overwhelmingly receiving cus-
tody of children.24° This is clearly not an equal division.
Another problem with marital property division is that it generally
does not take one of the great forms of modern wealth, human capi-
tal,24' into account. 2  Professor Robert Ellickson elaborates that at
least 75% of wealth in the United States is in the form of human capi-
tal.243 Human capital arises from an investment in one's self, typically
through education. As expected, men's human capital tends to be
more valuable than women 'S.244 By not recognizing human capital as
property capable of division on divorce, women and children suffer
unduly. "Studies document that treating fathers' human capital as
their personal property not only impoverishes women, but also results
in systematic disinvestment in children."245 Thus, with property divi-
sion that purports to be equal but is not, coupled with a definition of
marital property that does not include human capital, women and chil-
dren will continue to be economically marginalized following divorce.
These effects are magnified for women of color because they tend to
239. The non-custodial spouse receives fifty percent of the property for himself or
herself, while the custodial spouse receives fifty percent of the marital property to
divide among a minimum of two persons, thus effectively resulting in reduced use of
the marital property award. The percentage which the custodial spouse can realisti-
cally use declines dramatically with each additional custodial child.
240. Over the past century, women received custody in roughly 85% of divorce
cases. Weitzman, supra note 233, at 222; see Webster, supra note 235. Significantly,
women frequently want custody of their children but do not want to be impoverished
as a result of that choice. Nonetheless, they often gladly choose poverty with chil-
dren, rather than financial security without. See Williams, Married Women and Prop-
erty, supra note 220, at 407. Men often wage custody wars, but many times as a
bargaining chip to reduce other financial demands. See Scott Altman, Lurking in the
Shadow, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 493, 494 (1995); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for
Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings,
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523, 1541-42 (1994). Custody means more than disproportionate
care for children: it also means disproportionate spending on children. "[W]omen,
upon divorce, remain responsible for not only the care, but the lion's share of the
financial support of children." Williams, Married Women and Property, supra note
220, at 395.
241. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Trans-
mission, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 722, 723 (1988).
242. See Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and
Divorce, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 855, 868-69, 877-78 (1988). But cf. Mary Ann Glendon, The
New Family and the New Property 61 (1981) (discussing, comparatively, the trend
toward taking homemaking and human capital into account in distribution of marital
property).
243. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1353 (1993).
244. Professor Williams explains why working-class ownership of human capital
tends to be concentrated in men:
Among the working class, where the ideology of gender equality has less
strong a hold, disinvestment typically occurs before marriage, as women
"choose" lower-paid "women's work" rather than face the informal social
sanctions that police women into gender-appropriate jobs, including the se-
vere sexual harassment prevalent in traditionally male working-class jobs.
Williams, Married Women and Property, supra note 220, at 394-95.
245. Id. at 395.
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have both more children,246 and less human capital, than white
women.
247
It is common knowledge that education is a primary tool to eco-
nomic security,' 4 and that women have entered the education market
in large numbers only relatively recently. 49 Ethnic minorities also lag
behind whites in their level of education. "In 1993.... 22.6 percent of
whites had college degrees, [whereas] only 12.2 percent of African
Americans and 9.0 percent of Hispanics did."" 0 Without education,
advancement to higher paying jobs is difficult, if not impossible2 5 1
Acquiring an education without income is difficult. "In 1991, students
from families with incomes above $61,600 were roughly five times as
likely to complete college by age 24 as students from families that
earned between $21,500 and $38,200, and ten times as likely as stu-
dents from families earning less than $21,500. ''112 The impact of in-
come on a woman of color's ability to acquire an education accounts
for only part of the equation. This, of course, correlates directly with
246. In 1995, the fertility rate for white women was 1984, for black women it was
2427 and for Hispanic women, it was 2977. Jennifer Cheeseman Day, Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Population Projections of the United States by
Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, at 2 (1996). The rate is calculated
per 1000 women, thus producing an average of 1.984 children per white woman, 2.427
per black woman, and 2.977 per Hispanic woman. A different report noted that -His-
panic women, on average, have 3.5 lifetime births, while white women have 1.7 chil-
dren." U.S.-Population: Study Shows High Rate of Hispanic Fertility, Inter Press
Serv., Aug. 31, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10133984. Furthermore, among American
teenagers, "[b]irthrates were highest among minorities. In 1990, young black women
... and young Hispanic women were roughly twice as likely as whites to become teen
mothers." Teen Pregnancies: High Rates, Higher Costs, U.S. News & World Rep.,
Apr. 15, 1996, at 16. Minorities are also overrepresented as unwed mothers generally.
One article noted that "[u]mnarried Hispanic women had a birthrate of 95.3 per 1000.
The rate for black women was 86.5, and that for white women was 352." Larry
Witham, Unwed Mothers Increase: Illegitimate Births Soar Among Whites, Wash.
Times, June 7, 1995, at A3.
247. In 1993, approximately 81% of white females graduated from high school
compared with 71.1% of black females and 53.2% of Hispanic females. Abstract,
supra note 31,at 157. In 1994, about 20% of white females graduated from four year
colleges compared with about 13% of black females and 8.6% of Hispanic females.
Id.
248. Nat'l Council of La Raza, supra note 222, at 17 ("[A]ccording to Workforce
2000, about 30% of the new jobs created in the last 15 years of the 20th century will
require at least college graduation, and another 22% will require some college. Only
14% of new jobs will require less than a high school education.").
249. See generally U.S. Dep't of Educ., National Center for Educ. Statistics, Digest
of Educational Statistics (1994) (providing statistical trends in education). In the legal
field, in 1965, fewer than 10% of law school admittees were female, whereas in 1994-
95, approximately 45% were female. Unfinished Business. supra note 69, at 7.
250. Report to the President, supra note 20, § 4.3; see also Nat'l Council of La
Raza, supra note 222, at 17 ("Only about half of Hispanics are high school graduates,
less than one in ten is a college graduate, and one in eight has less than five years of
schooling.").
251. Nat'l Council of La Raza, supra note 222, at 16 ("In 1990. 35.7% of families
whose householder was not a high school graduate were poor.").
252. The Inclusive University, supra note 186, at 4.
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a woman of color's ability to earn income. There is a virtual catch-22
in place: the less money one has, the harder it is to acquire a college
education; without a degree, it is harder to earn money. If one cannot
afford a college degree, then employment opportunities are limited to
lower paying jobs." 3
If we visualize a continuum of income, women of color with limited
education (high school or less) will be on one extreme, earning the
least, and educated white men will be on the other extreme, earning
the most. In between, income rises for everyone with a college de-
gree, but at a greater rate for white men. From these statistics, we
learn a number of lessons. First, one's level of education directly im-
pacts one's income potential. Second, the greater a potential student's
wealth, the more likely that person will graduate from college. Third,
even if one has a college degree, that does not guarantee economic
equality. Applying these lessons to women of color, at the outset we
need to recognize that college must be accessible to women of color,
particularly those from lower-income families. Furthermore, colleges
and universities must welcome women of color through genuine inclu-
siveness. One way to do that, and the main focus of this article, is
through affirmative action. 4 Without affirmative action, it is almost
certain that the presence of women of color in higher education will
decline significantly. Women of color will continue to reside at the
bottom of the economic well unless they have access to higher educa-
tion. Accordingly, affirmative action must remain in place as a way
into education, which can then lead women of color out of poverty.
Until more women, particularly women of color, enter professional
careers and elevate to positions of power, they will not have the clout
to make policy decisions or institutional changes which can halt the
economic marginalization of women of color. Affirmative action has
the potential to remove the "in" from invisible, shedding light on a
many hued and vibrant resource-women of color. Thus, it should
continue in place as long as women of color are underrepresented in
education and overrepresented in poverty lines.
B. Distributive Justice
One of the goals of affirmative action is to provide equality of op-
portunity for people who have been denied opportunities or otherwise
discriminated against. Distributive justice looks to provide those op-
253. This is not to say that even if a woman acquires a college education, economic
parity with white males is achieved. In fact, disparities in income persist. Nonethe-
less, the gap is narrower than the gap between college educated white males and fe-
males of color who are not college educated.
254. Another is through outreach programs. In addition, the cost of higher educa-
tion should not place it out of the reach of women of color. This can be accomplished
through financial aid, work study programs, tuition credit vouchers, and related pro-
grams which make college more fiscally accessible.
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portunities in part by determining whether traditionally subordinated
groups currently have equal opportunities. One academic stated that
"[w]hen we consider minimum requirements of equal protection, dis-
tributive justice requires that whatever advantages are allowed under
fair conditions be allowed to everyone, regardless of race or gen-
der." 5 If those advantages are not equally available to all, distribu-
tive justice seeks to increase that availability. This theory also looks
to the distribution of resources or property to determine whether
groups are perpetually subordinated or discriminated against.'
Under this theory, because opportunities are still not equally available
and women of color are still struggling to enter and advance in higher
education,1 7 as well as in many professions, it is appropriate to con-
tinue affirmative action.
Women of color continue to be underrepresented in the legal acad-
emy, with respect to both entry and promotion.251 This is not for a
255. Fiscus, supra note 145, at 8.
256. Brest, supra note 199, at 48-49 ("The distributive theory assumes the moral
permissibility of unequal distributions of welfare among individuals, but holds that it
is at least prima facie unjust for one racial or ethnic group to be substantially worse
off than others.").
257. For example, in 1990, California's population was 7.4% African-American,
25.8% Latino, and 57.2% Anglo. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
1990 Census of Population and Housing: Summary of Population and Housing Char-
acteristics-California 38 (1991). During a corresponding time period, the UC sys-
tem's domestic student population consisted of 4.5% African-American students, and
11.1% Latino students-for a combined total of barely 16% of the total student popu-
lation which clearly was not proportional to the population of the state at large. UC
Office of the President, Student Academic Services, Admissions and Outreach Serv-
ices, Student Ethnicity Report C88330 4-5 (Jan. 1995). The source of these statistics
designated "Chicanos" and "Latinos" as separate categories, with 7.2% of the stu-
dents listed as Chicanos and 3.9% of the students listed as Latinos. Id. Since the
category "Latinos" includes both, to more accurately compare the student population
with the state population, I have combined the two student categories. Again, the
statistics did not provide a breakdown for women of color. Presumably not all the
students of color were women.
258. See Angel, supra note 25, at 801-02, 805. "By 1970.... while 4.9% of the legal
profession consisted of women, the sixty-six tenure track women made up only 2.2%
of all law school professors." Id. at 801-02 (citation omitted). I do not think any of
those women were women of color. Furthermore, "at the five schools studied women
are tenured at a substantially lower rate than men: 31% of female candidates and
60.5% of male candidates, hired and eligible for tenure between 1970 and 1987." Id.
at 805 (citation omitted); see also Vest, supra note 7, at 73-74 (comparing women's
progress in entering the academy as students to entering as faculty members). For
those women of color who are either denied entry into, or promotions within, the
academy because of gender or racial bias, there is little they can do. See id. at 69-70. It
is especially hard to prove bias in the academy, given the vague standards and the
imprecise and inconsistent application of those standards. This is exacerbated by the
disrespect accorded work relating to gender, ethnicity, or other marginalized identi-
ties. "Traditional peer review can seriously disadvantage minority and women law
professors who pursue work on the problems of race, ethnicity, and gender if defini-
tions of high-quality scholarship systematically exclude these challenging new per-
spectives." Rachel F. Moran, Commentary: The Implications of Being a Society of
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lack of candidates," 9 it has more to do with unequal opportunities.
While some women of color do obtain tenure track positions, they
frequently receive "low status" courses,260 inappropriate course
loads,261 or both.262 Furthermore, women of color in the academy
often have atypical burdens placed on them because of their "unique-
ness."2 63 For example, they are uniquely accessible to both female
students and students of color, particularly the female students of
color.264 Also, they are uniquely qualified to serve on just about any
One, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 503, 508-09 (1986). For those who do not make it, there is not
an uproar because of many people's implicit belief that "they" never belonged:
Either they are deemed mediocre, thereby fulfilling the comforting assump-
tion that "they" are not up to the task, and previous generations of academi-
cians were right in excluding them entirely, or the minority's work is deemed
competent, in which case the person is deemed a happy exception to the
general rule.
Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in Still White
Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. Rev. 385, 393 (1986).
259. Professor Angel performed statistical studies which indicated that there was a
more than sufficient pool of female faculty candidates. See Angel, supra note 25, at
801-02, & nn.9-12 (1988).
A justification for not hiring female faculty members has always been "there
aren't any qualified ones out there." This is not true nor has it ever been
true. The percentage of women faculty members has never matched, nor
come close to matching, the percentage of women lawyers in America, even
though studies indicate that the academic records of the women are at least
as good as, if not better than, those of the men.
Id. at 834 (citations omitted).
260. See Merritt & Reskin, supra note 98, at 2321 ("[W]e found that minority wo-
men were significantly more likely than minority men to teach trusts and estates, a
course many academics avoid.").
261. One female professor described her initial teaching load as follows:
During my first two years, I was assigned six of seven new courses. Three of
those courses had no casebooks .... It was not until years later that I real-
ized that such course assignments were ridiculous and inappropriate for a
new teacher. It is difficult enough for a new teacher to master three or four
new subject matter areas within the first two years of teaching, to get the
actual teaching under control, and to begin research.
At the end of two years, the dean wanted to know where my first article was,
a matter which had never been raised with me before.
Angel, supra note 25, at 823.
262. Merrit & Reskin, supra note 98, at 2321-22.
263. In discussing the difficulty of acculturation for minority faculty, Professor
Rachel Moran noted that they "are frequently burdened with disproportionately
heavy administrative duties. In addition to their teaching responsibilities, they may
be asked to assist in minority recruitment, act as advisors to minority student organi-
zations, and direct formal or informal tutoring programs for minority students." Mo-
ran, supra note 258, at 508.
264. The Latina professors on my faculty (both of us) spend a significant amount of
time with students in our offices, in the hall ways, at student mixers, orientations, new
admit receptions, student bar activities, as well as other events. We are committed to
being mentors as well as counselors to our students, regardless of gender, race, ethnic-
ity, sexual orientation, etc. However, we are in a double bind of sorts. If we were not
so committed, we would probably suffer from assertions that we are not even there
for the students we are "supposed to" mentor and counsel. On the other hand, some
faculty members probably want us to spend less time with students and more time on
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faculty, university, or administrative committee (most committees can
claim that they have no females of color on them, hence placing that
rare women of color in high demand).
The dearth of women of color in respected careers speaks to the
need for affirmative action to make opportunities equally available for
women of color. As we are reminded, "[cilaims of distributive justice
are... always centered on an abstract present; if the past is brought
into the argument, it is always incorporated into the terms of the ideal
distribution of goods-that is, a distribution that would be just for all
persons in all times."2 6 5 Accordingly, when looking at distributive jus-
tice as a policy rationale for affirmative action, we must focus on equal
opportunity today. For example, we can look at whether women of
color are fairly represented in professional careers. If we look around
at our current law and medical school faculties, corporate board
rooms, and major accounting firms, the answer is no.211 Claiming that
underrepresentation results primarily from our own laziness or inher-
ent deficiencies is simplistic and naive. The problem is much more
complex, as is the solution. Yet most people would agree that the
problem arises, at least in part, from lack of opportunity and other
factors whose impact has multiplied over time. Without opportunity,
we expect underrepresentation.
It is important to understand that "distributive justice as a matter of
equal protection requires that individuals be awarded the positions,
advantages, or benefits they would have been awarded under fair con-
ditions." 7 The term "fair conditions" does not mean that those with
the highest SAT scores win. It means that conditions from pre-school
through high school should be fair to all, thus giving every student the
opportunity to receive quality education, basic nutritional and health
care, and school and career counseling, as well as offering parental
training in the value and quality of education. Without equal and fair
opportunities, people become discouraged, which discouragement
grows exponentially over time, resulting in lower self-esteem, lower
aspirations, and self-fulfilling low expectations. Likewise, distributive
justice also results in its own upside multiplier effects-as women of
color move up, they can better serve themselves, their families and
communities, and the populations behind them.-26 For example,
"[i]ntended or not, (race-based) affirmative action in medicine has
served the purpose of improving access to care, and undoing it would
scholarship, teaching, and service of other sorts. It is easier for majority faculty mem-
bers to justify less time with students because there are many other majority faculty
members who can pick up the slack.
265. Fiscus, supra note 145, at 9.
266. See infra text accompanying notes 272-73.
267. Fiscus, supra note 145, at 13.
268. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
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hurt that access. '2 69 Many women of color who have entered previ-
ously inaccessible fields and moved up the ranks have reached a help-
ing hand back to help others.270
To summarize, distributive justice provides a policy justification for
affirmative action because it advocates equal availability of opportu-
nity-one of American society's basic tenets. Accordingly, so long as
we value equality of opportunity as a social goal, affirmative action
should continue in effect because it is proven to help accomplish that
goal.
C. Diversity
The need for economic and distributive justice supports affirmative
action, as does the need for diversity in higher education, government
contracting and positions of power generally. The United States is
comprised of a diverse population, yet those with the greatest power
and property do not reflect the diversity of that population. Only
0.05% of the population owns 39.3% of the nation's wealth, making
"the U.S. No. 1 among prosperous nations in inequality of income.
'"271
Not surprisingly, the wealthiest Americans are men,2 72 and "women
make up just 2 percent of the five top-earning officers at the nation's
500 biggest companies. 27 3 Those with the least power and property
likewise do not reflect the diversity of our population. The greatest
poverty is concentrated in the hands of people of color.274 Affirma-
tive action will not radically alter the composition of either the wealth-
iest or poorest segments of our population. But it can increase
diversity in the middle, allowing greater opportunities for many who
have effectively been blocked from access to power, prestige, and the
chance to move up. The Supreme Court has not precluded the goal of
diversity as a compelling interest to support affirmative action,275 but
269. Madden, supra note 197 (quoting Joel Cantor, primary researcher for study by
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation published in July 29, 1996 edition of the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield journal Inquiry).
270. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
271. John Rothchild, Wealth: Static Wages Except for the Rich, Time, Jan. 30, 1995,
at 60.
272. Of the 400 wealthiest Americans in 1996, 340 were men and 60 were women.
Ann Marsh, Meet the Class of 1996, Forbes, Oct. 14, 1996, at 104.
273. Maggie Jackson, Women's Pay Still Lagging, San Diego Union-Trib., Dec. 17,
1996, at C-2.
274. The ethnic composition of the bottom quintile is as follows: White-17.7%,
Black-36.8% and Hispanic-27.9%. Abstract, supra note 31, at 472. People of color
represent a smaller percent of the population, yet a larger percent of those living in
poverty.
275. Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent,
The proposition that fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to
justify... [an affirmative action] program is not inconsistent with the Court's
holding today-indeed, the question is not remotely presented in this case-
and I do not take the Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our decision
in Metro Broadcasting.
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a lower federal court has.276 Nonetheless, it remains an important so-
cial goal which can be accomplished in part through affirmative
action.2 7
Diversity fosters inclusiveness and serves the interests of the entire
population. Without diversity and inclusiveness, we risk the danger of
exclusiveness. When people are excluded from opportunity and from
society, they become frustrated and desperate. Desperate people do
desperate things. Recall the volatility following the acquittal of the
police officers who beat Rodney King.278 People were reacting not
only to the acquittal, but also venting the frustration at a social struc-
ture that systematically limits the opportunities for people of color,
segregates them into the toughest inner-city areas, allows a black man
to be severely beaten for a routine traffic violation, and then acquits
the officers who beat him. The dangers of exclusion are very real.
Through a policy of inclusiveness and diversity, this danger can be
averted.
There are many other reasons to support diversity. In the legal
academy, the Association of American Law Schools makes a commit-
ment to diversity, valuing it because it can "create an educational
community .... that incorporates the different perspectives necessary
to a more comprehensive understanding of the law and its impact on
society... [and] to produce a truly diverse profession prepared to
meet the needs of American Society. '2 79 As Dean Paul Brest and
Miranda Oshige have pointed out, "The intellectual case for diversity
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 258 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In fact, Justice Powell noted earlier that "the interest of diversity is compelling in the
context of a university's admissions program." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265,314 (1978). But racial classifications used to promote diversity still must
be narrowly tailored to cause the least burden to those negatively impacted by that
classification. Id. at 314-18; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 543-44, 552
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing the affirmative action statute was too broad
to justify a statutory classification on racial grounds).
276. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
"[W]e see the caselaw as sufficiently established that the use of ethnic diversity simply
to achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part of the consideration of a number of fac-
tors, is unconstitutional." Id. at 945-46. For a further discussion of Hopwood, see
infra text accompanying notes 358-72.
277. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 6, at 858-59; Murray, supra note 109, at 1104-
05.
278. Marc Lacey & Shawn Hubler, Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores: 4 Reported Dead
Rampage, L.A. Times, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al; David Treadwell, Violence Enpts in At-
lanta as Other Cities Brace for Trouble, L.A. Tunes, May 1, 1992, at A9; Amy Wallace
& David Ferrell, Verdicts Greeted with Outrage and Disbelief, LA. Times, Apr. 30,
1992, at Al; see also Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of
African American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1581 (1993) (blaming a societal system of "white supremacy" for the
Rodney King beating).
279. AALS Executive Committee Adopts Statement on Diversity, Equal Opportunity
and Affirmative Action, AALS Newsletter (AALS, Washington D.C.), Mar. 1996, at
9.
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begins with the observation that virtually every important issue of pol-
icy ultimately finds expression in law and the legal system. The dy-
namics and outcomes of the legal process reflect the interplay-often,
the struggle-among diverse interests and cultures."2 '
There are few women of color who hold important positions in the
academy, Fortune 500 companies, or other prominent fields or indus-
tries."' This is not inconsequential. Diversifying these arenas, in part
by adding qualified women of color to their ranks, remains important
for many reasons. For one, there are scant women of color as role
models.282 In my three years at Stanford Law School, there were no
professors who were women of color.283 Harvard Law School hired its
first woman of color, Elizabeth Warren, in 1995.28 Why would it
make a difference to have women of color as professors?
There is no question that having women on law school faculties
makes a difference and that the difference is multifaceted .... The
presence of women on a faculty also insures that women's interests
are protected. When women sit on committees fewer sexist com-
ments are made and women candidates' positive attributes are
probably focused upon .... But perhaps most important, the pres-
ence of more women faculty members alleviated the students' sense
that the one woman in the school was unique in some manner.28 5
Accordingly, women of color could add new views and experiences
which may result in a changed atmosphere and dynamic in the class-
room.286 It could also result in unique scholarship28 7 and an increased
280. Brest & Oshige, supra note 6, at 863.
281. See supra notes 86, 93 and accompanying text.
282. While role modeling to counter past societal discrimination will not legally
justify affirmative action according to the Court, see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986), there are socially compelling reasons to have women of
color as role models. For example, allowing young girls to see women who look like
them who are lawyers and law professors gives them hope that they too can aspire to
careers not seen in their families or neighborhoods. See Murray, supra note 109, at
1100-04. But see Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or,
Do You Really Want to be a Role Model?, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1222 (1991) (rejecting the
role model approach).
283. I started in the Fall of 1984 and graduated in the Spring of 1987. Stanford Law
School has since hired two women of color to its ladder faculty, Kimberly Taylor-
Thompson (in 1991), and Linda Mabry (in 1993). Telephone Interview with Professor
Robert Weisberg, Head of Faculty Recruitment, Stanford Law School (July 12, 1996).
Stanford recently announced that Professor Taylor-Thompson left for New York Uni-
versity Law School. Faculty Notes, Stan. Lawyer, Fall 1996, at 27, 29.
284. She was hired in 1995-1996 and is a full, tenured professor. Telephone Inter-
view with Michael Chmura, News Director, Harvard Law School (Aug. 6, 1996).
285. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law 233 (2d ed. 1993).
286. "Racial diversity leads not only to methodological change and the reformula-
tion of legal topics, but also to innovations in pedagogy." Ian Haney-Lopez, Commu-
nity Ties, Race, and Faculty Hiring: The Case for Professors Who Don't Think White,
Reconstruction, 1991, at 46, 55.
287. Diversity in the classroom has a positive effect on students:
The presence of women and minority scholars has in fact changed the intel-
lectual landscape of some areas of law, and their influence has permeated
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willingness for female students, particularly those of color, to speak up
in the classroom 8 and to attend office hours, thus getting the benefits
of one-on-one dialogue with professors and an opportunity to know
those professors better. 8 9 The need for diversity also trickles down or
filters up from law school students. In discussing their isolation, for-
mer Yale law students stated that: "[Al faculty with percentages of
women and people of color reflecting the general population would
send a message to students-female and male, Black, Asian, Hispanic,
Native American, and white-that women and people of color are
good enough to be professors."2 9 Thus, the need for diversity re-
fields that many would not have imagined had much connection with gender
or race. In any subject where a faculty member's experience brings different
perspectives to her scholarship, it will likely enhance her teaching in similar
ways.
Brest & Oshige, supra note 6, at 864 (footnotes omitted); see also Duncan Kennedy,
supra note 9 (arguing that affirmative action increases value of legal scholarship);
Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2-4 (contending that affirmative action will end apartheid in
legal knowledge); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal
Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 29 (1987) (stating that
excluded groups, if included, could offer expanded legal knowledge). For a discussion
of the impact of diversity, or the lack thereof, in law reviews, see Mark A. Godsey,
Educational Inequalities, The Myd of Meritocracy, and the Silencing of Minority
Voices: The Need for Diversity on America's Law Reviews, 12 Harv. BlackLetter J. 59
(1995). But see Kennedy, Racial Critiques, supra note 9, (arguing that proponents of
racial critiques have failed to persuasively support claims of racial exclusion from
legal scholarship). For a response to Kennedy's article, see Richard Delgado, When a
Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 95 (1990). This is not
to say that there is an essential voice for women of color. Nonetheless,
the importance of a diverse... faculty does not depend on the false notion
that one's race or ethnicity defines a particular way of thinking about issues
of law and policy. It does assume the reality-no less a reality because it is
socially constructed-that people of different races and ethnicities often
have different life experiences that affect their relations with members of
other groups and influence their views on issues of legal doctrine and policy.
Brest & Oshige, supra note 6, at 862.
288. Guinier et al., supra note 75, at 63-64 ("[Tlhe perception is widespread that
within the classroom, white men, more than women of all colors, are encouraged and
allowed to speak more often, for longer periods of time, and with greater positive
feedback from the professor and peers."); see also The Burdens of Both, supra note
27, at 11-14 (reporting that the law school environment is hostile, alienating, and abu-
sive to women of color).
289. See Guinier, et al., supra note 75, at 72, 77-78. Law schools do not hire enough
minority women as professors:
By neglecting to hire minority women on the same basis as minority men,
law schools-and their students-lose the talents and perspectives minority
women can offer. Legislatures and courts, in turn, lose the insights that fe-
male minority scholars could bring to legal and public policy debates. In an
increasingly diverse society, these are losses we can ill afford to sustain.
Merritt & Reskin, supra note 98, at 2301-02.
290. Weiss & Melling, supra note 63, at 1356. They went on to state that -[als long
as women and minorities do not appear on the faculty, we will infer that the faculty
who do appear consider us inferior as present or future scholars and teachers, and we
will be angry." Id. at 1357. The presence of women of color in the academy is also
beneficial for white students. Aside from providing all students with diverse view-
points shaped by their experiences, diversity in the academy allows all students to see
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mains. Yet we are still not seeing a significant change in faculty hiring.
In the CSU system, while the pace of diversification has increased
somewhat in recent years, "the rate is still so low that, if the trend
continues ... Latino parity would not be achieved for at least another
century."29 ' To make matters worse, even if women of color have
been hired in cautiously small numbers, whenever the economy falters
and budgets are tightened, their security is limited. "[W]omen and
faculty of color are most at risk due to budget reductions because they
are disproportionately concentrated among the ranks of nontenured
faculty."292
Reviewing statistics on diversity, it is clear that this country needs to
make much progress before this it can claim that its institutions repre-
sent the diverse society which makes up its population.2 93 This poor
diversity record exists with affirmative action-envision what these in-
stitutions will look like without affirmative action. Diversity would be
diminished and the chances of seeing women of color enter and ad-
vance in professional careers would decline radically. Thus, it is cru-
cial to preserve affirmative action for women of color if we do not
want them virtually to disappear from our institutions of higher edu-
cation and ensuing professions.
In this part, I have discussed moral justifications supporting affirma-
tive action. The economic justice section presented compelling statis-
tics about the financial plight of women of color, highlighting their
position at the bottom of the economic scale. Affirmative action will
not single-handedly alter their position. Eliminating affirmative ac-
tion, however, will almost certainly guarantee that fewer women of
color will leave the ranks of the poor. Thus, affirmative action pro-
women of color in positions of authority, likely a rarity for most of them. See Murray,
supra note 109, at 1103; see also Haney-Lopez, supra note 286, at 51 (arguing that
minority professors will lessen colored students' sense of inferiority and alienation).
291. Progress and Prospects, supra note 21, at 5 (emphasis added). That same re-
port pointed out that the time frame to parity could actually be much longer. "Be-
cause even the new hire rate for Latinos (9%) is less than half of the parity proportion
... if this rate persists Latinos would remain underrepresented indefinitely." Id. at 6.
292. Id. at 6.
293. For example, in a report on California Higher Education, the authors noted
that,
Latinos remain severely underrepresented in virtually every sector of Cali-
fornia higher education. Results for other groups are mixed-in general,
African Americans are represented in the executive leadership, but under-
represented in the faculty and student body, while the reverse is true of
Asian Americans. While complete data is not available, the emerging Asian/
Pacific ethnic groups-Filipinos, Southeast Asians, South Asians, and the
Pacific Islanders, who together comprise more than six percent of the Cali-
fornia population and a majority of the state's Asian/Pacific population-are
virtually absent among the leadership, faculty, and Ph.D. graduates of the
higher education system.
Id. at 1. While this information does not address the situation for women of color
(once again invisible or blended in with either women generally, or ethnic minorities
generally), we can speculate that the prognosis is even worse for them.
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vides a viable option to mobilize out from the bottom and accordingly,
must remain in place.
The distributive justice section focused on the theme of equality of
opportunity. It reminded the reader that this equality does not yet
exist, but that affirmative action brings us closer by providing greater
opportunities for women of color. Without affirmative action, the gap
will only widen and equality of opportunity will move further out of
reach.
The section on diversity confirmed that there is a causal relationship
between affirmative action and diversity. This section elaborated on
why diversity is important as a social goal and how affirmative action
contributes to diversity in education and employment. It discussed
the dangers of leaving a significant portion of the population-women
of color-behind, and how that can be avoided through a spirit of
inclusiveness fostered by affirmative action.
Each of these sections focused on the moral imperative not to leave
women of color to fend for themselves in a system which has routinely
disregarded their interests and has occasionally offered them as a sac-
rifice to promote other interests.294 Women of color have tradition-
ally been powerless to change this system but affirmative action offers
a way to educate them and increase their power. It can equip women
of color not only to change their own lives, but to change systems and
effect paradigm shifts. Accordingly, it would be inequitable, prema-
ture, and shortsighted to end affirmative action for women of color.
Il. THE LEGALITY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR WOMEN
OF COLOR
This part discusses the legality of affirmative action generally and
traces the Supreme Court's inconsistent rulings on racial classifica-
tions, including an analysis of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 95
the most recent Supreme Court race-based affirmative action case.
2 96
While case law currently mandates that a strict scrutiny standard al-
ways be used in race-based affirmative action cases and assures us that
294. See e-g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (making changes to federal welfare
law); Virginia Ellis & Dave Lesher, Wilson Details Welfare Changes to Save $550 Mil-
lion, L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1997, at Al (describing changes to California's welfare
system).
295. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
296. The Court has since had a chance to directly address race-based affirmative
action in higher education, but declined to do so. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). It nonetheless acknowledged that the ques-
tion of whether "a public college or graduate school [could] use race or national ori-
gin as a factor in its admissions process is an issue of great national importance." 116
S. Ct. at 2581-82 (explaining denial of certiorari). For a more detailed discussion of
the Hopwood case, see infra text accompanying notes 358-72.
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this standard is not fatal, 97 the trend suggests that it is becoming
harder to establish a compelling interest to support a benign affirma-
tive action program. Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons why
affirmative action should continue for women of color, which reasons
are presented later in this part. In addition, this part illustrates how
tenuous the law is in this area and how easily it changes based on
Court personnel. Thus, with alterations on the Court, the law might
switch course. This could result in a different standard for affirmative
action cases, a likelier finding of compelling interests supporting af-
firmative action for women of color, or an easier match between a
compelling interest and a program narrowly tailored to obtain that
interest.
This part also critiques the Court's recent treatment of affirmative
action, particularly the Adarand case.2 98 It analyzes the Court's con-
clusions in Adarand and its supporting justifications which demon-
strate a flawed understanding of affirmative action. This flawed
understanding would uphold affirmative action only under the nar-
rowest of circumstances-completely disregarding how discrimina-
tion, racism, and sexism operate in our society. Women of color
continue to suffer from discrimination, racism, and sexism in unique
ways which defy the formula the Court uses to determine whether to
uphold or deny the validity of affirmative action programs. This part
thus exhorts the Court and readers alike to consider the pervasiveness
of discrimination, sexism, and racism, and how they operate. It then
becomes clear that the Court's "objective" view of a color-blind soci-
ety is misguided. As long as society is not color-blind and women of
color continue to endure oppression and discrimination based on their
race and gender, it is appropriate to sustain affirmative action and
similar programs which attempt to compensate for the effects of that
oppression and discrimination.
Finally, this part demonstrates that even under the formidable stan-
dards established in Adarand, specifically tailored affirmative action
for women of color could and should be sustained. Those standards
require that a court look with strict scrutiny at any affirmative action
program for women of color.299 A program has to have a compelling
underlying interest, which could be proven for women of color in
many circumstances. Furthermore, a program has to be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest. This part will present generally how to
establish a program narrow enough to satisfy this requirement.
This part ends with a reminder that the lens which the Court has
used to view affirmative action programs filters out the symptoms,
such as discrimination, sexism, and racism, which prompt the need for
programs. With new glasses, the Court could adjust its vision to see
297. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235-37.
298. Id. at 200.
299. Id. at 237.
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both the problem and a solution, rather than only a solution in isola-
tion and out of context. This part then concludes that affirmative ac-
tion for women of color could and should be legally upheld.
A. Legality of Affirmative Action
Affirmative action is relatively new in this country's history.30
Nonetheless, it has frequently come under attack,0 1 with the most
common criticism of affirmative action being that it discriminates
against whites on the basis of their race.30 2 The standard of review for
challenged race-based governmental classifications typically at issue in
affirmative action cases has alternated between strict scrutiny30 3 and
intermediate scrutiny,3" changing with the composition of the Court
and depending on whether a federal, 0 5 state, or local government ' is
implicated. To complicate matters further, the Court's judgments fre-
quently have resulted not in opinions for the Court, but instead have
300. The term "affirmative action" came into prominence with President Ken-
nedy's Executive Order 10,925: "The contractor will not discriminate against any em-
ployee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin.
The contractor will take affirnmtive action to ensure that applicants are employed, and
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed,
color, or national origin." Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,977, 1,977 (1961)
(emphasis added).
301. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235 (holding that federal racial classifications
must serve a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored); Local 28
of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986)
(holding that individuals who are not identified victims of unlawful discrimination are
not entitled to race-conscious relief); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
272-73 (1986) (holding that retaining teachers on racial grounds during layoffs was not
permissible as affirmative action); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding
that government set-asides for minority business enterprises did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (hold-
ing that race may properly be a factor in graduate school admissions, but that quotas
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
302. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996) (holding that a state university law school's use of racial preferences in reach-
ing admissions decisions violated the Equal Protection Clause).
303. As far back as Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), race has
been deemed a "suspect" classification which requires strict scrutiny in determining
whether this type of classification can be upheld. Under this standard, the classifica-
tion or action's purpose must be constitutionally permissible, and the classification or
action must be narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose. See li re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717,721-22 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
304. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990); infra text accom-
panying notes 339-46.
305. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (applying intermediate scrutiny to federal gov-
ernment set-asides for minority-owned businesses).
306. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-97 (1989) (applying
strict scrutiny to municipal government contract set-asides for minority owned
businesses).
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given rise to split opinions with many concurrences and even more
dissents.3 °7
Race-based affirmative action cases are commonly recognized as
starting with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.30 s In
that case, Allan Bakke, a white male, applied to the University of Cal-
ifornia at Davis Medical School ("UC") under the regular admissions
program in 1973 and 1974, and was rejected each time.30 9 During that
time, UC had two admissions programs-a "regular" program and a
"special" program.310 The special program was similar to the regular
one, with some exceptions. First, there was a special admissions com-
mittee that reviewed applications and made recommendations to the
general admissions committee.311 Second, the candidates under this
program were culled from those who identified themselves as "eco-
nomically and/or educationally disadvantaged" or as members of a
"minority group." 312 Third, students with GPAs below 2.5 were not
summarily dismissed.313 Fourth, about one in five of the applicants
under this program were invited for interviews. 1 4 These candidates
were then given benchmark scores, just as under the regular admis-
sions process, but they were not rated against general candidates, only
against each other.315 The special admissions committee then made
recommendations to the general admissions committee which the gen-
eral admissions committee was free to reject if there were particular
deficiencies in a file. This process continued until the committees ad-
mitted a prescribed number of special admission applicants.
316
Bakke challenged the special admissions program as unconstitu-
tional, arguing that it discriminated against him based on his race.317
UC cross-complained, seeking a declaration that its special admission
program was legal.31 ' The trial court held that the special admissions
307. For example, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), Justice
O'Connor announced the Court's judgment, and she wrote the opinion for Parts I, II,
III-A, III-B, III-D, and IV, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, as well as Justice Scalia to the extent the opinion was not
inconsistent with his concurrence. Justice O'Connor also wrote the opinion for Part
III-C which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. In addition, Justice
Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, and Justice
Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Finally,
Justice Stevens filed a dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg; Justice Souter filed a dis-
sent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer; and Justice Ginsburg filed a dissent
joined by Justice Breyer. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204.
308. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
309. Id. at 276-77.
310. Id. at 272-76.
311. Id. at 274-75.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 275.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 277-78.
318. Id. at 278.
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program created a racial quota which was unconstitutional and that
UC could not take race into account in admissions decisions. 319 On
appeal, the California Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny stan-
dard because a racial classification was involved.
32 0
The Supreme Court upheld the California Supreme Court's applica-
tion of the strict scrutiny standard in assessing the special admissions
program at UC.3 2 1 Nonetheless, it allowed UC to use race as an ad-
missions factor,32 reasoning that the goal of a diverse student body
comprised a compelling interest.3 2  It affirmed the decision that the
quota system which UC used was invalid, however, because it was not
tailored narrowly enough to promote a compelling interest.3 24 Thus,
for voluntary state action involving a racial classification, the Court
upheld a strict scrutiny standard of review. Following Bakke, strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard in race-based affirmative action,
yet the grounds for proving a compelling interest were not so lim-
ited,3  and race could be used as a factor in an admissions program
for a public institution of higher education.-
Shortly after deciding Bakke, the Court heard Fullilove v. Khtz-
nick,32 7 another benign racial classification case, but one which in-
volved a congressionally-mandated affirmative action program and
classification scheme. In determining the constitutionality of the clas-
sification, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion acknowledged that
"[a] program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial
context, calls for close examination," but also conceded that it would
319. Id. at 278-79.
320. Id. at 279-80.
321. Id. at 291. Justice Powell's opinion called for a strict scrutiny standard of re-
view for race-based classifications. Id. However, four Justices would have utilized a
less stringent standard if the race-based classifications were formulated to advance
remedial purposes. Id. at 359. In other words, for benign race-based classifications,
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun would have supported some sort of
intermediate standard of review. To clarify, unlike race-based classifications that bur-
den groups which have traditionally suffered discrimination, "benign" race-based clas-
sifications are designed to benefit those groups.
322. Id. at 320.
323. Id. at 311-12.
324. Id. at 319-20.
325. For example, here, the goal of attaining a diverse student body was considered
to be "clearly... a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher educa-
tion." Id. at 311-12.
326. Id at 320.
327. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Here, petitioners challenged the minority business enter-
prise ("MBE") provision of the Public Works Act of 1977, a federal act which applied
to private prime contractors, and state and local grantees. Id. at 454-55. This provi-
sion required that in order for applicants to receive federal grants for local public
works projects, they had to spend ten percent of the federal grant funds to procure
business or supplies from MBEs, unless the grantee obtained an administrative
waiver. Id. at 453-54. The petitioners claimed they suffered economic injury as a re-
sult of the MBE provision, and that the provision, on its face, violated the equal pro-
tection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 455.
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apply such standard "with appropriate deference to the Congress."328
Although this could have been interpreted as strict scrutiny, the defer-
ence language implied a lesser standard.329 In fact, the plurality's ap-
plication was not as stringent as it has been in other affirmative action
cases precisely because it granted deference to Congress. 330 The opin-
ion thus implied a lesser standard if Congress were to enact an affirm-
ative action program.
Accordingly, the source of an affirmative action program may affect
whether it will be upheld. Note, however, that in today's climate, af-
firmative action programs from every level of government are being
challenged.331 Thus, even congressionally-mandated programs would
be subject to intense scrutiny. Furthermore, in the current anti-affirm-
ative action milieu, it is unlikely that new congressionally-sponsored
affirmative action programs would be introduced. Nonetheless, Fulli-
love neither precludes nor guarantees that affirmative action will be
upheld-it simply provides that if Congress introduces an affirmative
action program, it will be subject to less intense scrutiny than pro-
grams introduced by state or local governments.
In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 332 a plurality of the Court "defini-
tively" resolved the standard of review question for state and local
affirmative action cases, again resorting to strict scrutiny. 3  Here, the
city of Richmond adopted a plan under which contractors were re-
quired to subcontract at least thirty percent of city-awarded construc-
tion contract amounts to MBEs.33 4 The plan was prompted in part by
a statistical study which showed that even though the city's population
was 50% black, only 0.67% of the city's subcontracts had been
328. Id. at 472. Note that once again, the Court here did not produce an opinion.
Chief Justice Burger delivered the judgment, joined by Justices White and Powell. Id.
at 453.
329. Justice Powell stated in a separate opinion, however, that the plurality opinion
had basically applied strict scrutiny as laid out in Bakke. Id. at 496 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
330. For example, in Adarand, which is factually similar to Fullilove, the Court ap-
plied the test much more strictly, stating explicitly that it was applying strict scrutiny,
with significantly different results. See infra text accompanying notes 350-56.
331. See supra note 3.
332. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
333. Id. at 493-94. 1 say "definitively" with caution because this was another split
opinion (Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion and she was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy; Justice Scalia concurred in the judg-
ment). Also, as is obvious by now, the Court had yet (and has yet) to reach a consen-
sus on the level of scrutiny it should use to review challenges to race-based
classifications. In this case, however, a majority of the Court did agree that a strict
scrutiny standard should be used for state and local governmental racial classifica-
tions. Id. at 493-94, 520. The Court later admitted that it had been vacillating on
standards of review in affirmative action cases when it stated that its "failure to pro-
duce a majority opinion in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant left unresolved the proper
analysis for remedial race-based governmental action." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 221 (1995).
334. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
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awarded to MBEs. 335 Nevertheless, in applying a strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review, Justice O'Connor's opinion stated that the city failed
to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest which could justify
the plan.336 It reasoned that "none of the evidence presented by the
city points to any identified discrimination in the Richmond construc-
tion industry. ' 33 7 In other words, in order for the plan to be upheld,
the city would have had to present specific proof that the Richmond
construction industry had discriminated in the past against those who
were designed to benefit under the plan. The statistical disparities be-
tween the city's black population and the percent of the city's subcon-
tracts that had been awarded to MBEs were deemed irrelevant.
Although the Court used a strict scrutiny standard here and the pro-
gram did not withstand scrutiny, Croson was not necessarily fatal to
all affirmative action programs. A problem with the Croson strategy
was its comparison of the local population of blacks to the number of
subcontracts awarded to MBEs. It would have been more meaningful
to compare the percent of subcontracts awarded to non-MBEs against
the percent awarded to MBEs, taking into consideration the total
number of non-MBEs yersus the total number of MBEs who had bid
on projects. This would have provided clearer and more direct proof
of discrimination.338
Thus, to uphold affirmative action programs following Croson, it is
essential to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest which
may be accomplished by proving direct (as opposed to indirect, un-
conscious or unintentional) discrimination. In the contracting context,
for example, one could compare the number of contracts awarded to
qualified women, minorities, and women of color against the number
awarded to non-MBEs and non-WBEs, taking into consideration the
total number of non-MBEs and non-WBEs versus the total number of
women, minorities, and women of color who bid for contracts. To the
extent that women, minorities, and women of color continue to be
under-awarded in spite of their availability, it will be easier to prove
discrimination.339
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 0 the Court directly addressed
federal actions in race-based classifications for only the second
335. Id at 479-80.
336. Id. at 505.
337. Id.
338. Of course, requiring this sort of proof disregards that more broadly based dis-
crimination may be at the root of why there are so few MBEs. In the text here, I am
simply trying to make the point that affirmative action could be upheld even under
the strict scrutiny standard. For a critique of the standard used and its application, see
infra Part III.B.
339. The task of proving that a program is narrowly tailored to reverse discrimina-
tion remains, and that can be a formidable challenge. See id.
340. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
time.341 At issue was whether Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") policies which granted preferences to minorities violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.342 In determining
the constitutionality of the challenged policies, the Court established a
distinct standard of review for "benign" racial classifications,343 which
only had to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
3 44
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Con-
gress-even if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of
being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or soci-
etal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent
that they serve important governmental objectives within the power
of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.3 45
Under this standard, the Court held that the challenged policies did
not violate the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because
they arose with Congress' official sanction,346 and were related to the
important governmental objectives of achieving broadcast diversity.
3 47
341. Id. at 552. The Court has since addressed an additional claim based on a fed-
eral racial classification.
This is the third time in the Court's entire history that it has considered the
constitutionality of a federal affirmative-action program. On each of the two
prior occasions, the first in 1980, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, and
the second in 1990, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, the Court
upheld the program.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 256 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
342. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 552. The first challenged policy favorably weighed
minority ownership status in comparative proceedings for new licenses. Id. The sec-
ond challenged policy permitted certain existing licenses to be transferred to qualified
minority-owned firms through distress sales. Id.
343. Id. at 564. The Court stated that it was applying the standard promoted by
Justice Marshall in his Fullilove concurrence, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). Id.
344. Id. at 564-65.
345. Id. Thus, the Court was actually willing to justify affirmative action on some
basis other than "penance for past sins." See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 80, 83, 91-96.
The Court did not go so far as to specifically state what other grounds might justify
affirmative action, but it was at least willing to speculate that other such grounds
existed. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 564-65.
346. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 563 (stating that the policies were mandated by
Congress).
347. Id. at 566. It was relatively easy to determine that broadcast diversity was an
important governmental objective because the Communications Act of 1934 was spe-
cifically intended "to promote diversity of programming." Id. at 554-55, 566-68. Fur-
thermore, under the intermediate scrutiny standard, the FCC policies at issue only
had to be "substantially related" to the important objective of broadcast diversity.
The Court found such a relationship because of Congress and the FCC's substantiated
findings of a "nexus between minority ownership and programming diversity." Id. at
569, 570-600.
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Once again, the standard was modified, this time for "benign" racial
classifications.- 48 The Court decided this only a year after determin-
ing that state and local governmental actions and classifications were
always subject to a strict scrutiny standard.- 9 Thus, federal racial
classifications, particularly those formulated by Congress or stamped
with Congress's imprimatur, remained subject to shifting standards of
review.
The most recent Supreme Court case addressing affirmative action
is Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena."'0 Justice O'Connor's opinion
stated that Supreme Court cases dealing with governmental race-
based classifications up through Croson had developed a trend result-
ing in three general propositions.351 The first proposition was skepti-
cism concerning race-based preferences which gave rise to "a most
searching examination. '35 2 In other words, courts should always look
skeptically at race-based classifications. The second proposition was
consistency, meaning that the standard of review for challenges to
race-based classifications on equal protection grounds should be the
same, regardless of the classification's purpose (i.e., benign or other-
wise).3 53 The third was congruence between treatment of claims
under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. 3- Regarding these
propositions, Justice O'Connor stated, "Taken together, these three
propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of whatever race,
has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny. 3
55
Accordingly, the plurality opinion stated that reviewing courts must
analyze racial classifications imposed by a federal, state, or local gov-
ernment under a strict scrutiny standard, thereby overruling Metro
348. While the Court tried to reconcile its finding here with that in Croson by stat-
ing that Croson did not "prescribe the level of scrutiny to be applied to a benign racial
classification employed by Congress," it was not convincing. Id. at 565.
349. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
350. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Here, the petitioner challenged the federal governmental
policy of providing financial incentives to general contractors for awarding contracts
to subcontractors controlled by socially or economically disadvantaged individuals,
including individuals classified as racial minorities. Id. at 204. Petitioner challenged
the policy on Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection grounds, claiming
that the policy discriminated against it because it was not controlled by socially or
economically disadvantaged persons. Id.
351. Id. at 223-24.
352. Id. at 223 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986)).
353. Id. at 224
354. Id.
355. Id. Justice O'Connor relied on the principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments protect persons and not groups. See id. at 223-27. Therefore, any group
classification (such as race) is subject to strict scrutiny "to ensure that the personal
right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed." Id. at 227. Under this
principle, even benign racial classifications will be held to a higher standard of
scrutiny.
19971
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Broadcasting.356 Thus, it extended the strict scrutiny standard to all
federal affirmative action programs, requiring any race-based classifi-
cations to both serve a compelling governmental interest and be nar-
rowly drafted to advance that interest.
357
In the most recent federal affirmative action case, Hopwood v.
Texas,358 the Fifth Circuit closely followed the standard laid out in
Adarand, applying strict scrutiny in a stranglehold fashion that was
fatal in fact. Here, white applicants to the University of Texas School
of Law ("UT") challenged a special admissions program, arguing that
it discriminated against them by granting preferences to select stu-
dents based on their race, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 9 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding that,
"[tihe law school has presented no compelling justification, under the
Fourteenth Amendment or Supreme Court precedent, that allows it to
continue to elevate some races over others, even for the wholesome
purpose of correcting perceived racial imbalance in the student
body.
360
While a lower court held that UT presented both remedial and non-
remedial goals which satisfied the compelling governmental interest
test,361 this court disagreed. With respect to the use of race as one
factor to achieve the goal of diversity, it stated "that any consideration
of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a
diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 62 Yet UT received the court's blessing to continue to
356. Id. at 2113. Adarand thus affirmed Croson, expanding the application of
Croson to federal government action under the Fifth Amendment. Note that the
Court did not actually apply the strict scrutiny standard to these facts to determine
whether the federal action at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at
237. Instead, it simply determined the standard to be applied, then vacated the Court
of Appeals judgment and remanded for a determination of this issue.
357. Id. at 227.
358. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
359. Id. at 938. The program was similar to the one that was challenged in Bakke.
See supra text accompanying notes 308-15, for a description of that program.
360. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934.
361. Id. at 941. The non-remedial goal was to have a diverse student body and the
remedial goal was "justified as a remedy for the 'present effects at the law school of
past discrimination in both the University of Texas system and the Texas educational
system as a whole."' Id. (citation omitted).
362. Id. at 944. With little explanation, the court wrote that "the classification of
persons on the basis of race for the purpose of diversity frustrates, rather than facili-
tates, the goals of equal protection." Id. It is difficult to conceive of how diversity can
be achieved without intentionally considering race. Moreover, where diversity in de-
sirable positions is absent, some type of discrimination is usually present, and discrim-
inatory conduct violates equal protection. Yet this court explicitly stated both that
achievement of diversity is not a compelling governmental interest and that race can-
not be considered in trying to achieve diversity. Id. at 948. In a seemingly contradic-
tory statement, the court stated that "a host of factors-some of which may have
some correlation with race-[could be considered] in making admissions decisions."
Id. at 946. If race cannot directly be considered a factor in admissions decisions, it is
hard to understand how it can be indirectly considered.
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use legacy considerations, thus perpetuating class preferences,363
while simultaneously prohibiting race preferences. The Fifth Circuit
went on to forcefully assert that "the Court appears to have decided
that there is essentially only one compelling state interest to justify
racial classifications: remedying past wrongs.
' 3 1
The court then addressed the remedial goal of employing racial cri-
teria to remedy the present effects of past discrimination in Texas pub-
lic schools. 6 It initially limited the discriminating actor to UT,
deciding that primary and secondary schools, as well as the larger Uni-
versity of Texas system, were too remote.3 1 While it is easy to under-
stand why the plaintiffs argued that the discriminatory actor should be
limited, it is difficult to comprehend how the court could believe that
discrimination occurs in such an isolated fashion. If there had not
been so much discrimination along the way, maybe women of color
would arrive at the law school admissions process on a level playing
field. But it is precisely because of the pervasive and systematic na-
ture of discrimination that the pool of law school applicants comprised
of women of color is so small and, under a numbers game, is often less
qualified.
Having determined the appropriate actor, the court next looked at
whether there were present effects of past discrimination.3 7 It de-
cided that there were none and hence, it did not have to consider the
question of whether the admissions program was narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling state interest.36
Hopwood's application of the strict scrutiny standard makes it very
difficult for an affirmative action program to be upheld. Unlike
Bakke, which held that in some circumstances race could be used as a
factor in making admissions decisions, this court stated that "the law
school may not use race as a factor in law school admissions. " 369 It is
363. Not surprisingly, this type of legacy preference effectively discriminates
against racial minorities because many schools did not admit minorities until quite
recently. Yet this received the court's sanction.
364. Id. at 944.
365. Id at 948.
366. It reasoned that "when one state actor begins to justify racial preferences
based upon the actions of other state agencies, the remedial actor's competence to
determine the existence and scope of the harm-and the appropriate reach of the
remedy-is called into question." Id. at 951. Even if the state were considered an
appropriate actor, in order for the admissions program to be upheld, this court re-
quired "the State of Texas, through its legislature .... to find that past segregation has
present effects; it would have to determine the magnitude of those present effects; and
it would need to limit carefully the 'plus' given to applicants to remedy that harm." Id.
367. Id. at 952. "[Tlhe party seeking to implement the program must, at a mini-
mum, prove that the effect it proffers is caused by the past discrimination and that the
effect is of sufficient magnitude to justify the program." Id. (citation omitted). Having
proven that, it must "show that it adopted the program specifically to remedy the
identified present effects of the past discrimination." Id.
368. Id. at 955.
369. Id. at 935 (emphasis added).
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difficult to ascertain how seriously we should take this pronounce-
ment, considering that this court attempts to overrule Supreme Court
precedent.370 If we take it at its word, racial criteria cannot be taken
into account in admissions, and by extension in contracting, hiring, or
other entry or promotion circumstances, except under the narrowest
of circumstances-where the actor's past discrimination results in
present negative effects. 37 1 The application of this test by the Hop-
wood court makes the hurdle even higher; it requires an identification
of the "types of present effects of past discrimination, if proven, [that]
would be sufficient under strict scrutiny review" and if a remedial jus-
tification underlies a racial classification, then the court "must make a
'factual determination' as to whether remedial action is necessary. "372
Hopwood does not bode well for affirmative action programs for
women of color. It is unclear how much weight this decision will have
beyond the Fifth Circuit, but schools throughout the country have al-
ready started to examine their affirmative action programs to see if
they comply with Hopwood. The Supreme Court's recognition of the
importance of the Hopwood issues,37 3 yet denial of certiorari, send
mixed messages about the future of affirmative action. These mixed
messages are also conveyed by the passage of Proposition 209 in Cali-
fornia,374 followed by a federal judge's injunction prohibiting imple-
mentation of Proposition 209. 311 It is probably best, in this
environment, to err on the side of caution. Any affirmative action
program should ensure that the administering agency was the one
which discriminated in the past (that is, the law school, the city con-
tracting entity, the State Department of Motor Vehicles, etc.), that
there are present effects of past discrimination,376 that the effects are
370. Chief Judge Politz wrote a dissent from the failure to grant a rehearing en
banc, and he was joined by Judges King, Wiener, Benavides, Stewart, Parker, and
Dennis. They stated that "the opinion goes out of its way to break ground that the
Supreme Court itself has been careful to avoid and purports to overrule a Supreme
Court decision, namely, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke." Hopwood v.
Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, C.J., dissenting).
371. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 949.
372. Id. To elaborate on the first part of the test, the actor must show that "the
effect it proffers is caused by the past discrimination and that the effect is of sufficient
magnitude to justify the program." Id. at 952 (citation omitted). In addition, the actor
"must show that it adopted the program specifically to remedy the identified present
effects of the past discrimination." Id.
373. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 2.
375. Id.
376. It is unclear what would satisfy this test but some effects which will not qualify,
according to Hopwood, include the acting agency's bad reputation in minority com-
munities and the acting agency's provision of a hostile environment for minorities.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952. The court seemed to suggest that even if there were cur-
rently a hostile environment because of present discrimination, that would not satisfy
the past discrimination test. Id. at 953. If we follow that reasoning to its logical con-
clusion, present discrimination would go unpunished and we would have to wait until
the future to take any action so that the current discrimination could then qualify as
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caused by the actor's discrimination, that there was a need for the
program (which seems self-evident if one can get through the above
hurdles), and that the program was adopted to overcome the identi-
fied discrimination by the narrowly defined actor. Crafting affirma-
tive action programs for women of color to clear these hurdles may
require training, but with time, it can be done.
The Court has been more consistent in gender-based affirmative ac-
tion cases, relying on an intermediate scrutiny test.377 This evolved
out of the use of an intermediate scrutiny standard for gender classifi-
cations more generally,378 which crossed over to gender-based affirm-
ative action.37 9 It is important to understand where the case law
stands with respect to both race- and gender-based affirmative action.
One must also recognize, however, that these "either/or" laws do not
take into account multiple consciousness, thus ignoring the "both-
and" experiences of women of color. Gender-based laws and reme-
dies, in isolation, are therefore not sufficient to address the exper-
iences of, or discrimination against, women of color? Nor are race-
based laws and remedies. Thus, in order to craft appropriate reme-
dies, laws and judges interpreting the laws must recognize the inter-
sectionality of discrimination which women of color face.
Nonetheless, laws do not currently address the experiences of women
of color as a discrete identity, taking into account race and gender.
While I am hopeful that laws will eventually recognize multiple con-
sciousness in formulating remedies addressing discrimination, until
then, I will utilize the higher standard of review, strict scrutiny, which
applies to race-based classifications.
past discrimination. An effect that may satisfy the test is current underrepresentation,
but it did not work in Hopwood. If underrepresentation can be tied to the actor's past
discrimination, then it could be upheld. Again, while this is possible to show, it per-
verts the way that discrimination works today-it is no longer as blatant as in the past,
but rather is often subtle, unconscious, systematic, and institutional. See infra text
accompanying notes 388-90, for a discussion of this issue.
377. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616
(1987).
378. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating a state statute which
based minimum age for beer sales on gender, relying on an intermediate scrutiny
standard); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (using a rational basis standard to invali-
date a state statute which favored males over females as estate administrators).
379. Johnson, 480 U.S. 616; see also Gilligan v. Department of Labor, 81 F.3d 835
(9th Cir. 1996) (validating an employer's decision to use gender as a basis for promo-
tion decisions); Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 856 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va.
1994) (upholding gender-based affirmative action for a public university).
380. As Professor Harris wrote:
[I]n feminist legal theory, as in the dominant culture, it is mostly white,
straight, and socio-economically privileged people who claim to speak for all
of us. Not surprisingly, the story they tell about "women," despite its claim
to universality, seems to black women to be peculiar to women who are
white, straight, and socio-economically privileged ....
Harris, supra note 4, at 588 (footnote omitted).
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B. Critical Analysis of Affirmative Action Law
Adarand presently stands as the law on government-generated ra-
cial classifications, but its hold is not firm. One reason is that most of
the seminal affirmative action cases resulted in plurality opinions, in-
dicating that with a slight Court adjustment, another plurality opinion
could send the pendulum the other way.381 Another reason, explained
below, is that the plurality's reasoning in Adarand is flawed, partly
because of its conclusions regarding the "three general propositions,"
and partly because it presumes a color-blind society and disregards
continuing race- and gender-based discrimination.
The plurality's reasoning in Adarand, particularly the use of the
consistency proposition to justify the strict scrutiny standard, is misdi-
rected. This proposition ignores the continued existence of discrimi-
nation against women of color. In the words of the plurality opinion,
the consistency proposition "means that whenever the government
treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has
suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of
the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. '382 Therefore, any
time a white male suffers a disadvantage because of his race under a
governmental benign racial classification, he could, and frequently
does, challenge the classification. In order to uphold the classification,
the government would have to identify a specific past injury to bene-
fited groups. In addition, the classification would have to be narrowly
tailored to remedy that past injury. This would effectively preclude
any legislation that attempts to deal with subtle, unconscious, or pres-
ent discrimination, or legislation that otherwise attempts to provide
equal opportunities or expand inclusiveness of groups traditionally
underrepresented in areas like higher education, professional careers,
crime prevention, and firefighting.383
381. With no clear majority on this issue, the Court can continue to vacillate as it
has over the past twenty years.
382. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995). Paradoxi-
cally, race-based classifications designed to eradicate discrimination against women of
color would by necessity discriminate against people who are not women of color,
thus always calling a strict scrutiny standard into play. That does not necessarily
doom a benign classification, but it limits the tools that can be utilized to eradicate
discrimination and to level the field of opportunities. To date, when applying strict
scrutiny, race-based classifications are typically upheld only if they are used to
counter specific past instances of discrimination, yet cannot be used to eradicate pres-
ent or future discrimination. They are akin to certain types of stalking laws which
only provide a remedy after the fact, when it is often too late. A murder victim finally
has a remedy, if only she were around to utilize it.
383. Women have traditionally been underrepresented in firefighting. For exam-
ple, in 1987, the San Francisco Fire Department admitted women as firefighters for
the first time. Report to the President, supra note 20, § 2.1. While male officers of
color admittedly made significant strides in 1987 (the number of Black officers in-
creased from 7 to 31, Hispanics went from 12 to 55, and Asians went from 0 to 10), id.,
with women's recent entry into the department, it will likely be some time before
women of color make similar strides. They are concededly in the door, but under the
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Under the consistency principle, even if there is blatant discrimina-
tion, much less the subtle but thriving discrimination that continues
today, the victims of that discrimination cannot receive any benefits
provided through racial classifications unless they can prove past dis-
crimination by the body granting the benefits, plus a close fit between
the injury and the remedy.
What is a close fit between the injury caused by years of subtle dis-
crimination against women of color and a remedy to correct the in-
jury? Allow me to tell a story which illustrates the difficulty of using
this test as the bellwether for determining whether to uphold affirma-
tive action. Let us say that a young Latina is taunted throughout
grade school because her English is not very good. This causes her to
be silenced, but not beaten. Her grades are excellent. Then in high
school, she is harassed by her male classmates because she is a good
student. Her silence continues and is reinforced. She may be en-
couraged to pay less attention to her studies, but she is unusually tena-
cious and continues to excel at school. She is admitted to an Ivy
League college, but her grades there are average. She would like to
spend more time at the library during the day, but her days are filled
with classes and a part-time job to pay for her college education."s
She would also like to spend more time at the library in the evenings,
but she can only go to the library if she can find someone to walk her
back to her dormitory at night. 8- Which of the many discriminatory
acts that she has been subjected to are going to be considered suffi-
cient past discrimination to warrant affirmative action relief under
Adarand? Probably none. Yet, she undeniably has suffered discrimi-
nation, partly because of her race, partly because of her gender, and
partly because of the intersectionality of race and gender.3s1 None-
Court's test, if present discrimination hinders their progress, affirmative action cannot
intervene to propel forward progress. This is a serious shortcoming of the Court's
treatment of racial classifications.
384. Latinas are more likely to be poor than non-Latinas. Thus, it is expected that
if they go to college at all, they will work part time. "Even with a parent working full
time, year-round, Hispanic children in the U.S. are three times more likely to be poor
than children in comparable non-Hispanic families." Nat'l Council of La Raza, supra
note 222, at 16-17.
385. At many campuses, it is not safe for a female to walk alone at night. See, e.g.,
Babita Persaud & Fred Hartman, Hundreds 'Take Back the Night' at Two Campuses,
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 2, 1993, at B1, available in 1993 WL 5092642;
Peter Ortiz, Marchers Deplore Violence" the 14th Annual Take Back the Night March
is Held at Oswego State, Post-Standard (Syracuse, N.Y.), Oct. 25, 1995, at Bi.
386. Kimberle Crenshaw describes this experience of intersectionality for Black
women:
Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to
and different from those experienced by white women and Black men....
[O]ften they experience double-discrimination-the combined effects of
practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex.
And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women-not the
sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women.
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theless, the consistency principle does not allow affirmative action to
be utilized to level the playing field currently or prospectively. Hence,
the status quo remains. This is not acceptable because it ignores too
much of the way that discrimination operates. To the extent that dis-
crimination is intentional, legal-savvy perpetrators rarely will blatantly
conduct themselves to give rise to legal action. Instead, they tend to
discriminate subtly, with less of a trail.3" 7
Discrimination also occurs unconsciously.3" People with the best
intentions often are not aware that they are discriminating.3 89 For ex-
ample, people have "complimented" me by assuring me that "I am
not a dirty Mexican," or "I am different." Or, less blatantly, law firm
partners may provide jobs to women of color, but then not provide the
same mentors or training that they provide white males. 390 Similarly,
they may not provide networking opportunities because they think a
woman of color would not be comfortable with people unlike herself.
Relatedly, discrimination may occur unintentionally. 391 For exam-
ple, in the contracting and subcontracting context at issue in Adarand,
Justice Stevens pointed out that:
[M]inority subcontractors may face more obstacles than direct, in-
tentional racial prejudice: They may face particular barriers simply
Crenshaw, supra note 4, at 149. The point here is that the Court's insistence that the
source and content of discrimination be clearly identifiable is simply not possible all
the time, or even most of the time. That does not make the discrimination any less
real.
387. See, for example, Freeman, supra note 128, at 1081, 1084-85, for a discussion of
supposedly objective and neutral practices which are really driven by discriminatory
motives.
388. I recently witnessed a perfect example of this. Our church sponsored a vaca-
tion bible school in the parks. Each day's theme sprang from a color, such as white
for holiness. Not surprisingly, black symbolized sin. No one in my bible study group
thought of the racial implications. I asked them to think about what it would feel like
to be the lone black girl in the school and to have church representatives tell everyone
that black, your skin color, stood for sin. For a poignant discussion and explanation of
unconscious racism and unintentional discrimination, see Lawrence, supra note 45.
389. "I am certain that my kindergarten teacher was not intentionally racist in
choosing Little Black Sambo [to read to class] .... I knew even then, from a child's
intuitive sense, that she was a good, well-meaning person." Id. at 318.
390. They may justify this because it would be awkward to play golf with a woman
of color or to go to dinner with her after work, as it may upset a spouse or partner.
One report noted that this lack of mentoring "could be due to a disparity in white
male comfort levels: after all, white women look like their mothers, sisters and wives
and minority men can at least use the same locker room. But white males have noth-
ing in common with women of color." The Burdens of Both, supra note 27, at 31.
391. As one critical race theorist has written:
Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about ra-
cial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized
as neither intentional-in the sense that certain outcomes are self-con-
sciously sought-nor unintentional-in the sense that the outcomes are ran-
dom, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires,
and wishes.
Lawrence, supra note 45, at 322 (footnote omitted).
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because they are more likely to be new in the business and less
likely to know others in the business. Given such difficulties, Con-
gress could reasonably find that a minority subcontractor is less
likely to receive favors from the entrenched business persons who
award subcontracts only to people with whom-or with whose
friends-they have an existing relationship.
392
The lead opinion's consistency proposition also falters because it
refuses to distinguish between benign and malignant racial classifica-
tions. As Justice Stevens pointed out, there is a distinction:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy
that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to
eradicate racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine
of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or main-
tain the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences
reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.
393
If one believes that there is a distinction between the two types of
racial classifications, it makes sense to treat them differently under the
law.394 There are many reasons why one would not believe that there
is a distinction between different types of racial classifications. It is
certainly easier to posit and enforce a crystalline principle which states
that all racial classifications are suspect, requiring the highest level of
scrutiny. But ease of administration should not suffice if laws are pur-
posively designed to assist people who suffer from discrimination. If
this were the case, laws purposefully designed to help those with disa-
bilities would be deemed unconstitutional. This is despite the intent
of providing special accommodations because existing accommoda-
tions had the effect of discriminating against persons with disabilities.
On a different but related note, what about laws that intentionally
help farmers who own large production farms but not those who own
smaller farms? And what about laws designed to give tax breaks to
large corporations but not to smaller corporations? There are distinc-
tions here that are not only recognized, but actually drive disparate
legislation. The laws in these examples intentionally assist members
of certain groups, which by necessity discriminate against members of
other groups. Laws have always done this. The difference is that
when the laws which do this operate in favor of the powerful to the
detriment of the powerless, there is no strong voice to object. Be-
cause affirmative action assists those who are typically silenced, those
392. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 261 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
393. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
394. Admittedly, it is not always easy to determine whether a classification is be-
nign or malignant. Furthermore, one cannot be assured that a classification is benign
simply because it labels itself as such. That does not justify disregarding the distinc-
tion, however, just as other legal distinctions are not disregarded even if they are
susceptible to misuse or misidentification.
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
with booming voices object and their voices are heard. The silenced
ones remain marginalized.
There are other reasons that people may not recognize distinctions
among racial classifications. For instance, there is the generally un-
spoken truth that it may be advantageous to disregard the distinction.
After all, many people in privileged positions who conceptually sup-
port affirmative action are not willing, consciously or otherwise, to ab-
dicate their power to further the goals underlying affirmative
action. 95 It is time to reconcile the conceptualization with action.
Supporters must be willing to advocate affirmative action for women
of color, even if it means some personal sacrifice. Courts, likewise,
must be willing to learn about discrimination and how it operates, and
acknowledge that we do not yet live in a color-blind society. They can
then structure tests which recognize the difference between benign
and malignant racial classifications, and which promote remedies for
women of color when they suffer intersectional discrimination.
Naturally, those who do not support affirmative action are even less
willing to concede any power and will favor any standard or rule
which makes it harder for subordinated persons to succeed. 3 96 Suc-
cessful claimants have been able to challenge laws or classifications
designed to help those who suffer prejudice and discrimination, turn-
ing those very classifications around, often invalidating them, thus re-
turning to the status quo.3 97 It is easy to understand this reluctance to
give up, or even share, power. The American psyche seems to be
driven by a notion of power based on domination, a white male
norm, 398 as opposed to a notion of power driven by partnership and
mutuality.399 As we proceed toward the 21st century, which brings
with it demographic shifts in the population, perhaps power sourced in
395. "White people cling to the belief that racial justice may be realized without
any loss of their privileged position." Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term,
Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8 (1985).
396. To wit, many of the significant racial classification cases have dealt with re-
verse discrimination claims in which the claimants argued that a strict scrutiny stan-
dard was appropriate. See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
397. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
398. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, in Feminist Juris-
prudence 110, 122-26 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism
Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 40-43 (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 127-54, 215-34 (1989); Rosemary Radford
Ruether, Gaia & God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing 3, 116, 140 (1992).
399. Riane Eisler contrasts domination models, which rely on subordination of
others as a power source resulting in inequitable relationships, against partnership or
mutuality models. These latter models are sourced in a synergistic discourse between
and among different constituencies to arrive at mutually beneficial decisions which do
not require one to push others down in order to lift oneself up. Ms. Eisler elaborates:
[T]he more male-dominant a society or period is (be it Nazi Germany, the
Samurai period of feudal Japan, or Khomeini's Iran), the more authoritarian
and warlike it tends to be. Conversely, where we see more equal partnership
between women and men (as in the Scandinavian nations, and Hopi and
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mutuality will be more palatable. Eventually, those presently privi-
leged may realize that when they are no longer as privileged because
they are in the minority, rules which they create now will then apply
to them. Thus, they may prefer rules and standards premised on
shared power as opposed to power sourced in domination. Alterna-
tively, they may continue trying to prevent the loss of their privilege
by maintaining the status quo, although that behavior is cruel to those
who live without privilege. If that happens, which is admittedly a
more likely scenario than the mutuality one outlined above, it will be
crucial to carry on with affirmative action programs for women of
color. Otherwise, the privileged will hoard their power and women of
color will continue to slip through the cracks.
Turning now to Justice O'Connor's assertion that the congruence
proposition arose as a result of the Court's earlier equal protection
cases, it is difficult to see how those cases consistently produced any
such proposition. The plurality's tracing of equal protection jurispru-
dence in racial classification cases proves as much.4" Although some
cases indeed found that the Fifth Amendment provides the same type
of equal protection obligation on the Federal government as the Four-
teenth Amendment does on state and local governments,40 1 other
cases found to the contrary." 2 Thus, it is incongruous to claim that
Pueblo tribal societies), we also tend to see a more equitable and peaceful
society.
Envisioning a Partnership Fuire" An Interview iti'h Riane Eisler, Woman of Power,
Summer 1995, at 20.
400. For example, as the Court pointed out, in early race-related cases, the Fifth
Amendment only offered due process protection and not equal protection guarantees.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213-14. It was not until 1954 that "the Court for the first time
explicitly questioned the existence of any difference between the obligations of the
Federal Government and the States to avoid racial classifications." Id. at 215 (refer-
ring to Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). While Boiling did not explicitly
offer equal protection guarantees by the Federal government, it implicitly did so and
"the resulting imposition on the Federal Government of an obligation equivalent to
that of the States, followed as a matter of course." Id. at 216. Nonetheless, that obli-
gation did not necessarily follow as a matter of course. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (stating that different standards of scrutiny apply to federal
affirmative action, indicating that the obligations under the Equal Protection Clause
are different for federal and state actors). Thus, it is puzzling that Justice O'Connor
relied on the Weinberger Court's statement that "Itihis Court's approach to Fifth
Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Adarand, 515 U.S. at 217
(quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (alteration in origi-
nal) (emphasis added)). It is almost as puzzling that Justice O'Connor asserted that
case law prior to Adarand would support the congruence principle that -[elqual pro-
tection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, at 93 (1976)).
401. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 479-81 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480-92 (1980): Boling,
347 U.S. at 500.
402. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) ("[While the Fifth Amendment
contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifi-
able as to be violative of due process."' (quoting Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499)); Hiraba-
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the congruence proposition inevitably results from earlier cases. It is
more accurate to state that early equal protection jurisprudence was
sourced in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court gradually came
to locate an equal protection right in the Fifth Amendment. Ac-
knowledging that there is a present equal protection right emanating
from the Fifth Amendment does not equate to recognition of
supremacy of that right in all circumstances. The Court has conceded
this when it defers to Congress.4 °3 Thus, Congressional legislation,
which typically results from extensive fact-finding, has received special
consideration by the courts and should continue to do so. To the ex-
tent Congress abuses its power, there are mechanisms to counter that
abuse.
Another shortcoming in Adarand arises from Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's assertion that preferential racial classifications are only appro-
priate if preferred races have been discriminated against in the past.
The problem is that past discrimination is not the only, or even pri-
mary, cause for the subordination of women of color.4" To the extent
that past discrimination has caused subordination, it should support
affirmative action for women of color. This type of discrimination,
however, should not be the only grounds supporting affirmative ac-
tion. Women of color should be able to benefit from affirmative ac-
tion without having to prove in advance that they were discriminated
against in the past by specific actors.4 5 Indeed, Justice Stevens made
a similar claim in his dissenting opinion in Adarand. "Instead of
merely seeking to remedy past discrimination, the FCC program [in
Metro Broadcasting] was intended to achieve future benefits in the
form of broadcast diversity.
' 4 6
yashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
does not contain an equal protection clause); Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S.
329, 337 (1943) (holding that the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, does not contain an equal protection clause and hence does not guaranty
against discriminatory legislation by Congress).
403. See Bohrer, supra note 9.
404. Furthermore, the law as established only recognizes race or gender-based dis-
crimination. Women of color, however, are frequently subjected to discrimination
which goes beyond race or gender, and it is not possible to tell where one begins and
another ends. "Because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of ra-
cism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account cannot
sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women are subordinated."
Crenshaw, supra note 4, at 140.
405. "[A]ffirmative action has two general justifications-remediation of discrimi-
nation, and promoting inclusion-both of which are consistent with the traditional
American values of opportunity, merit and fairness." Report to the President, supra
note 20, § 1.2.2.
406. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 257 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); see also Report to the President, supra note 20, at § 1.2.2 (stating two general
justifications for affirmative action: to remedy discrimination and to promote
inclusion).
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A final criticism is directed to Justice Scalia's claim that we are one
race, and therefore society, as well as the Court, should operate in a
color-blind fashion.4°7 This is pollyannaish at best, and dangerously
ignorant at worst. "One cannot preach color-blindness in a color-con-
scious society and claim moral sanction."4" However, I am not sur-
prised at Justice Scalia's claim, considering the segregation of legal
knowledge coupled with the gendered and raced nature of legal lan-
guage and discourse. A white man can easily and genuinely believe
that the world is color-blind. For one who does not experience racism
and sexism personally, it is easier to believe that racism and sexism do
not exist. Many members of the dominant culture continue to see the
world through an egocentric lens, "My experiences are universal ex-
periences-if I do not experience it, it does not happen." ' ' Race and
gender matter for outsiders on a daily basis. 410 Race matters when it
is time for a black man to get a cab.411 Race and gender matter for me
when I am dressed casually for housecleaning and a solicitor comes to
the door asking for the homeowner.412 It matters when women of
407. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring). ("In the eyes of government,
we are just one race here. It is American."); cf Michael Omi & Howard Winant,
Racial Formation in the United States From the 1960s to the 1990s, at 1 (2nd ed.
1994):
[E]ven a cursory glance at American history reveals that far from being
color-blind, the United States has been an extremely "color-conscious" soci-
ety. From the very inception of the Republic to the present moment, race
has been a profound determinant of one's political rights, one's location in
the labor market, and indeed one's sense of "identity."
For detailed critiques of the color-blind notion, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind
Constitution (1992); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 1060 (1991); Bryan K. Fair, Foreword: Rethinking the Colorblindness
Model, 13 Nat'l Black L. J. 1 (1993); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is
Color-Blind," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
408. Ellis, supra note 138, at 576.
409. See Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2-3.
410. See Cornel West, Race Matters (1993).
411. See Jerelyn Eddings, The Covert Color War, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 23,
1995, at 40. In describing "stealth racism staples," the author went beyond stories of
cab drivers who will not stop for blacks, to helpful hints from blacks on getting cabs to
stop for them. Some argue, however, that considerations of race are part of the pack-
age of prudence that should be utilized in the process of making daily decisions, thus
justifying the reluctance of cab drivers to pick up black men.
These [safety] concerns seem to be borne out by cabdriver muggings and
killings .... The U.S. Labor Department recently reported that driving a cab
is the riskiest job in America .... These facts suggest how hollow it sounds
to accuse cabdrivers of "prejudice" and "stereotypes." While we can be sure
that racist taxidrivers would discriminate, not all taxidrivers who discrimi-
nate are racist.
Dinesh D'Souza, Myth of the Racist Cabbie, Nat'l Rev., Oct. 9, 1995, at 36, 38: cf note
186 and accompanying text (arguing that discrimination against Blacks who attempt
to hail cabs is alive and well).
412. When I was dressed in spring cleaning attire, a sales person came to the door
and asked for the home owner. In this case, my gender and race combined to cause
her to think I could not possibly own the home. My appearance as a Mexican woman
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color try to get jobs.413 It matters when one looks at statistics on the
composition of the poorest sector of the economy.414 Thus, it is spe-
cious to state and believe that in U.S. society today, race does not
matter, or that we are all one race.
In sum, to send players with gifts, albeit devalued or unrecognized
gifts, onto a playing field tilted in favor of players with traditionally
valued gifts, and then claim that all opportunities are equal, is disin-
genuous. I advocate only for equal opportunity. Of course, one can-
not force people of any race, gender, physical condition, or sexual
orientation to take advantage of those opportunities. If those oppor-
tunities are not equally available from the outset, however, it is unten-
able to claim that the playing field is level. As long as opportunities
are not equally available to women of color, they will disproportion-
ately remain in an economic underclass and neither society nor the
Court will be able to operate in a color-blind fashion. Affirmative
action helps women of color arrive at a playing field which is partly
designed by them and for them, thus approaching greater fairness.
Therefore, affirmative action should be sustained into the future.
C. Legality of Affirmative Action Revisited
I do not agree with much of the Adarand decision, but, for now, it
has established a strict scrutiny standard against which all race-based
governmental classifications will be judged. However, even under
Adarand, affirmative action programs which further a compelling gov-
ernmental interest could survive strict scrutiny and continue in effect
for women of color, as long as those programs are narrowly tailored.
There are a number of compelling interests that support affirmative
action for women of color. The first and most obvious is that discrimi-
nation still exists and affirmative action can be used as a tool to over-
clearly colored her perception of my identity, causing her to believe that I was domes-
tic help.
413. Research by the Urban Institute "undercuts claims that hiring practices today
are effectively color-blind or systematically favor blacks. The study revealed that
when equally qualified black and white candidates competed for a job, the whites
advanced farther in the hiring process a significant amount of the time." T'rner et al.,
supra note 96, at 4. The report found that:
In 20 percent of the cases a white applicant was able to submit an application
when a black could not, the white received a formal interview when the
black did not, or the white was offered a job when the black was not. The
study also found that, in a small share of cases, blacks were "steered" by
potential employers to less desirable positions than their white counterparts.
Id. at 5.
414. "[I]n 1992, 33.3 percent of blacks and 29.3 percent of Hispanics lived in pov-
erty, compared to 11.6 percent of whites." Report to the President, supra note 20,
§ 4.1. As far as sheer numbers are concerned, there are admittedly more whites who
live in poverty than any other demographic group, but that is only because they still
comprise a majority of the population. But with respect to percentages, whites are
underrepresented in the ranks of the poor, while ethnic minorities, particularly wo-
men of color, are overrepresented.
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come the effects of that discrimination. Of course, to uphold
affirmative action, one would have to prove discrimination in a partic-
ular setting. Contextual examples of continuing discrimination can
easily be found through audit or tester studies. These involve empiri-
cal research using persons with similar credentials, but different ap-
pearances, as testers. The testers attempt to obtain job interviews,
apartments or other limited "commodities." Many of these studies
still find discrimination against people of color, especially women.415
One General Accounting Office ("GAO") study found that significant
discrimination still exists against Hispanics,116 and other research
found that "[t]he percentage of the Hispanic female-Anglo male in-
come gap attributable to employment discrimination falls within a 30-
40% range. '417 Another GAO study utilizing Hispanic testers found
that Anglo applicants received at least 33% more job interviews, and
52% more job offers, than other interviewers."" The sequence of
events illustrated by these statistics is significant. At the outset, His-
panics received one-third fewer interviews than Anglo applicants.
This places Hispanics at an initial disadvantage because so many fewer
of them will even get a foot in the door. Once those 75% get to the
interview stage, the statistics predict an even grimmer outcome-the
Hispanics will receive approximately 50% fewer offers than similarly
qualified white job applicants. These statistics are not gender specific,
as it is very difficult to get statistics for women of color.419 I can assure
415. See, e.g., Immigration Reform, supra note 97, at 48 (discussing discrimination
against Hispanics). Note, however, that many studies are designed to test for race- or
gender-based discrimination, but not both. While it would be difficult to design stud-
ies to capture both types of discrimination because they can be inextricably interwo-
ven, tests could be produced which detect each type of discrimination, working
independently and together.
416. Id- I use the term "Hispanics" here because that is the term the GAO used in
its report.
417. Nat'l Council of La Raza, supra note 222, at 27.
418. See id at 26. In a particularly blatant example of continuing discrimination, a
Hispanic tester applied for a job in response to a "counter help" sign at a lunch ser-
vice company and was told that the job was filled. A mere two hours later, a white
tester was offered that very job. Immigration Reform, supra note 97, at 48. That same
study found more egregious discrimination. White applicants received 33% more in-
terviews and 52% more job offers than their Hispanic counterparts. Id. Furthermore,
while only 11% of the white applicants experienced unfavorable treatment during the
hiring process, 31% of the Hispanic applicants experienced such treatment. Id. at 47.
419. This is not surprising considering women of color's invisibility as a discrete
identity. bell hooks notes that subordinated groups tend to be identified as people of
color or women, but not women of color.
In America, white racist ideology has always allowed white women to as-
sume that the word woman is synonymous with white woman, for women of
other races are always perceived as Others, as de-humanized beings who do
not fall under the heading woman. White feminists who claimed to be politi-
cally astute showed themselves to be unconscious of the way their use of
language suggested they did not recognize the existence of black women.
They impressed upon the American public their sense that the word "wo-
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you, however, that based on similar statistics for gender, the numbers
for Latinas would give even greater cause to worry.
Strategically, to establish the need for affirmative action for women
of color in a particular profession, one should start by performing an
audit study. For example, a study might reveal that women of color
have traditionally been denied higher-paying government jobs at the
Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"), even though equally quali-
fied men and women of color applied for those jobs. That would pro-
vide evidence of discrimination against the women of color, resulting
in unequal opportunities. Assuming that it is an important govern-
mental interest to break the cycle of the colored feminization of pov-
erty which is caused in part by discrimination against women of color,
the next task is to ensure that such goal is obtained through a nar-
rowly tailored affirmative action program. Once discrimination by a
particular actor is established, it is important to demonstrate the pres-
ent effects of that past discrimination and then to narrowly tailor a
program to eradicate those effects. For example, if we can establish
that the DMV discriminated against women of color and a present
effect of that discrimination is that they currently do not have high-
paying jobs at the DMV, then an affirmative action program can be
narrowly tailored to hire more women of color for those positions.
The program should include built-in mechanisms which would ensure
that it remains in place only as long as the present effects of past dis-
crimination persist.
Another area where discrimination persists against women of color
is education. Education is a requisite stepping stone out of the
colored feminization of poverty and into the world where policy deci-
sions are made. With the structural changes in the economy and the
work force that are upon us as we approach the end of this century,
there are fewer and fewer jobs for uneducated persons. 420 This de-
crease in education and employment opportunities will disproportion-
ately impact minorities, particularly Latinos.
421
man" meant white woman by drawing endless analogies between "women"
and "blacks."
bell hooks, Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism 138-39 (1981). In other
words, it is fairly common to find affirmative action programs benefiting minority-
owned businesses or women-owned businesses. The implication is that a business is
owned by one or the other, but not by people who are members of each group.
420. See supra note 248.
421. One author noted that "[i]n New York City, the official dropout rate for Pu-
erto Rican children was 57 percent as late as 1971, which means the true rate-that is,
the entering first grade class compared to the graduating class twelve years later-was
probably 70 percent or more." Shorris, supra note 191, at 219-20 (footnote omitted).
Shorris also emphasized that "[h]istory weighs most heavily on the children who have
come to the United States from another country where parents had little or no educa-
tion, for their parents may not understand the concept of school beyond the require-
ment for rudimentary literacy, if that." Id. at 221.
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Roughly 80 percent of whites and 70 percent of black adults are
high school graduates, but only 53 percent of adult Hispanics and 46
percent of Mexican Americans, according to the U.S. Census Bu-
reau. Blacks also graduate from college at roughly twice the rate of
Mexican Americans. And the gap is widening every year.4
Latinas traditionally graduate from high school and attend college at
even lower rates, reflecting a cultural bias toward making opportuni-
ties available to males, even if the cost is taking those same opportuni-
ties away from females.4" This is exacerbated by the Latino tradition
that women should serve their men and children first, sacrificing their
autonomy in the process.424
Affirmative action is not essential for Latinas or other women of
color to acquire an education, but it makes a significant difference in
accessibility to education for many of them. Furthermore, without af-
firmative action, certain substantive areas will continue to be severely
underrepresented by women of color. For example, in a report dis-
cussing diversity and biomedical and life sciences, the authors noted
that:
[T]raining and support for underrepresented groups is one means,
albeit imperfect, of providing a work force of service providers
likely to be concerned with undeserved [sic] 4" populations. There
is an added purpose, however, in ensuring that research agendas
over time reflect the full range of society's needs: experts state, for
example, that participation of minorities and women in biomedical
research helps ensure not only that key questions are being ad-
dressed, but that the questions are even asked in the first place.
426
Likewise, "in science, higher education and several other fields ad-
dressed by Federal programs, studies project dangerous shortages of
talent if we continue to draw the ranks of those professions so over-
422. Scott Thurm, Losing Ground, San Diego Union-Trib., Feb. 5, 1996, at C-2.
"Hispanics are a little more than two and a half times as likely as non-Hispanics to
live in poverty, and are more likely to attend overcrowded, segregated and poorly
funded schools with few or no Hispanic or bilingual teachers; be enrolled below grade
level; and be placed in non-academic tracks which greatly reduce access to college."
Nat'l Council of La Raza, supra note 222, at 10. This is clear evidence that Latinas do
not arrive equally equipped to take advantage of an "even playing field." Thus, it is
appropriate for these Latinas to have an opportunity to arrive equally well equipped
and if it is too late for that, then it is similarly appropriate to level the playing field at
the time of arrival.
423. Shorris, supra note 191, at 220 ("Women had the added problems associated
with their gender, making it all but impossible until very recently for even the bright-
est Latinas, including those from middle-class families, to get through high school and
go on to college.").
424. Mily Trevino-Sauceda talked about the stories of many of the women
farmworkers with whom she worked. "They all reflected this belief that the job of
women is to obey the men-the men at home, the crew leaders in the field, all the
men are to be obeyed, no matter what." Pamela Warrick, A Life of Their Own, LA.
Times, June 7, 1996, at El (quoting Mily Trevino-Sauceda).
425. Freudian slip?
426. Report to the President, supra note 20, § 10.6.1.
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whelming [sic] from among white males only." '4 2 7 With that said, it
will be easy to demonstrate that there is a dearth of women of color in
biomedical and life sciences. It can also be shown that it is important
to have the input of women of color in these fields for the reasons
elaborated above. Thus, the first part of the test to uphold affirmative
action for women of color under a strict scrutiny standard can be met.
The next step would be to design an affirmative action program
which is narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of increasing the
number of women of color in a particular area where they are under-
represented. There are a number of ways to narrowly tailor a pro-
gram-through realistic goals and timetables, as opposed to quotas,
which goals and timetables are tied to relevant applicant pools; 428
through built-in periodic evaluations and assessments, which would in
turn be used to determine both the success of the program to date and
the projected need for the program into the future; through evidence
of consideration of race-neutral alternatives that would have likely
been ineffective in addressing the identified problems; through consid-
eration of the impact of the program on non-beneficiaries; and
through application of the program in a flexible manner. Because the
task of this article is to position women of color in the affirmative
action dialogue, it is beyond the scope of this article to actually design
a narrowly tailored program of affirmative action for women of color.
Suffice it to say, in formulating a program, governmental actors should
document how they have taken these types of factors into
consideration.
In closing this part, I want to stress that from a legal standpoint,
affirmative action can be upheld for women of color. After all, Justice
O'Connor herself wanted to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 4 29 I am not naive enough to believe
the Court would uphold affirmative action programs particularly ben-
efiting "women of color" as a class in the near future. As one court
stated:
The legislative history ... does not indicate that the goal of the
statute was to create a new classification of 'black woman' who
would have greater standing than, for example, a black male. The
prospect of the creation of new classes of protected minorities, gov-
erned only by the mathematical principles of permutation and com-
427. Id. (emphasis added).
428. Goals are necessary in designing any project or program. "[G]oals, objectives,
and timetables have now become commonplace in relation to a wide range of business
activities. Their purpose is to provide objective criteria by which performance can be
measured and evaluated to promote desired results." The Inclusive University, supra
note 186, at 16-17.
429. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
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bination, clearly raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed
Pandora's box.4 0
Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed throughout this article, I be-
lieve that the intersection of race and gender provides greater support
for affirmative action for women of color than either race or gender
do separately. If the Court recognized that we do not live in a color-
blind society, and that the continued discrimination against certain
identities results in unequal opportunities, then affirmative action for
women of color would be upheld under even more circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION
Part I laid out common myths about affirmative action and at-
tempted to debunk those myths as they apply to women of color. One
purpose of that part was to illustrate that even with affirmative action,
women of color still suffer discrimination, but are better off than they
were without affirmative action. It thus demonstrated the need both
to continue affirmative action and to consider restructuring it so that it
is more effective. It also revealed that white men are not unduly bur-
dened by affirmative action. After all, they have been and continue to
be the primary beneficiaries of preferences. Affirmative action, there-
fore, does not demand too much of those who have not been benefi-
ciaries under benign affirmative action programs. Finally, Part I
argued that if we did not rely so heavily on traditionally defined merit,
the need for affirmative action might decline. But as long as we look
at merit as defined by test scores, which measure has consistently hurt
women of color in the past, then it is crucial to keep affirmative action
in place.431
Part II presented moral bases for upholding affirmative action. It
first gave the readers a glimpse of what life is like for many women of
color-who hold low-paying jobs and are stuck in a cycle of poverty.
For those who have escaped, it has often been because of affirmative
action. To terminate affirmative action now would close off one of the
few paths out of poverty for many women of color. Part II then
looked at distributive justice which is concerned with providing equal
opportunities for all. It showed that equal opportunities are not cur-
rently available for women of color, but that affirmative action pushes
us in that direction. Accordingly, as long as equal opportunities are
not available for women of color, we should seek as many viable ap-
proaches as we can to increase those opportunities, including affirma-
tive action. Part II closed by looking at the symbiotic relationship
430. DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976). The
Supreme Court would probably follow the spirit of the DeGraffenreid court, focusing
on gender and race as separate issues.
431. I still think that the definition of merit needs to be expanded, and I will not
give up that fight.
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between affirmative action and diversity. It argued that diversity is
socially healthy because it supplies role models and promotes a spirit
of inclusiveness, and it is enriching because it provides diverse view-
points. It then concluded that affirmative action is desirable because
it promotes diversity.
Part III discussed the legality of affirmative action generally and
whether affirmative action for women of color can be upheld. In trac-
ing the history of the Supreme Court's treatment of affirmative action,
it acknowledged that it is getting harder to uphold an affirmative ac-
tion program, but nonetheless concluded that programs for women of
color can be crafted which would be upheld. That part also performed
a critical analysis of the Court's method of reviewing affirmative ac-
tion cases, pointing out many shortcomings of that method and sug-
gesting alternate ways of reviewing both discrimination and
affirmative action. Part III closed by determining that courts should
consider both race and gender in looking at discrimination and affirm-
ative action claims, and should broaden their understanding of dis-
crimination to include subtle, unintentional, and unconscious racism
and sexism, in addition to intentional racism and sexism.
I return now to the question of where women of color are posi-
tioned in the affirmative action dialogue. My answer remains that at
best, they are at the margins, and at worst, they are invisible. I pro-
pose that women of color should be at the center of the affirmative
action dialogue because they are impacted by both race- and gender-
based discrimination. They often cannot determine which self is being
discriminated against-is it the female self? The colored self? A
combination? The law should not ask women of color to fragment
themselves in order to stake a claim to an entitlement, to seek re-
course for unlawful behavior perpetrated against them, or to formu-
late adequate remedies. They should be able to avail themselves of
the "both-and" approach discussed by Professor Angela Harris.432 By
incorporating the notion of intersectionality into the affirmative action
conversation, women of color will be able to heal the fragmentation
the law has asked them to bear and avail themselves of affirmative
action remedies.
If the law supports continuing and strengthening affirmative action
for women of color, it can stand behind the admirable goals of lifting
432. Professor Harris argues for a holistic analysis of the minority female self:
Far more for black women than for white women, the experience of self is
precisely that of being unable to disentangle the web of race and gender-of
being enmeshed always in multiple, often contradictory, discourses of sexu-
ality and color. The challenge to black women has been the need to weave
the fragments, our many selves, into an integral, though always changing,
and shifting, whole: a self that is neither "female" nor "black," but both-
and.
Harris, supra note 4, at 604 (footnote omitted). Of course, I would extend the "both-
and" concept to all women of color.
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women of color out of the colored feminization of poverty, enhancing
the breadth and depth of opportunities for women of color, and turn-
ing back the tide of the subordination of women of color.
Notes & Observations
